DÆDALUS

Intellectuals and Tradition

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Michael Confino
S. N. Eisenstadt
Thomas F. O'Dea
Benjamin I. Schwartz
Edward Shils
Frederic Wakeman, Jr.



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DÆDALUS

Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

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

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Preface to the Issue "Intellectuals and Tradition"

WORDS ARE generally highly selective in the associations they tolerate; it is not common, for example, to find the word "intellectuals" linked with "tradition." As S. N. Eisenstadt, in his very original and provocative introductory essay indicates, intellectuals are conventionally taken to be rebels or critics, potential or actual opponents of the established order. To view them as something other than iconoclasts or heretics, to dwell on their importance as "the creators and carriers of tradition," is to present them in an unaccustomed role. Yet, this is precisely the one selected by many who have written for this issue of *Dædalus*.

There is in this volume an implicit and explicit denial of the all-too-facile distinction between intellectuals in a premodern or "traditional" society and those who exist in a so-called "modern" society. It is not an accident that the volume deals so extensively with intellectuals outside the West European and American orbits. Whether the subject be Japan, China, or Russia, the effort is always to link the conditions of intellectual life in an earlier period with those that prevail today.

S. N. Eisenstadt sets the tone for the volume when he argues that every tradition—every interpretation of social reality—posits certain questions and provides certain answers, thereby effectively excluding the possibility of other questions and other answers. Tension is inherent in intellectual life, precisely because every intellectual construction of reality will be challenged. If a construct of "rational society" is developed by one group of intellectuals, this will only provide an incentive for others to view the matter in another way.

Eisenstadt suggests that every tradition has both symbolic and structural-organizational dimensions. Traditions are the creation of intellectuals, but also of men of power (politicians and bureaucrats), and they are often in conflict. The conflict ought not to be seen as simply a struggle between intellectuals who deal mostly with symbols and political men who deal mostly with organization. Eisenstadt shows that each creates both, and that there is, in fact, a "mutual interdependence" between intellectuals and political authorities. It is his view that the political authorities of a society seek to be legitimized by intellectuals, religious or secular; their legitimacy derives largely from recognition by the elites of a society. Intellectuals and intellectual organizations, in turn, generally require the protection of political institutions; this is a condition of their survival. It is Eisenstadt's argument that the intellectual and political authorities seek to maintain the maximum autonomy for themselves, while at the same time achieving the maximum control over the other.

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The tension which derives from this necessity of interdependence and the persistent concern with independence influences substantially the intellectuals' moral dilemmas; it governs their responses to the problems of participation in society. The range of possibilities of participation for the intellectual may be: total withdrawal from society, with a readiness to concentrate on private contemplation, all the way to a willingness to submit to authority totally, even to assume power itself. The ideal that is most commonly sought for is somewhere in the middle—to be both a critic of society and a participant in it.

Eisenstadt insists that it is a mistake to believe that intellectuals oppose tradition as such, or that they seek a society in which traditions will have no major role. Intellectual attitudes toward tradition will differ markedly; some will accept it, others will reject it. It is well to realize, Eisenstadt says, that the majority of intellectuals have been "active or passive cultural and political conformists." The variations between societies in this respect may be large, and it is important that we know more about these differences.

When the intellectual is rebellious, Eisenstadt says, the rebellion may be as much against intellectual authority as against political authority. In modern society, the relationship between various forms of protest and general social and cultural innovation is crucial. Eisenstadt reminds us that the breakthrough to modernity involved strong revolutionary orientations on both the symbolic and the organizational levels.

Edward Shils, in his general consideration of the problem of intellectuals and tradition, distinguishes between three types of intellectuals: those who are productive, those who are reproductive, and those who are essentially consumers. His concern is principally with the first two—with those intellectuals who produce intellectual works and those who engage in the interpretation and transmission of such works. It is impossible to think of intellectuals without considering their works; these need to be placed in a frame which includes previously produced works of the same order which served either as models or points of departure. Shils writes: "An intellectual tradition is a set or pattern of beliefs, conceptions of form, sets of verbal (and other symbolic) usages, rules of procedure, recurrent and unilaterally linked with each other through time." The intellectual needs to conceive of himself as having an obligation to produce works. Unless this obligation is felt, and unless intellectual institutions and communities exist to support the intellectual in his efforts, there can be no intellectual production.

We are reminded that the term "intellectuals" is of recent creation—it is less than a hundred years old—and that before this time men were satisfied to call themselves writers, poets, dramatists, philosophers, and the like. Even now, not all who create intellectual works are prepared to call themselves "intellectuals." Fundamental to all intellectual effort is the belief that the intellectuals' concern is with important, even ultimate things. The confidence in the charismatic quality of intellectual works brings intel-

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lectuals into association with other powerful individuals. Shils maintains that the intellectual comes to see himself as participating in a social category of powerful individuals—economically and politically powerful. The contacts are sometimes positive, often hostile. There is the mutual interdependence that Eisenstadt wrote about. The powerful require the intellectual; the intellectual requires and constantly finds himself beguiled by the powerful.

Shils treats two of the more significant traditions that have developed in modern times—those that make intellectuals support anti-institutionalism and antitraditionalism. As Shils explains, the word "tradition" has itself become polemical, and is no longer properly analyzed. One of the strongest intellectual traditions since the French Revolution, he says, has been "the acceptance of the legitimacy of revolution and of the iniquity of tradition." Not all intellectuals, however, have accepted this view. Many have chosen other ways, and have served the state in important roles. To an extent that was never true before, Shils says, "intellectuals have become an estate of the realm," and this has meant the wide diffusion of their traditions. All these developments require a kind of analysis that has not yet taken place.

The greater number of articles in this issue of *Dædalus* deal with specific intellectual groups in particular societies. Frederic Wakeman's interest is principally with intellectuals in late Imperial China. While the possibilities for an intellectual in China were many—from being a civil statesman and policy-maker on one extreme, to being an anchorite or eremite on the other —there were two familiar intellectual types missing from the Chinese scene. Confucianism militated against the emergence of the technocrat, and there was no room for the prophet as Max Weber had defined him. Again, what is so obvious in the case of Imperial China is the mutual interdependence of state and intellectuals. Wakeman writes: "As authority required Confucian legitimization, so did literati need imperial protection against iconoclastic peasant rebels." This, however, did not make the literati entirely happy with their dependence on the state. They wished to preserve some area of true independence, though they were never capable of developing the principle of group rights for themselves. In Wakeman's view, they lacked corporate identity and had no institutional autonomy, but "sought a measure of social independence as members of the local gentry." Even in this respect they were threatened by the development of the examination system, which made their position as gentry considerably more precarious. The examination system, with vast numbers of candidates eligible for a small number of higher posts, kept most intellectuals from questioning established authority. The obligations were wholly one-sided. As Wakeman points out, "hierarchical subordinates could not expect imperial gratitude in exchange for their loyalty." The power of the emperor grew, and the possibility of resistance to him diminished.

Since there was no likelihood of the individual acting alone, or of being

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very effective if he took such action, the only hope of success lay in some sort of collaborative action. While Confucian tradition accepted the idea of the merit of intellectual association, anything that smacked of "parties" or "factions" was thought dangerous. With the obvious conflict between these two tendencies in traditional Chinese thought, it was usually the opposition to factions that won out. Any combination of intellectuals that could be tarred with the brush of being factious, of belonging to factions (*tang*), became immediately suspect.

Wakeman develops in considerable detail the implications of what he calls "the second major intellectual phenomenon of the sixteenth century: the feeling that orthodox school-work was irrelevant to true learning." The actions of the imperial system determined the possibilities of intellectual life. While it is impossible to convey in brief compass the events of these tempestuous decades, many intellectuals, in Wakeman's words, particularly those "of a more yielding temperament," substituted "quietism for activism." This, however, was not true for all, and Wakeman gives considerable attention to the activism that developed in the Tung-lin Academy, founded in 1604. His concern is to show how a group of activists formed a clique, and how they aspired toward a general policy influence. Inevitably, they depended on a set of Neo-Confucian symbols, like loyalty, for their program, and were, according to Wakeman, undone in the end by their inability to create their own symbolic and concrete forms. As Wakeman explains: "Even in their own institutions they could offer nothing in the way of alternatives to the harmonious familistic images that sustained the state by making dissent a sign of selfish factionalism." The academies never became centers of important intellectual dissent; while many of them still flourished as late as the nineteenth century, the great majority "taught the texts necessary for examination success or subsidized degree candidates."

Only after China's defeat by Japan in 1895 were new kinds of institutions founded. These so-called study societies were sometimes short-lived. They expressed in one way or another the concern with saving China from imminent dissolution at the hands of the imperial powers. This activity was particularly conspicuous during the years 1897-1898 and 1906-1908. The study societies sought to infuse their scholars with a new kind of intellectual resolve. Their interest was no longer in mutual philosophical cultivation; rather, they saw themselves as intellectuals who understood the value of utilitarian skills. Theirs was a new concept of the idea of nation; they saw their own relation to the nation in a new way. For them, man's unique distinction, separating him from all other animals, was his capacity to form social organizations. Implicit in all this was a repudiation of the traditional theory of imperial sovereignty. That men were themselves capable of creating a nation, and that the ruler of such a nation needed to rule in the name of the people were ideas that gained currency. All this, however, had to be expressed within the framework of traditional values. It is not the least of

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Wakeman's achievements to suggest how this was accomplished. As he puts it, "Popular sovereignty undermined the very foundations of the throne, but it was presented as a means of uniting the throne with the people, of creating the kind of ultimate 'we-ness' even Ku Hsien-ch'eng would have appreciated." Wakeman explains that this was "not just masking novel political innovations with a classical cosmetic." Important conceptual changes had taken place; there was a new theory of popular sovereignty and a new concept of royal descent. For a moment the intellectuals seemed to have gained extraordinary influence.

This was not to last. By mid-century the possibility of intellectual dissent was seriously compromised. To attempt to differ from the established political position was to open oneself to the charge of being an elitist, of betraying the democratic dictatorship that embodied the will of the people. As Wakeman puts it, "The ultimate cost of the Chinese quest for intellectual autonomy was political estrangement."

In a second study of intellectuals in China, Benjamin Schwartz explains why the attempt to structure the experience of intellectuals in terms of a conventional triad—"tradition/development/modernity"—as is too often done, is doomed to failure. As Schwartz indicates, the ways in which one traditional culture differs from another may be more significant than anything they share in common. The differences between the caste structure of an Indian village and the structures of Chinese peasant life are absolutely critical. Yet, it is common for such differences to be underestimated. Schwartz is suspicious of those who think that the symbolic world of the great religions of the past touched only a small number of people, and that they have not significantly affected the outlook of intellectuals in developing or modern societies. Schwartz writes: "In fact, quotations from the Confucian classics were probably more immediately available to the discourse of the masses in China than passages from George Lukacs, Lévi-Strauss, or Herbert Marcuse are to our own masses."

It is wrong to see the "great traditions as essentially static, integrated, unproblematic wholes which can be described in a few well-chosen propositions." Confucianism in China, for example, Schwartz says, had a complex history with much contradiction and conflict embedded within it. The idea that there was a single Confucianism, or that one can add Taoism, Buddhism, Legalism to Confucianism and make of these a single traditional intellectual mind-set, is what Schwartz finds untenable. He will not accept the conventional notion of the Chinese literati of the early nineteenth century as the "somnabulant mandarins complacently embedded in the unchanging essence of Chinese tradition." Schwartz refuses to see tradition as a simple integrated system; he is equally suspicious of the efforts to make modernization seem a coherent whole with simple uniformities. The emphasis in his essay is always on the tensions and conflict that existed within traditional society.

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Looking at the Chinese scene, he sees the first decade of the twentieth century as absolutely crucial. The decade saw the end of the imperial examination system and the admission of great numbers of people into Westernized schools. All this, he reminds us, took place in an urban environment that was changing at an unprecedented rate. The young coexisted with another generation trained in a totally different way, who were in fact remarkably open to every variety of modern Western thought. Because the latter were familiar with Chinese traditional thought and with many varieties of modern Western thought, a "complex dialectic of conscious and unconscious relations between the culture of the past and modernity" developed. Schwartz explains that this attitude was confined not only to the pre-1911 generation, but continues also into the present. Some who reached intellectual maturity after the 1911 revolution came to see the traditional culture "as a vast, inert, and uniform incubus strangling the vital spirits of the nation," but this did not mean that those who despised the past had only a high regard for the urban culture of modern Europe. Chinese intellectuals, confronted with resolving the tensions of modernity present in the West, found it relatively easy to resist certain types of political and economic liberalism. Reading the works of Western intellectuals, they had a full armory of arguments from Western books with which to attack Western ideas.

Schwartz deals only briefly with the intellectual influence of Mao Tse-tung. He shows how Mao's hostility toward intellectuals had early roots. Mao saw the intellectuals as urban men, isolated from the realities with which he had dealt from his first days as a revolutionary. He detested the intellectuals' vanity and their efforts "to complicate simple truths and to seek ironies and ambiguities." While despising them for their weakness and their unwillingness to join in the revolutionary battle, it did not occur to Mao before 1949 that the intellectuals might be dispensed with entirely.

It is clearly impossible to guess what the future will bring. While the Maoists have succeeded in silencing the older generation, there is no way of telling what a new generation of Chinese intellectuals will choose to say. Under relaxed conditions, Schwartz writes, one may expect Chinese intellectuals to renew their interest in the West. He reminds us that the West of 1972, however, is not the West of 1919. Schwartz writes: "[The West] is more deeply involved than ever in its own intellectual and moral crises. One would thus expect a new Chinese intellectual generation to be far less passive and far more critical in its relations to various tendencies in the West."

Robert Bellah, writing about intellectuals in Japan, begins by considering the ways in which Chinese culture and social institutions came to be imported into Japan in the seventh and eighth centuries. The Chinese educational and examination system, however, did not long survive in the Japanese environment. Japan's aristocrats simply refused to accept the

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social changes that such a system would have required. The metaphysical and political side of Chinese thought had little interest for the Japanese; insofar as the Japanese were influenced by Chinese thought at all, the interest was largely confined to literature. Until the seventeenth century, the Buddhist monks and Shinto priests were the principal intellectual forces in the country. Two periods of great vitality and originality are conspicuous before the seventeenth century—the earlier one was dominated by poetry and fiction (794-1192); the later one was dominated by religion (1192-1333). As Bellah points out, "no major work of political or social philosophy was produced in the entire period."

This situation changed dramatically after the seventeenth century. While the Europe of Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke was closed to Japan, Confucianism brought a new message to the country. Confucian scholars, acting as teachers, advisers, and administrators, became increasingly important. Because of its explicit endorsement of established authority, there was little likelihood that a group of critical Japanese intellectuals would develop. Japanese society was not much exposed to skeptical criticism. Bellah dwells at length on the one intellectual who did attempt such criticism—Ogyū Sorai—whose work, though superficially conservative, was in fact highly critical. Sorai was to have great influence on Japanese intellectuals in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but it is important not to exaggerate the influence of his ideas. When, for example, with Yamagata Daini, an attempt was made to carry Sorai's principles into practice, the result was abortive and Daini was executed.

Bellah suggests that it is difficult to know how important was the role of the intellectuals in the process leading up to Meiji Restoration. As he says, "Behind the Meiji Restoration stood no Locke or Rousseau, no Marx or Lenin, no Gandhi or Mao Tse-tung, but only a group of open-minded young men, ready to learn, committed to Japan, but with no determinate vision of the future." Bellah sees that those few Japanese who could use a European language in 1868 were enormously advantaged. Many were taken into the government; others established their own schools, teaching English and European studies rather than traditional Confucianism. In the early Meiji period, the intellectuals came mainly from the Samurai class; their background and that of officials in the government were essentially the same.

In more recent times, movement between the intellectual class and the political class has become increasingly difficult. The intellectuals have great influence through the mass media, but are not in a position to share authority with the political elites. The Meiji Restoration created the possibility of traditional institutions being questioned. This, however, has not meant that the intellectuals have come to dominate society. Two models of Japanese society have developed—one which emphasizes hierarchy and is openly elitist; the other which emphasizes *Gemeinschaft* and is obviously com-

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munitarian. While most modern Japanese intellectuals have been critical of the first and very accepting of the second, there have been important variations in their approach to both. There can be no question that the appeal of the idea of *Gemeinschaft* to the Japanese intellectual has had something to do with the enormous popularity of Marxism in intellectual circles. While intellectual protest in modern Japan has been common, the bureaucracy has continued to rule. As Bellah writes, "Postwar democracy was not the popular enactment of the democratic visions of the Japanese intellectuals. It came from the occupation through the hands of the bureaucrats. Though enjoying an unprecedented degree of freedom the Japanese intellectuals have most of the same problems they have always had. They have yet to find the organizational forms through which they can have a decisive impact on their own society."

Michael Confino, writing about intellectuals and intellectual traditions in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russia, challenges most traditional interpretations of that period. While he accepts the idea of an "intelligentsia," and reminds us that the term was invented in the late 1860's and was used to characterize a group of men and women with certain moral and political ideas, he sees the necessity also of speaking of "intellectuals." The intellectuals were the professionals of the society—the bureaucrats and scientists, the professors and teachers—but also the free-lancers and artists. Not all intellectuals were part of the intelligentsia, though there was some overlap on occasion.

Confino suggests that the first major change in intellectual life took place under Peter the Great. These changes were secular and nonreligious, and they received their institutional support from new structures. To be an intellectual in Russia under Peter was to go along with the tsar's reforms. Only those who were prepared to oppose those reforms could be said to be genuine dissenters; very few chose this route. Intellectuals served Peter loyally, favoring his revolutionary changes; after his death, when the tsar stood for conservation and consolidation, they stood behind these policies also. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, with the emergence of a larger group of educated nobles, the development of historical writing, an increase in the number of scientists, and, particularly after the French Revolution, with the exaggerated fear of Western ideas on the part of those in authority, a few, like Radishchev, came forward to criticize existing institutions. This company of "critics" was miniscule. Confino writes: "Well into the 1840's, most Russian intellectuals, following patterns established in the eighteenth century, remained state servants and maintained a basic identification with the autocracy and its attitude on the major problems of social and cultural order. Alternatively, they kept their thoughts to themselves or preserved them for future generations, sometimes in beautifully written personal diaries."

The Decembrist uprising, which was largely a revolt of the military,

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gave the so-called "first generation" of the Russian intelligentsia a legacy they prized. Confino shows how small was this so-called first generation, and how much they represented only themselves. They did not, Confino tells us, "form 'centers' for the implementation of their ideas and did not try to organize and carry out a political action." They did not try to find disciples; their purpose was not to proselytize. A few individuals had made an existential choice. Confino argues that it is a mistake to call this group the first generation of the intelligentsia; this was "a myth" created by intellectuals of a later time.

The so-called second generation of the Russian intelligentsia, sometimes called the "generation of the sons," emerged in the late 1850's. This generation is often defined by its support of nihilism. According to conventional opinion, there was a large social difference between the two generations, the second being substantially less noble, with commoners predominating, who showed themselves considerably more radical in their political opinions. Confino raises questions about the accuracy of this portrayal. He writes: "The nihilists . . . were chiefly young men and women of gentry origin." While the commoners had a role in shaping the intellectual outlook of this generation, Confino insists that theirs was not a leading role. Just as important, perhaps, there were no substantial ideological differences with the men of the first generation. The principal criticism made of the "fathers" was that they had been insufficiently activist. They possessed the knowledge requisite to action, but had chosen not to move.

Nihilism, Confino emphasizes, despite its protestations, was not really a political movement at all; its concern was largely with a moral despotism that the nihilists found objectionable. The nihilists were rebels, not revolutionaries, Confino insists; their importance lay in their creation of a life style and a moral code that emphasized the "here and now," and that represented a sort of counterculture. Nihilism had a short life; it was already waning by the end of the 1860's. It succeeded in creating a counterculture that pretended to be a popular movement—which it was not. Nihilism was the rebellion of sons and daughters of the gentry, in which commoners also took part.

Confino is concerned to say something also about the use of the term "intelligentsia" in more recent times. He reminds us that Lenin used the term disparagingly; for him, it was equated with all that was weak and compromising in intellectual life. Confino questions the conventional opinion that intellectuals played a leading role in the revolutionary parties of the first decades of this century. He suggests that they were always a minority within these parties, and that a new assessment of their role needs to be made. Intellectuals, he explains, were among the victims of the Revolution.

Thomas O'Dea treats the role of the intellectual in the Catholic tradition. His particular concern is to show how the Catholic church, after the Council of Trent, finding itself on the defensive, came to emphasize disci-

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pline, loyalty, and resistance to every novel political or social doctrine. Increasingly, the church saw the bourgeois universe, with its characteristic values and objectives, as essentially hostile to its own. Science was particularly fearsome to the church, and it is against this background of fear that the church's attitude toward Galileo needs to be seen. There was, in O'Dea's words, "an attitude of caution and reserve toward scientific breakthroughs."

In 1789 the church experienced yet another shock: the Revolution in France. This made the church hostile to revolutionary movements, and for the greater part of the nineteenth century there was an open hostility to everything that smacked of modernity. Within the church, there were important attempts to alter this attitude but none of them succeeded. The church, basing itself on two firm positions—that of the Counter Reformation and counterrevolution—became increasingly isolated from some of the most significant modern intellectual movements. O'Dea's purpose is to indicate how that situation was altered in this century, with the convening of the Second Vatican Council.

O'Dea's brief historical summary serves to introduce a larger topic: how the intellectual's role developed within the church. O'Dea contrasts Jewish religious rationality with Christian religious rationality, which adopted the Greek mode of thought. He writes: "Jewish religious rationality was basically ethical and legal, while Christian religious rationality became basically ontological, thus further revealing and intensifying the abiding Socratic tension." Christian education, O'Dea tells us, came to rest on the older classical literature and the new, specifically Christian literature. The church, "the schoolmistress of Europe," formed the Western mind. The church was the central institution in European culture; its role was to recruit an intellectual elite from many strata of society, keeping the elite within the church. There were tensions throughout the late medieval period, but the first open break came only with the Reformation. As O'Dea explains: "That movement represented an attempt to renew religious life by emancipating it from the now rigid and overinstitutionalized ecclesiastical context in which it had become embedded. Yet it was also an attempt to return to the conditions of the earlier now hardly appropriate sacral society."

The Catholic church, in O'Dea's words, was put on the defensive; it was increasingly concerned with matters that did not seem central to the interests of modern man. The Catholic intellectual, O'Dea says, was progressively pushed out of the mainstream of intellectual life. Not only did the church become alienated from science and modern scholarship, but it showed itself hostile to the new political movements that developed.

Only in very recent times has the church made a consistent effort to withdraw from these "counterpositions." The Second Vatican Council, like *Pacem et Terris*, represents efforts by the church to undo much of what it had become since the time of the Reformation. Mr. O'Dea recognizes that

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this effort has produced the greatest crisis in the church since the sixteenth century. As he explains, the position of the intellectual in the church is now entirely altered, but it is impossible to know what the results of the new freedom will be.

This issue of *Dædalus* owes an enormous amount to Professor S. N. Eisenstadt of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and to the Jerusalem Van Leer Foundation. The essays printed here were first presented at a Conference on Intellectuals and Tradition convened in March 1971 in Jerusalem under the auspices of the Jerusalem Van Leer Foundation as part of its program on the Dynamics of Cultures.

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S. N. EISENSTADT

Intellectuals and Tradition

THIS ISSUE brings together two themes in sociological and historical analysis that have often been conceived as being antithetical: "intellectuals" and "tradition." The concern with intellectuals is of long standing in the history of social thought and analysis. Until now its main focus has been on intellectuals as critics of existing regimes, as their potential or actual opponents, as innovators and revolutionaries, as creators of social or cultural orientations and activities opposed to tradition.

This has been true even more in the historical approach to intellectual history, epitomized best in the tradition of the history of ideas which concentrated on the study of the internal dynamics and interrelations of systems of ideas and rarely examined the relations of the social and political context in which these ideas were formulated to the development of the ideas themselves. In these studies, also, the emphasis tended to be on intellectuals as originators of new ideas, as iconoclasts or heretics. Intellectuals were most often conceived as the guardians or would-be guardians of a society's "conscience"—but only when that conscience was thought to be opposed to the established order.[1]

Those who viewed culture from a conservative perspective, such as religious leaders and theologians, leaders of churches or sects—to whom Max Weber, for example, devoted so much attention in his study of the sociology of religion—were rarely seen as intellectuals. If they were viewed as intellectuals, they were often designated as "conservatives," as supporters of the given tradition or status quo, as being part of the establishment. By implication, they had betrayed their special calling as intellectuals. Even the conservative intellectuals studied by Karl Mannheim in his seminal essay on the *Conservative Mode of Thought* were seen as especially interesting because they were opposed to the liberal and "rational" bureaucratic premises of modern society.[2]

In all of this literature there was relatively little concern with the intellectuals as creators and carriers of traditions, as participating in the symbolic and institutional frameworks of such traditions, or as performing their function as the conscience of society within the framework of existing traditions.

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Thus, the body of beliefs and knowledge created by them—their intellectual works, the products of their intellectual activities—were given much less attention, being often treated as epiphenomena rather than as independent factors of social life.

Similarly, while there was a great concern with the degree of the intellectuals' autonomy and independence, their often difficult relations with the holders of power, and their potential revolutionary roles, this concern rarely became—as in the work of Karl Mannheim and later Edward Shils—connected with the analysis of the modes of intellectual attitudes with regard to their own products. As for associating this with the realm of intellectual activity and creativity more generally, or with different intellectual traditions, this was rarely done.[3]

This approach was, of course, very closely related to a certain conception of tradition—a conception with strong roots in the history of modern sociological analysis and in its central concern about the distinctiveness of the modern social order. This conception of tradition was especially prevalent in the work of many of the founding fathers of sociology—deToqueville, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and others.

From the beginning of this century, the concern with the nature of modern society became transformed in sociological thought into a confrontation between modern and nonmodern, or modern and premodern societies. Ultimately the confrontation became one between modern and traditional societies—as more or less completely closed types. These types were described in various ways, among the most famous of which were Ferdinand Tönnies' distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and Robert Redfield's later more anthropologically-oriented distinction between primitive, folk, and urban societies.

Whatever the methodological and substantive criticisms raised against these and similar typologies, they dominated the thinking on the subject for decades and inspired much investigation. From these studies emerged the picture of traditional and modern societies which has prevailed in sociological thought for many years.

In such work, traditional society was generally depicted as a static one with little differentiation of specialization, with a low level of urbanization and of literacy. Modern society was seen as having very high levels of differentiation, or urbanization, with literacy and exposure to the mass media being commonplace. In the political realm, traditional society was represented as being based on a traditional elite ruling by virtue of some Mandate of Heaven, while modern society was seen as being based on wide participation of broader strata of the population who did not accept the traditional legitimation of the rulers and who held those rulers accountable in terms of secular values and efficiency. Above all, traditional society was conceived as society bound by the cultural horizons set by its tradition, while modern society was seen as culturally dynamic, oriented to change and innovation.

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Some time ago dissatisfaction developed with this dichotomy, with this too narrow conception of tradition, which assumed an equivalence between tradition and traditionality. The dissatisfaction stemmed also from the unstated assumption that modern societies, being oriented to change, were antitraditional or nontraditional, while traditional societies, by definition, were necessarily opposed to change.[4] It was not only that the great variety and changeability in traditional societies were rediscovered, but there developed also a growing recognition of the importance of tradition in modern societies—even in its most modern sectors, be it "rational" economic activity, science, or technology. Tradition was seen not simply as an obstacle to change but as an essential framework for creativity.

Hence, the view developed that tradition need not be restrictive. However permanent tradition may be, it is not simply the dead hand of the past, but, as Shils demonstrated many years ago in his article on "Tradition and Liberty,"[5] a framework without which cultural creativity is impossible.

These considerations called for a shift in the sociological and historical analysis of intellectuals. If they were the major creators, the carriers and bearers of the greatest products of tradition—the great religious and intellectual symbols and monuments of their day—it is not easy to reconcile this role with the emphasis on their critical stance, except when, as in modernity, their activities in the opposition served to create some new tradition.

Clearly, the relations between intellectuals and tradition are more complex than has been generally assumed. To study these relations, in a very preliminary way, is one of the principal objectives of this volume.

I

While no single definition of tradition has been agreed upon let alone developed as a result of our study, we have started our discussion with certain tentative approaches to tradition, trying to identify the enduring elements of a tradition behind their continuously changing symbolic forms and structural expressions. We attempt to see tradition as the reservoir of the most central social and cultural experiences prevalent in a society, as the most enduring element in the collective social and cultural construction of reality.

This reservoir, however, is not an undifferentiated one; it has a structure of its own; it focuses mostly around:[6]

(1) the major ways of looking at the basic problems of human existence and of social and cultural order, of posing major questions about them, especially concerning such problems as: the definition of the relative importance of different dimensions of human existence and their bearing on cultural and political identity; the perception of the interrelation and mutual relevance of the cosmic, the cultural, the social, and the political orders; the patterns of participation in the formation of social and cultural orders; the bases of legitimation of such orders;

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(2) the possible answers to these problems that develop within a given society or civilization; and
(3) the organization of various institutional and symbolic structures for the implementation of different types of solutions to these problems.

Such construction of social and cultural reality, of any tradition, is closely related to the charismatic dimension of human endeavor and social activity.[7] It is here that some of the problems of the position of intellectuals, including the tensions between intellectuals and political authorities, become most fully articulated. Charismatic qualities and activities, as displayed by great leaders such as the promoters of great religions or great empires, may be of crucial importance in the construction of tradition and the expansion of the human social and cultural environment that takes place through such constructions.

The charismatic construction of reality—the construction of a meaningful environment—is not limited to what is generally defined as the intellectual dimension, such as the pursuit of learning or rational knowledge. It pertains also to other symbolic elements of human existence—the aesthetic, mythical, ritual elements—as well as to the realm of social solidarity and justice. Each of these dimensions is also susceptible to symbolic rational elaboration and can serve as focuses for the definition of collective and personal identities and bases for participation in a meaningful environment.

Such responses to the quest for some ordering experience, although always containing a strong symbolic element within them, are not created only by intellectual specialists, religious, expressive or aesthetic, and ideological. Indeed, as we have seen, many of the great traditions of mankind have been created by persons who, however adept in using symbols in their activities, played social roles not defined in terms of such specialization but spanning a much wider range of activities.

Institutionalization of the symbolic orientations inherent in the construction of traditions does, however, promote some such specialization among intellectuals and other elites, particularly the political elite. Symbolic and institutional responses to the quest for the charismatic order tend to become, in any society, centered in some specific institutional loci that are important from the point of view of the construction of tradition in general and that of the place of intellectuals in it in particular. Among these loci the most important are the so-called centers of a society. In such centers the major spheres of social and cultural identity are crystallized,[8] and the sources of authority and power are established. The exercise of authority and power is closely related to various organizational needs and must be considered in terms of what has often been called, in sociological literature, its functional prerequisites.

Thus, any tradition, especially those embedded in macrosocial orders, has both symbolic and structural-organizational dimensions. Each of these di-

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mensions develops a dynamic of its own, while, at the same time, both are intimately interdependent through specialization of roles and the interpretation of symbolic and organizational dimensions across such specialization of roles. This fact accounts for a powerful potential for tensions and conflicts within every tradition in general and between political authorities and intellectuals in particular.

It may seem, as has often been assumed in sociological literature, that the roots of such conflict can be explained by the fact that in every society tensions develop between the symbolic and the structural-organizational dimensions of tradition. These tensions express themselves, first, in competition between specialists in each of these dimensions, that is, intellectuals dealing primarily in symbols as opposed to politicians and bureaucrats dealing primarily with organization. But though this is probably true—and though each such activity tends to have its distinct organizational and institutional basis—in fact, such tensions have much deeper roots. They are inherent in the very process of the institutionalization of the charismatic dimensions of tradition and manifest themselves on several different levels, the direct organizational competition between intellectuals and other elites being only one.

Potential for the development of such tensions lies in the fact that any tradition, any construction of cultural reality, implies posing certain types of questions about the basic problems of human existence in the social and cultural context, as well as a range of permissible answers, thus excluding other possible questions and answers.

First, any such social or cultural construction of reality usually emphasizes some dimensions of human existence—be it the aesthetic, the political, or the ritual experience—as setting up the limits of the permissible and meaningful parameters of experience. In the process, it may suppress other dimensions or relegate them to secondary or subterranean levels. Thus in almost any great tradition there tend to develop, at its very core, some accepted ideals which, although antithetic to some of its primary orientations, are derived from its parameters. While these ideals point in different and seemingly opposing directions, they nevertheless tend to reinforce one another. The interrelation between the Brahmanic ideal and that of the renouncer in Indian civilization, between the active engagement of the church in the world and the monastic ideal in Western Christianity, between the Caesaropapism and the monastic withdrawal and submission in Eastern Christianity are illustrations of such antithetic yet mutually reinforcing ideals.

Second, potential for tension is based in the fact that within any tradition or social order the possible relations between different components which coexist there go beyond their actual coalescence in the given institutionalized system. In any given historical situation, there exists a greater variety of possibilities for setting up of the components of those clusters and of their organizational derivatives than that which has become actually institutionalized. Hence, any such component may become a focus for tension and heterodoxy.

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This possibility is inherent in almost all characteristics of tradition, in its symbolic as well as its organizational aspects. Thus, for instance, the very specification of the basic parameters of a cultural tradition in its relation to various collectivities is open to redefinition and recrystallization in terms of any of these parameters or of new orientations developing from them. Similarly, attempts at such redefinition may develop with regard to the degree to which any given collectivity becomes the embodiment of the major orientations, along with the relative evaluation of the different dimensions of human existence.

All these tensions are increased by the close relation of the processes of institutionalization of the various dimensions of tradition with the organizational aspects of the social division of labor in general, and with the distribution of power and control over resources in particular. The holders of power usually tend to support such interpretations of tradition. Therefore, the restrictions and exclusions entailed are necessarily closely associated with, although not necessarily identical to, maintenance of the distribution of power and wealth. Hence each of these aspects of the institutionalization of the social and cultural construction of reality—the symbolic and organizational aspects and especially the combination of the two—tends to limit the scope of participation by various groups in the society in the central symbolic spheres, in the control over resources, and in access to meaningful participation.

These constrictions may also be rooted in the fact that once an innovation is accepted it may become routinized, "deflated," more and more removed from its original impetus. Those who participate in its perpetuation—its originators and their initial close collaborators—tend to become less interested in it. Such constrictions may also stem from the fact that the originators of these cultural innovations—great religions, new political systems, new economic enterprises—may fear the further spread of such a spirit of free creativity. The one-time innovators may attempt to impose limitations on the spread of this spirit and on the attempts of other people or groups to participate in such creativity or to extend its scope. There then develops among such groups hostility and alienation toward the very acts of creativity.

II

Within the symbolic dimension these may find expression in conflicts about changing conceptions of sources or bases of social order—for example, revelation versus reason, the degree of "givenness" of the cultural tradition, the nature of "ultimate" authority which legitimizes and sanctions the social order, or the relative importance of different dimensions of human existence. These tensions in the symbolic realm are closely related to those in organizational spheres—those rooted in competition over power and resources and in structural and organizational pluralisms and manifest in movements of rebellions and sociopolitical protest. The more intellectual expressions of these

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tensions may become strongly interwoven with such movements. Indeed the most often recurring themes of protest in any human society are closely related in the various combinations of structural organizations and symbolic restrictions inherent in the institutionalization of any tradition.

Among these themes is, first, the tension between the complexity and fragmentation of human relations inherent in any institutional division of labor and the possibility of some total, unconditional, unmediated participation in the basic social and cultural order. Parallel to this are the tensions inherent in the temporal dimension of the human and social condition, that is, the tensions between the deferment of gratification in the present as against the possibility of its attainment in the future.

Hence many movements of protest tend to emphasize the suspension or negation of the structural and organizational division of labor and to proclaim the ideal of "communitas," of direct, unmediated participation in the social and cultural orders. They also emphasize, together with such participation, the suspension of the tensions between productivity and distribution and merge these two through a basic commitment to unconditional participation in the community.

Similarly, many such movements place strong emphasis on the suspension of differences between various time dimensions—between past, present, and future—and of the relation between time dimensions and patterns of gratification and allocation of rewards.

The two institutional-symbolic positions around which the ambivalence toward traditions and orders tend to converge are: first, those of authority, especially as vested in the various political and cultural centers; and second, the system of stratification in which the symbolic dimensions of hierarchy are combined with structural aspects of division of labor. Thus symbols of authority and of hierarchy are common causes of ambivalence and demands for change.

Such protest tends to be directed against restrictions on development of all spheres of human endeavor or on participation in all of them. Protesters, therefore, often emphasize orientations contrary to those prevalent in a given tradition. That is, they emphasize aesthetic and otherworldly orientations in rational traditions, or this-worldly orientations in a Confucian tradition. As the themes of protest become related to the problem of participation in the social order and to the distribution of power and control within the social order, as well as to the search for a meaning in terms of the identity of various groups in a society, it focuses on demands for incorporation of new dimensions of human existence into the central parameters of a tradition, for incorporation of broader groups into the more central zones of a society, or for widening the scope of participation by such groups.

Although such themes of protest may be limited to relatively simple populist, antirational, and anti-intellectual movements, tendencies to heterodoxy, antinomy, and rebellion are most clearly articulated by intellectuals. Through

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the activities of intellectuals—especially in the more differentiated societies and more rational traditions—elaborated antinomian sects and ideologies grounded in the negation of the rational premises of their respective traditions may develop.

These antinomian tendencies often are accompanied by support for other dimensions of human existence, such as the mystic or ritual, and, as we have pointed out above, by the more extreme expressions of subjectivism and privatization. They may also emphasize symbols of primordial attachment, though expressed in intellectual terms. But it would be wrong to assume that they are directed against political authority only. They may also be directed against intellectual authority and it is in this tendency that the antinomian orientations of intellectuals become most clearly articulated.

In the intellectuals' articulation of the major themes of protest the antithesis between rational and antirational orientations are most fully worked out. It is indeed the intellectuals who, while often building on broader populist tendencies, tend to articulate most fully, from within the very centers of tradition, from the very depths of their rational elaboration, the most extreme antinomian tendencies. With their emphasis on the negation of rationality, these tendencies and themes become focused on the symbols of some of the other dimensions of human existence and social life, and very heavily stress the various primordial dimensions of human life.

III

The preceding analysis implies that the tension and ambivalence that have characterized the relations between intellectuals and power and authority throughout the history of human society are not merely due to specialization of roles. They stem first of all from the combination of such specialization with common participation in the construction of both the symbolic and the organizational aspects of institutionalization of traditions. Political authorities and intellectuals alike tend to participate in both the organizational and symbolic aspects of formation of tradition in general and of centers in particular. They participate in the institutionalization, in symbolic and organizational terms, of some of the crucial aspects of the quest for the ordering of social and cultural experience. Their participation is especially marked in the crystallization of the common societal and cultural collective identity or identities, based on sharing common attributes or on participation in common symbolic events, and in the articulation of collective goals, that is, of organizational goals conceived as the goals of the polity.

The competition between these two groups is rooted in the very nature of intellectuals and political authority, in their mutual interdependence. Political authorities need the basic legitimation provided by intellectuals, religious or secular, and that provided by elites. Intellectuals and intellectual organizations need the protection and help of political institutions for the establish-

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ment and maintenance of their own positions. Each group attempts to maintain maximum autonomy and maximum control over the other.

Political authorities may quite naturally attempt to control the activities of intellectuals and to claim for themselves the sole right to represent the major religious and cultural symbols of the society. At the same time, they may expect a certain level of involvement in central political activities on the part of the intellectuals. Against this, intellectual elites often attempt to become the major representatives of the pure social and cultural orders, to usurp central political offices, and to remove their organizations from the political control of the rulers.

To attain these broad objectives intellectuals may attempt to gain official recognition and protection from the state—either as the established religion or dogma, if possible, or as a secondary one. They may attempt to maintain their autonomy in the performance of major activities, especially internal government, organization of activities, and recruitment of members; in the propagation of activities and maintenance of institutions; and in the independent determination and transmission of major values and dogmas. They may attempt to preserve and extend the material bases of their institutions and to enhance their general position in the society. Some may obtain positions of political and administrative importance, motivated, aside from personal ambition, by the desire to serve as the rulers' spiritual guides to assure loyalty to their own values and symbols and to increase the political and economic power of their own groups. Ultimately they may overthrow the existing regimes and establish religious or secular theocracies.

Intellectuals, especially the more technical and professional ones, tend to be ambivalent with regard to the more mundane, instrumental entrepreneurs. On the one hand, they may be envious of the entrepreneurs' power or wealth and want to share in it, while on the other hand they may look down on them as being in need of some broader legitimation that the intellectuals can provide. These tendencies may, of course, be resisted by instrumental entrepreneurs, though they may feel that in some situations, especially in situations of change, they are in need of some such legitimation. Thus, the more professionally and organizationally oriented intellectuals may become allied with some of the institutional entrepreneurs—seeing in their activities a chance to extend the scope of their own influence.

The basic poles of interdependence and tension between intellectuals and other authorities and elites in general and political authorities in particular shape the intellectuals' moral dilemmas and their responses to the problems of participation in society. On the structural-organizational level, the most extreme response is withdrawal by the intellectual elite from the existing order, establishing their own segregated, separate units or withdrawing into private activity or contemplation. This may occur with or without the performance of any active roles in the public sector. At the other extreme are two possibilities: total submission to those in power or total usurpation of power.

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Between these extreme organizational responses there may develop many more differentiated types of response. In less extreme cases, intellectuals may attempt to combine, in various ways, their respective cultural activities together with different degrees of criticism, on the one hand, and participation in the formation, maintenance, and change of cultural traditions and political orders, on the other.

These organizational responses may be linked with the intellectual themes of protest analyzed above, as well as with the various traditions of intellectual response to the problem of the basis of intellectual activity and its place in the over-all cultural tradition—the scientistic, romantic, populist, apocalyptic, and anti-intellectual modes designated by Shils.[9] In their pure form, virtually all these traditions can become combined with the more extreme organizational and emotional attitudes of intellectuals. But they also become ingredients of the responses in which different modes of critical and participatory activities and orientations are combined. These various types of response may be combined with different degrees of organizational autonomy in the pursuit of intellectual activities.

IV

This brings us to two major problems in the analysis of the relation between intellectuals and tradition: first, the entire complex of problems related to the critical stance of the intellectual; and second, the problem of the place of the intellectual in the construction of broader social traditions.

The range of problems involved in the critical stance of the intellectual includes the social, cultural, and political conditions affecting their innovative activities in general and their critical ones in particular, and the relationship between their critical stance and social political radicalism.

The second problem—that of the place of the intellectual in the broader process of construction of traditions—is related to the first but not identical with it. It deals with such questions as: What are the mechanisms through which intellectual creations become articulated with the enduring elements in the social construction of reality which guide the orientations of collective and individual action, invest these actions with broader meaning, and mold the commitments of other nonintellectual groups in the society? More specifically, how did the various intellectual products and activities—and the various themes of protest, antinomy, heterodoxy, and dissent, elaborated and conceptualized by intellectuals—become integrated into broader social and cultural traditions?

These two problems tend to converge around the assessment of the role of the intellectual in social, cultural, and political change in general, and in modernization in particular.

The very linking of the problems of the critical attitudes of intellectuals to their place in the construction of tradition indicates that we should be wary

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of the rather common assumption that intellectual attitudes are necessarily opposed to tradition as such, and that intellectuals always perceive their role in terms of creating a society in which traditions do not play an important part. The critical stance is a condition of the mind which may express itself in assent to and acceptance of traditions, ideas, beliefs, and authority as well as in rejection. Moreover, as we have mentioned above, there is no necessary relation between the pursuance of intellectual activities, even in relatively independent and autonomous ways, and the development of different types of broader critical attitudes. The majority of intellectuals productive in intellectual fields in various societies have been in many ways active or passive cultural and political conformists. Needless to say, however, there developed many variations in different societies, variations which have yet to be systematically investigated.

Several variables in social conditions influence the scope and nature of intellectual activity in the construction of traditions, the types of intellectual traditions developed, and the scope and direction of the critical role of the intellectuals. One such variable is the degree of structural and organizational differentiation, especially the degree of development of specialized intellectual roles. A second is the degree of pluralism in the symbolic systems of a society or a tradition: the degree to which there exists in a tradition a conception of the symbolic order of society as a complex of separate and autonomous though interacting domains, as opposed to an undifferentiated, totalistic concept implying either lack of distinction between, or the hegemony of, one symbolic domain (for example, religious, cultural, or political) over all others. A third includes several aspects of the contents of such traditions, as well as the basis of the legitimation of the social and cultural orders. Especially important is the degree to which the possibility of change exists in the tradition as against a conception of the tradition as given and immutable.[10]

Societies do, of course, vary greatly with respect to the degree of social structural differentiation and spheres of cultural activities. Thus, for instance, in many primitive societies these various realms are—symbolically, conceptually, and institutionally—not fully differentiated from one another in terms of the roles that specialize in the creation and transmission of symbols. As is well known, both types of differentiation—symbolic and organizational—tend to increase as we pass from primitive to archaic, historical, and modern societies, although certainly not always in the same degree.

Cutting across degrees of structural differentiation and extent of differentiation of the various symbolic spheres is the degree of flexibility and autonomy of different symbolic orders, the relative predominance of the different spheres within the over-all symbolic structure or cultural tradition, and the degree of openness to the participation of different groups. Here several possible constellations can be distinguished. First there are those cases in which each such different symbolic sphere is seen as autonomous but closely interrelated with the others, in the sense that participation in one enables access to

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another without, however, the first imposing its own criteria on the second. The second possibility is that of relative closeness of each such order and of purely adaptive or power interrelationships among them. Last, and some times connected with the previous possibility, one center or symbolic sphere may predominate over the others in being able both to regulate access to them and to impose its own values and symbols on them. The exact nature or contents of such institutional and symbolic flexibility or rigidity necessarily differs from one society to another.

Thus, in primitive societies such rigidity is manifest in the close interdependence of its various units (clans, kinship group) and in the organizational and symbolic overlapping, or even identity, in the definition of these units. There is little differentiation between the symbols of belonging to one or another institutional sphere (political, economic, or ritual) and between the situations and roles in which they are enacted.

In more complex societies, in which there exists a much higher degree of organizational differentiation of institutional and symbolic spheres, such flexibility or rigidity is especially evident in the institutional autonomy of such spheres (in terms of their specific goals) as against a relatively tight symbolic or institutional control of one central sphere over all the other spheres.

Traditions also vary greatly, regardless of the degree of structural or symbolic pluralism prevalent within them, in the extent to which they are conceived as given and immutable, or alternatively, open to change and modification. They also vary in relative stress on learning, as opposed to inspiration or revelation, as the major source of knowledge and order, as well as in the degree of commitment to the tradition's values and symbols on the part of individuals. Here the major distinction is between a high level of commitment to it, as against a more adaptive "resource" attitude toward it.

V

The various combinations of all these aspects of structural and symbolic differentiation, and of the contents of traditions analyzed above, greatly influence the whole range of intellectual activities—their symbolic and organizational patterns and the different types of critical stances.

Thus, in general, the greater:

(1) the differentiation within the basic units of the society, and especially between the periphery and the structures of the centers and within them;
(2) the internal socioeconomic differentiation within both the centers and the periphery and a concomitant development of some wider strata or classes;
(3) the differentiation in the symbolic definition of relations between prevalent, existing units and the symbolic expression of the various centers;

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(4) the general displacement of symbolic spheres and their anchorage in primordial symbols, development of varied autonomous symbolic systems, and development of varied autonomous symbolic spheres in religion and philosophy;
(5) the differentiation and *specialization* between societies,

the greater also the range of activities and organization in which the intellectuals may engage. Thus, the greater the specialization of their roles and the scope of their creativity, the greater the possibility of the development of relatively autonomous intellectual activities and institutions and of the development of critical stances, especially in relation to political authorities.

The greater the degree of structural economic and technological development of a society, the greater the degree to which the political elites become dependent on the technical resources, knowledge, and skills of various specialist groups. These specialists are, both personally and on the bases of their knowledge, associated in various ways with intellectual groups and institutions. Such conditions also tend to increase the intellectuals' ambivalence toward authority and to increase the possibility of their total submission to authority and renunciation of their own autonomous identity.

Under such conditions, the tension inherent in all societies and traditions —between different types of rationality, between them and other dimensions of human existence, and between these and the possibilities of meaningful participation in social life—become intensified as do the tendencies of heterodoxy. As we have seen, while the tendencies to heterodoxy, antinomy, and rebellion are most clearly articulated by intellectuals, they are not directed solely against political authority. They may also be directed against intellectual authority, and, indeed, in such situations intellectuals tend to articulate the most extreme antinomian tendencies.

In situations of social change leading to growing differentiation, the tendencies to heterodoxy and the attempts to reformulate different parameters and institutional aspects of tradition become fully apparent.[11] In these historical situations there also arises the possibility of extending the scope of critical orientations and substantive rationality on the one hand, and the possibility of the development of restrictive antirational tendencies on the other hand.

These latter tendencies may be due first to the fact that the greater the critical potential in any society, the greater the attempts by the carriers of tradition and the holders of power to limit the range of such criticisms. Second, there may arise among intellectuals or other groups what may be called irrational—magical, demoniac, constrictive, and alienated—answers to such new problems, often in terms of antirational antinomianism.

These general possibilities for the growing scope of intellectuals' activities, as well as for development of the different types of critical attitudes analyzed above, are indeed closely related to the general trends of differentia-

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tion already mentioned. But the specific contents and organization of these activities, and the connection between different types of creative and critical behavior and attitudes, are not influenced by the general trend to differentiation. Rather, they are affected by the constellation of relations between the different aspects of differentiation and by the other aspects of tradition we have discussed.

Here it is very important to stress that the various aspects of social and symbolic pluralism or differentiation and different contents of cultural traditions analyzed above do not necessarily appear in steady association. We may find societies—of which Japan is one of the most important illustrations—in which a high degree of structural differentiation is accompanied by a relatively small degree of differentiation in the symbolic field and with a strong emphasis on the givenness of the social and cultural order. In contrast, in other societies—such as the early Christian and many of the initial Islamic societies—some openness of social traditions and a strong emphasis on learning may be combined with a relatively small degree of structural differentiation.

Moreover, the contents of a cultural tradition—for example, its relative stress on learning as opposed to inspiration or revelation—may vary, independently of the degree of symbolic openness or of emphasis on the givenness of tradition. These contents naturally influence the direction and type of intellectuals' activities, their major form of organization, and—of special importance from the point of view of our discussion—the relations between different types of criticism and between them and other types of intellectual and broader cultural activities.

Of special interest is the distinction between heterodoxy and criticism in the intellectual field and that in the political-social field. Some traditions, for example, the Chinese, may generate far-reaching and sophisticated critical stances in the field of pure intellectual or symbolic criticism, but at the same time allow very limited criticism in the structural-political field. In other traditions, such as in Latin America, radicalism is associated with a level of intellectual criticism that is, relatively, only slightly sophisticated.

Societies may also differ greatly in the degree to which they segregate such intellectual movements from broader political and social ones. Here again China is probably the most important illustration of such segregation, when compared with other societies—Western Christianity probably being the outstanding example—which tend to facilitate close association of intellectuals with social and political movements. Moreover, as we have indicated above, societies may vary greatly in respect to the degree to which they develop within autonomous intellectual activities and organizations—also, in the degree of their combination with various intellectual stances.

All these variations are, in principle, influenced by the different constellations pointed out above. But exactly how the intellectual criticism and critical activity is addressed to the symbolic aspects of traditions related to political

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dissent, social and political nonconformism, and sociopolitical radicalism remains a fascinating question which is in one way or another raised in all the essays presented here. They attest to the importance of these problems and the richness of the materials available for their analysis.

VI

Such a full analysis is still very much before us, but it may be worthwhile to present here the preliminary results of an analysis of relations between intellectuals (in this case mostly religious elites) and political authorities in one type of traditional society—the historical bureaucratic empires. This analysis attempts to show the extent to which religious institutions, organizationally autonomous, participated in the central political struggle. The more closely the religious organizations were identified with state organs and institutions, the more their political participation was confined to the accepted, legitimate level; the less they were identified with political institutions, the more they developed articulated political activities beyond the existing institutional framework.

Similarly, the greater the extent to which a polity or state constituted a basic referrent of religious activity, the greater the extent to which the political activities of religious groups were contained within the framework of existing political institutions and the smaller the possibility of their undermining this framework. On the other hand, the stronger the universal and transcendental elements within these religious groups, the greater the possibility of their developing various kinds of intensive political orientations and activities beyond the existing institutional framework.

Finally, the more that activist orientations within religions were mainly otherworldly, the more passive the attitude toward political activity, deflecting active forces from participation in the central political area, often directing them into segregated religious spheres. The greater the emphasis on involvement in the secular world and the stronger the specific ideological formulations, the greater the active political involvement. The combination of these elements and the vicissitudes of political struggle influenced the exact level of political participation and orientation of these religions in each specific case.

Within the framework of these relations the various modi vivendi between the religious and the political regimes were worked out. Within this basic framework there also developed opportunities for the various religions to undermine rather than support the political systems of the centralized empires, either through open opposition and active promotion of change or through political passivity and the withholding of political support.

This possibility was rooted, first, in the fact of partial differentiation of the political and religious systems. As a result, these two systems were closely interwoven or even identical at the local level, while highly interdependent

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and sensitive to one another in the central political sphere. Potential for undermining the political system was also encouraged by the relative autonomy of the religious sphere, by the fact that the mutual interdependence between these two spheres was to some extent asymmetrical. This asymmetrical relation was a historical fact: most of the religions analyzed had origins independent of their polities; their chances of surviving the regime were therefore quite likely. Many of these religions had flourished under other political systems: Buddhism, Islam, and especially Christianity developed and functioned under various types of relatively undifferentiated or decentralized regimes, whether patrimonial or feudal. Although a centralized empire was not a necessary condition for the existence of these religious organizations and systems, the existence of some combination of wider, relatively flexible, and traditional religious orientations was a basic prerequisite for the institutionalization of the political systems of the empires.

These factors, plus the ultimately religious character of these societies, forced their rulers to depend on religious organizations for the maintenance of their traditional legitimation and for provision of the more flexible resources. True, the rulers could destroy any given religious organization, but the basic autonomy of the religious organizations and their transcendental orientations made them relatively independent of any particular polity. Only when a given polity constituted a central referent of the orientation of a given religion—as in Confucianism and to a smaller extent in the Mazdean Church—was the dependence of the religion on this polity relatively great and its fate closely bound to that of the polity.

VII

The problem of the relationship between various forms of criticism, protest, and general cultural and social innovation on the part of intellectuals seems to be especially salient on the modern scene. Indeed, the kinds of conditions that facilitate the varied and independent activities of intellectuals become much more fully developed—and complicated—in modern societies.

Of special importance from the point of view of differences between the premodern and the modern period seem to be the much higher level of differentiation of intellectual roles; growing secularization; the breakdown of traditional types of legitimation opening the field to intellectual creativity and influence; and the increasing impingement of criticism and protest on the very centers of the society. The growing proportion of specialized intellectuals in the general population and the growing mass of their product no doubt causes increasing impact on the conceptions of social, cultural, and political order, on the symbols of identity, the perception of meaning, and the interpretation of the relation of social arrangements to transcendental contents. Reinforcing these effects is the increasing intellectualization of the trades and professions, that is, the increasing use of abstract and symbolic

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elements in the manipulation of nature, men, and social reality. The mass media not only stimulate the illusion of the growing impact of intellectuals, they also change the balance between them and politicians in influencing beliefs, attitudes, and orientations.

Moreover, the very breakthroughs to modernity contained a strong revolutionary orientation and the constitution of modern politics and cultural traditions is often perceived as being deliberately and consciously created. The many protest movements that ushered in the modern period, unlike those in more traditional societies, were characterized by a continuous combination of protest with institution building and center formation. These combinations were also characteristic of the great modern social movements, in which intellectuals played such important roles.

This tendency was reinforced, as S. M. Lipset has shown, by an apparent paradox that tends to develop in the dynamics of education systems. Modern systems of education, on the one hand, draw men into the orbit of the societal center and generate intensified participatory activity; on the other hand, they engender a tendency to a more fully articulated protest and dissent.

For all these reasons, modernity is often perceived as brought about only or mainly by intellectuals, and the process of modernization is often implicitly identified with their alleged role in destroying old traditions and in forming new ones. This uniqueness of the place of intellectuals in the creation of modern traditions is to some degree an illusion created by the perspective resulting from our own awareness and involvement in intellectual traditions and activities.

In fact, the context of modernization does not necessarily change the nature of the problem of the relation between intellectuals and tradition. True, intellectuals tended to play important roles in most modern reform or revolutionary movements. But they have not necessarily been the only or even the most important leaders of such movements. Nor have they necessarily been the most important generators of change or of successful symbolic institutional innovation. Rather they constitute important reservoirs of catalysts of change. They are important in the articulation of the themes of change and serve as legitimators of change.

Even in some of the more outstanding cases of participation by intellectuals in the creation of modern tradition—notably the cases of Africa, South America, and nineteenth-century Russia—it is quite clear that once intellectuals have contributed to the shaping of new symbols of collective identity, these are taken up by other elites. Intellectuals are then relegated to a more specialized and less central role, culturally and politically. This was true, for example, of the new African and Pan-African federations. These problems are not entirely different from those that existed in constitutions of premodern traditions—whether concerning the origins of the Christian faith and its conceptualization and codification into a system by the early church intellectuals or, in a sense obversely, the attempts to elaborate intellectual

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elements in the Japanese tradition, whose initial crystallization was most clearly not based on intellectual rationalized symbols.

VIII

Here we come to our second problem, that of the place of intellectuals in the construction of tradition. Obviously, by definition, intellectuals, as experts in symbols and their operation, play a vital part in the formulation of the symbolic dimensions of traditions. It is primarily through intellectual works that we see broader traditions, that we attempt to discern or extract them from the fantastically intricate network of sociocultural, political, and economic phenomena. However, societal traditions contain elements that are not specifically intellectual creations. Intellectuals themselves live and work within wider sociocultural traditions, traditions that constitute part of their environmental constraints, that mold their behavior and the forms of their activities. They contribute to these wider traditions, not only through their works, but also unconsciously—through their actions, reactions, and interactions, through their daily behavior.

Thus we return to the question of what the mechanisms are through which intellectual creations become articulated with the more enduring elements in the social construction of traditions. We are as yet far from a full or systematic answer to the question, but some indicators have emerged during the preparation of this volume. Of special importance is the place of so-called "secondary" intellectuals, what have been alternatively designated as "minor" or "spurious" intellectuals. They may be defined either in terms of the quality of their intellectual work—from the vantage point of cultural originality as against cultural borrowing—or in terms of their occupational roles as teachers, government civil servants, or those engaged in mass communications and popular entertainment. While the relative status and mobility patterns of various intellectual genres are clearly subject to cultural variability, it has become more and more apparent that secondary intellectuals may indeed play a central role in the broad process of construction and transmission of tradition. It may well be that it is they, through their activities in teaching, entertainment, and communications, who serve as channels of institutionalization, and even as possible creators of new types of symbols of cultural orientations, of traditions, and of collective and cultural identity.

It is true that with regard to the broader problem of the place of intellectuals, and of different types of secondary intellectuals, in the construction of tradition, we have but few systematic explanations. The problem constitutes one of the major new avenues for research and study, one that may help us to go beyond the double optical illusion: the illusion that, on the one hand, all traditions are created by intellectuals and are most fully manifest in high intellectual works and products; and, on the other hand, that the major creative aspects of intellectual activities are confined either to purely specialized tasks or to purely critical orientations.

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5. Edward Shils, "Tradition and Liberty: Antinomy and Interdependence," *Ethics*, 68 (April 1958), 153-165.

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8. See Eisenstadt, *Charisma and Institution Building;* Shils, "Charisma, Order and Status"; Shils, "Society and Societies."

9. Shils, "The Intellectuals and Powers."

10. These distinctions follow largely the analysis presented in the General Introduction and the various specific introductions to S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *Political Sociology* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

11. These points are more fully elaborated in S. N. Eisenstadt, "Innovations and Tension Between Different Types of Rationality," paper presented to the International Seminar on the Social and Political Implications of Scientific and Technological Innovation in the Field of Information, Olivetti Foundation, September 7-12, 1971, Courmayeur, Italy.

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EDWARD SHILS

Intellectuals, Tradition, and the Traditions of Intellectuals: Some Preliminary Considerations

INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITIES are directed simultaneously toward their objects and toward intellectual works. The objects are as diverse as the universe and all its contents. Ostensibly, intellectual works are about objects; in fact, they are about objects perceived within frames set by works. In their relations to works, intellectual activities may be classified into productive, reproductive, and receptive activities. The normally anticipated outcome of an intellectual's productive activity is the publication of a coherent, conventionally self-contained intellectual work, printed or in manuscript. By self-definition, the process of intellectual production is incomplete without its culmination in an end product which is a work. The work itself becomes a work when it is presented in a conventionally complete form, when it takes a physical form capable of entering into the "possession" of others—that is, capable of being received, assessed, and acknowledged.

A work is an objectively existing pattern of symbols of remote reference which record the "state of mind" of the producer; the "state of mind" might be cognitive, normative, analytical, descriptive, or expressive—formative, auditory, or visual. It is not ordinarily, in itself, a link in a chain of empirical, executive action; in any case, when it is, it is not that feature which constitutes it as an intellectual work. The remoteness of reference of the symbols can be remoteness through actual or implied abstraction, or by distance in time or space. The referents of the symbols may be the physical universe, unseen powers, the earth, its contents and inhabitants, or society and particular men —at any level of abstraction and at any point in time. They might not have an experiential referent. A work which consists of patterns of symbols usually has a physical form or precipitate—manuscript or book or journal article or painting or musical score or sculpture. Certain works require enactment after reaching intellectual and then physical form, for example, musical and dramatic works.[1]

A principle formulated and written down by a legal philosopher might be incorporated into the decision of a judge in a *particular* case; a general proposition regarding a property of a certain class of substance might be

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incorporated into a technological action in the production of a particular piece of machinery. Analytically the principle and the proposition are distinct from the judicial decision and the maker of machinery. The former *are* intellectual works or parts of intellectual works; the latter *use* intellectual works or parts of them in a sequence of actions with practical intentions to maintain or modify. The dividing line between practical actions and intellectual works is fluid. The constitution of the intellectual work is independent of its intention; a work intended to be "used" or "applied" is a work nonetheless; it is not a practical action.

Works fall into a variety of genres: in literature—novels, lyric poems, epic poems, ballads, short stories, essays, and so on; in science—treatises, reports on particular investigations (monographs and papers), reviews of literature, and so on. There are marginal forms of work which do not quite correspond with this definition. For example, oral narratives, "preprints," works circulated in mimeographed form, posthumous works, and suppressed works which do not reach the stage of printed presentation. These are, however, only variants around the norm of work completed and published by the author regardless of whether it is explicitly attached to his name. The various divisions among works are defined very roughly by differences in forms, techniques, and subject matters. Genres are defined by common forms and techniques: fields, disciplines, subfields, and specializations distinguished from each other by their subject matter and procedures. (The divisions of genres and the divisions of fields are not coordinate.) Often, but not always—and increasingly in modern times—the fields and disciplines are associated with corresponding institutional divisions and the specialization of the persons who produce works in particular genres or fields.

I

Those who produce intellectual works are intellectuals. Those who engage in their interpretation and transmission are intellectuals. Those who teach, annotate, or expound the contents of works are intellectuals. Those who only "consume," for example, read intellectual works in large quantities, and who concern themselves receptively with works are also intellectuals. Each of these is a different intellectual activity and they coexist in the same persons in varying combinations. Productive intellectuals are almost invariably receptive and reproductive intellectuals as well. Practically all intellectual works reproduce to some extent other works—this is one of the constitutive elements of any intellectual tradition. Obviously there could not be reproduction without reception. Receptive intellectuals—the audience—usually reproduce the contents of works but they do not produce works; if they did, they could become productive intellectuals. The three intellectual functions correspond roughly to the threefold division of types of intellectuals: productive intellectuals, reproductive intellectuals, and consumer intellectuals,

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all of whom are concerned with intellectual works. For the most part, in our studies of intellectuals, we are concerned with productive and reproductive intellectuals.[2]

II

Any intellectual work is produced in the setting of an intellectual tradition or traditions, for example, a setting of families of previously produced works which serve as models or points of departure. An intellectual tradition is a set or pattern of beliefs, conceptions of form, sets of verbal (and other symbolic) usages, rules of procedure, recurrently and unilaterally linked with each other through time. The linkage is an identity between two or more temporally sequential works. An intellectual tradition exists in a stock of works which those who participate in the tradition "possess," that is, assimilate into their own intellectual culture and to which they also refer. Intellectual traditions are not necessarily continuous in time; there can be periods of recession in which a tradition is dormant or latent. This state of latency—not extinction—is made possible on the existence of differentiated sets of stocks of works which are handed down or made available to the productive, reproductive, and receptive intellectual through teachers, historians, critics, and editors, and through printed books, journals, and manuscripts made available through libraries, bookshops, and other distributive institutions.

Intellectual traditions are differentiated into the traditions of particular genres, fields, and disciplines. Each of these divisions of works has a variety of traditions of its own, containing and referring to its procedures and its subject matters; each has its own monumental works which embody some of the qualities the works and the adherents of the traditions prize most highly; each has its own monumental figures. There are manifold relationships including identities among these traditions. Traditions become differentiated internally and often split up into separate and distinctive traditions; traditions previously separate and distinct sometimes are fused. The traditions which neighbor on each other sometimes fuse with each other, at least the parts which are adjacent do so. Sometimes traditions which are remote in substance and space from each other come together—at least unilaterally. Numerous separate and distinct traditions very often share certain elements with each other. These shared elements may be substantive or procedural elements, or they may be elements of the ethos of intellectual activity in general, or of a major field or section of intellectual activity, or of a body of general culture.

Traditions refer to and are effective through individual works and a vague overtone or disposition which runs through many works and possesses a force of its own.[3] Every tradition is characterized by common patterns to be found in the works which constitute it and represent it to its adherents. The

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patterns of beliefs, forms, usages, and procedures which refer to the substantive objects that are taken into or dealt with in works we will call primary or substantive traditions.

Every work which appears inevitably has its point of departure in an existing tradition. Every productive intellectual produces his work under the influence of beliefs, forms, usages, and the ethos of procedure and production which he has received and which he in part reproduces. These form the primary tradition to which he is attached or by which he is dominated. Wholly reproductive intellectuals and productive intellectuals with feeble imaginative and ratiocinative powers are dominated by their traditions and leave them unaffected. Many poor intellectuals by their feeble use of their traditions and exercising feeble mental powers could, without concert but by the effect of massive numbers, bring about a decay of their traditions. Intellectuals with greater imaginative, ratiocinative, observational, and verbally and visually formative powers—that is, intellectuals with "creative powers" or "genius" or "originality"—create works which extend and change their traditions.

The strength of a tradition—the extent to which its carriers are formed by it and thus give it persistence—is partly a function of the institutional procedures and structures by which it is inculcated and sustained, and partly a function of the pattern of the tradition itself—particularly of the ethos which it contains. It is also partly a function of the tasks accepted by productive intellectuals, itself something which is defined by tradition. The intellectual tasks which intellectuals undertake in the production of a work are often "given" by traditions but not by any means exclusively so.[4]

The attachment of an intellectual to a tradition can be a function of his "training" and participation in an institution which is the custodian of one or a number of primary intellectual traditions and of the activity of the auxiliary intellectual institutional system, which includes publishing, patronage, criticism, distribution, and so forth. Such intellectual institutions operate through training, through the provision of a sustaining environment of other persons who embody and exercise standards of performance, and through the allocation of facilities and rewards for intellectual exertion and accomplishment. Not all intellectuals, however, acquire their acquaintance or maintain the connections with their primary intellectual tradition through institutions to the same extent.

There is, nevertheless, a minimal institutional setting. It might be only an acquaintance with an individual who embodies and exemplifies some elements of an intellectual tradition or recommends particular works, or it might be membership in a family which has mastered a particular intellectual activity and transmits and cultivates skill and forms and arouses motivation in one or more of its offspring for the further performance of such intellectual activity. The relationship of an apprentice to a master is a more organized, even if structurally elementary, institutional form of the transmis-

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sion of tradition. There have been productive intellectuals, particularly in the production of certain genres, such as novels and poems, who have had practically no institutionalized training. Where, as in the case of literary production, there is resistance to institutionalization, we may speak of "uninstitutionalized" intellectuals. But even these uninstitutionalized intellectuals have had a minimal contact with certain elements of the intellectual traditions through some institutions of elementary schooling, that is, by learning how to read and write and having their attention focused on certain major works, for example, certain epic poems, novels, and so on. The formation which the potential intellectual receives in school is not training for the production of works; it is rather some knowledge of a few works and cultivation of some of the sensibilities which enable him to make contact on his own with intellectual traditions, that is, constellations of intellectual works, and which enable his propensities to be aroused. Before this first contact and behind these constellations lies an enchainment of intellectual institutions which have made their coalescence possible. The tradition in question could not have been formed without an institutional structure to form and transmit it. Thus the uninstitutionalized intellectual is the beneficiary of a considerable amount of anterior institutionalization.

Furthermore, the uninstitutionalized intellectuals are, at least in modern times, surrounded by a complex of auxiliary intellectual institutions. They come into contact with them through the distributive institutions and the institutions of assessment. (I refer here to publishing, bookshops, libraries, journals, book reviews, honorific and sponsoring academies, and so forth.) The relatively uninstitutionalized intellectuals sometimes mingle convivially with institutionalized intellectuals, for example, in clubs and salons where literary and scientific intellectuals meet each other; they also encounter the works and ethos of the institutionalized sector of the productive intellectual stratum in a variety of settings. Increasingly they have to cope with the auxiliary or distributive intellectual institutions.

The traditions of these auxiliary or distributive intellectual institutions are sometimes but by no means always identical with major elements of the ethos or substance of the primary intellectual traditions of the productive intellectuals. An editor or director of a publishing house or of a literary review might be very congenial and indeed helpful in guiding young writers in a fruitful direction. In contrast with this, certain editors, critics, and publishers might be antagonistic to a certain trend of literary production. Censorship is the most dramatic instance of the antagonism of an auxiliary institution to an intellectual tradition. All these institutions exercise a "directive" influence of their own through selective policies of financial support, selective acceptance for publication, selective reproduction, and discriminative critical assessment. All of them have selective consequences through facilitation, promotion, obstruction, and suppression and through encouragement and discouragement.[5]

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It is difficult to tell whether these restrictive influences are in the end successful in curbing or diverting the movement of production guided by the primary tradition where there is antagonism between it and the restrictive or repressive auxiliary institutions. Censorship in the eighteenth century was not enduringly effective. The puritanical restrictions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were broken by the middle of the twentieth century. It remains to be seen whether the restrictions in Communist countries will continue in the future with the power which they have had for many years. Whatever the ultimate outcome, it is clear that the antagonistic auxiliary institutions, especially when confronting a primary tradition which has only a rudimentary institutional foundation, as it does in literature and painting, can constrict and inhibit production which is guided by the disapproved primary tradition.

III

Intellectual works are, of course, not produced only under the influence of primary intellectual traditions, the primary intellectual institutions which sustain and nurture them, and the auxiliary institutions which influence the fate of particular completed works and of conceptions of works unborn. They are also products of intellectual propensities, that is, the need to be in contact or communion with an order or pattern of symbols which have an "objective" validity to which the producing intellectual orients himself and which provide standards for his intellectual conduct. This order (or pattern) is either believed by the intellectual to be "given" and his task is therefore its discovery, or it is thought to be susceptible to "creation" by the intellectual's exertion of his powers. The intellectual propensities and powers—very obscure words to use to refer to such crucial phenomena—include such qualities as imagination, observational and ratiocinative capacity, sense for the sounds of words and form of works, and so forth. They also include the intellectual's motivation and capacity for sustained and assiduous application to the tasks which are accepted by him.

Intellectual works are produced in roles which include in their constitution the obligation to produce works. Once a person begins to conceive of himself as a poet or a scientist—a conception formed in part by the activity of producing, or aspiring to produce, a work—he regards it as an imperative flowing from his self-image to exert himself to produce works. The obligations of the role reinforce and give direction to the motivating propensity; they help to shape the powers of production. The roles are often enmeshed in intellectual institutions and communities which sustain and intensify propensities, help to focus them, and embody the particular currents of tradition in demanding forms. The intellectual institutions affect the propensities and powers by the exercise of authority which sanctions and rewards intellectual performances, by the presentation of models of individuals who

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incorporate standards, and by the opportunity for frequent and intimate association with other persons performing the same kind of actions and standards. All these by their presence fortify propensities and can if the standard is high enough impel exertion of the powers. Their absence or feebleness can dull propensities and cause talents to wither. These are the most elementary functions of intellectual institutions; some of these functions can be performed by amorphous communities in which there is no institutionalized authority but in which there is frequent and intimate association with like-minded persons and models incorporated into individuals. (Literary circles, salons, cafés can perform these functions.)

The productive intellectual acts within the framework of intellectual traditions—primary intellectual and secondary or auxiliary intellectual traditions. (The "stronger" his powers, the more likely he is to go beyond them and impose his own beliefs and thereby change what he receives from them.) He also incorporates into his image of the world and responds to his preintellectual and extraintellectual experience in society—in the family, the economy, the state. These preintellectual and extraintellectual experiences provide him with subject matter in some genres; they might also set problems for him to deal with. The extraintellectual experiences also result in attachments and repugnances which influence his relationship (for example, selection and emphasis) to elements of his primary intellectual traditions. It is relevant to mention at this point also the nonintellectual traditions with which he enters into contact through his membership in society and in the particular sector in which he spends his life. The nonintellectual traditions of the larger society—moral, religious, political—may be called the tertiary traditions of the intellectual.

Primary and auxiliary intellectual institutions exist in a setting composed of the institutions of the larger society—for example, ecclesiastical institutions, economic institutions, political parties, the state, and the system of stratification. These all influence the attachments and images of society which are possessed by intellectuals and therewith influence the production of works and the contents and shapes of primary intellectual traditions. These macrosocial institutions influence intellectual institutions through their impact on the flow of financial resources, the provision of careers, the flow of persons into careers, the direct exercise of authority, and the fostering of a matrix of beliefs about what is important in life and society. The authorities of these macrosocial institutions also set and select tasks for intellectual works through their exercise of authority, through their control of occupational opportunities and financial support, and through experience with problems which some intellectuals, by identification and sympathy, regard as their own. These externally set tasks are never viewed by intellectuals independently of the framework of their own primary (and secondary) intellectual traditions. Even when tasks are set or problems are given by an external instance, they are never exclusively externally given; the intellectual's treatment of an

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externally given problem is always constitutively influenced by the procedures, categories, and interpretations which he draws from his own intellectual traditions.

IV

Intellectual traditions are substantively continuous but they do not necessarily develop in temporally continuous or substantively unilinear shape. Innovations are constantly made, although at different rates in the different parts of the same traditions and in different traditions.

The ethos of intellectual production in each primary tradition emphasizes the need to be in possession of the tradition and, in some traditions, such as the tradition of modern science, the simultaneous need to modify it. The traditions undergo revision, sometimes with the deliberate intention of modifying the tradition to cause it to conform more closely with a transcendent standard of truthfulness. Sometimes it is modified because the individual who has absorbed it has the "need," that is, "originality" or "genius" to produce something true to the "facts" as he experienced them or more expressive of his vision or imagination, which then turns out to be different, but not because novelty as such was his aim. There are also innovations motivated primarily by the aim to be "original." Finally there are those who are motivated by the need to "destroy" what has been received. By no means all of the efforts to modify tradition—especially those which seek primarily to be original or to destroy it—turn out to have the desired effect. Often they have no effect at all.

The traditions are presented to their recipients at a moment in time but the traditions themselves have an existence through time. They have a form which moves and grows through time. This process of growth in traditions is a process of modification, element by element. A tradition is such because of the substantive continuity of its development and the relatively greater stability—the relative unchangedness of certain elements. It is in this relative stability that an important element of tradition resides. In the Christian community of believers, for example, belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ and in His redemptive mission have been stable elements handed down from the original Christian belief for nearly two millennia, although many other elements of original Christian beliefs have undergone great changes. Many subsidiary traditions have developed, the carriers and proponents of which have often been extremely antagonistic toward each other, while nonetheless sharing the beliefs in the divinity of Jesus and His redemptive mission. In other traditions there is a gradual replacement or pronounced modification of practically every element of the tradition even including sometimes its ethos. Even the ethos of traditions undergoes elaboration and change of emphasis. Yet these "totally changing" traditions too must be regarded as single traditions if there is continuity in their development. By continuity I

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mean reference to antecedence and factual even if unwitting incorporation of what is presented from the past, immediate or remote, into new worlds.

No tradition begins *ab ovo*. Every tradition grows out of another tradition and that is the way it has been since the beginning of intellectual activity. No intellectual tradition if it survives long enough to preside over the production of significant works ever dies completely. Even where its content is not explicitly referred to and identified as such, it goes on living through incorporation in the life of what comes after it.

V

With the precipitation of intellectual traditions and the production of a considerable stock of intellectual works, intellectual roles were accelerated. These roles were not necessarily identical with professional roles, although the frequent coincidence of intellectual roles and professional roles is of great importance for the development of primary and secondary intellectual traditions. Those who produced intellectual works came to see themselves as incumbents of intellectual roles; they saw the roles defined as those in which intellectual works were produced. They saw such roles as distinctive and different from other roles. The performers of these roles did not call themselves "intellectuals"—the term is less than a hundred years old—they called themselves writers, poets, dramatists, philosophers, theologians, historians, antiquarians, natural philosophers. Even now by no means all who perform intellectual roles call themselves "intellectuals."

The intellectuals' roles and the institutions and communities in which they have been integrated have formed the social matrix for a set of secondary traditions. These secondary traditions have been about all sorts of things and not just about particular objects of the work, the production of which was associated with the roles. Many of these secondary traditions have touched in one way or another on authority—authority in general, transcendent authority, and earthly authority.

One of the elements in primary intellectual traditions—the element of ethos—has defined intellectual activity as being concerned with fundamental—important and ultimate—things. The ethos of intellectual activity has defined the highest performance as being endowed with charismatic properties. The conception of "genius," the notion of "inspiration," both bespeak the charismatic overtones which are oriented to the greatest intellectual accomplishments. Accordingly, intellectual roles of the most creative intellectuals have been defined as correspondingly endowed with charisma; their incumbents have been correspondingly perceived.

Most of the secondary traditions of intellectuals, being concerned with authority, have been concerned with the locus of the charismatic and its institutional manifestations. The greatest secondary intellectual traditions of modern times, for example, populism, nationalism, scientism, equalitarianism, individualism, progressivism, "genuiness," and spontaneity, are traditions

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which assert the locus of the charismatic and its institutional manifestations. They assert that charisma is located in a particular part of society or in a particular kind of activity. Some of the secondary traditions also entail some conception of the significance of intellectual works in society and the rights, obligations, and powers of those who perform the intellectual roles. This belief in the charismatic qualification of intellectual works, of the roles of their producers and the producers themselves, has brought intellectuals into unavoidable contact with earthly authority. It has made for a sense of membership in the same social category as the other claimants of charismatic qualifications, namely the powerful. It brought intellectuals into symbolic contact with the economically powerful—landowners, industrialists, merchants, financers. These contacts have been both affirmative and hostile.

Intellectuals have been drawn and forced into social relationships with the mighty of the earth by a variety of factors. One factor has been their own social origins. When literacy was rare, the literate and the intellectuals who grew from their midst were either offspring of families of some earthly importance or they were taken into their presence so that they grew up in their midst and continued in their maturity to associate with them. Also, regardless of their class origin, intellectuals have been brought into contact with the powerful by the demand of the latter for the services of the literate, as court historians, astrologers, chaplains, civil servants—as legitimators, as conjurors with spirits, and as functionaries. Quite apart from these factors, intellectuals have been brought into contact with the powerful because they needed to be in contact with them to obtain their livelihood as their employees and as their clients and stipendiaries.

But even if these factors had not been operative, intellectuals would have been in contact with the mighty because they have been fascinated by them. Intellectual activities are "serious"; the charismatic is "serious" and intellectuals being concerned with the charismatic have, willy-nilly, been drawn into preoccupation with those in authority because all great, very powerful authority is believed by those who possess and those who contemplate it to have a charismatic element resident in it.

VI

In richer and highly differentiated societies with more numerous intellectuals and more specialized intellectual activities, intellectuals formed institutionalized and informal communities of their own. Thereupon, they tended to associate less with the mighty than they did when the way of life of intellectuals was less differentiated and the numbers of intellectuals smaller. Nonetheless, their preoccupation with the mighty, even where more of them led a life separate from the mighty, remained an ineluctable element because it was established in their secondary traditions and was constantly fed by their own primary propensity to be drawn by charismatic things.

These experiences have affected the contact of intellectuals with their own

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traditions. The rulers have had their own traditions and the institutions and situations of rulers and the otherwise powerful have their own exigencies. Demanding services from intellectuals for the accomplishment of their ends and for their legitimation, the powerful gave tasks to intellectuals which were not always those which were given by the traditions of intellectuals. Thus, a certain conflict arose between the obligations and commitments of intellectuals intrinsic to their primary and secondary traditions and the demands, often accepted by intellectuals, of their nonintellectual associates. This conflict has in turn fed the secondary traditions and it has also influenced in various ways certain contents of the primary traditions in those genres and fields in which intellectual activity has drawn on the intellectual's own experience in society.

VII

From their own experience and from certain secondary traditions, particularly those which developed in modern times (for example, scientism, populism, equalitarianism, progressivism, "genuineness"), intellectuals have developed two particular secondary traditions which are of interest to us here. One of these is the tradition of anti-institutionalism and the other is the tradition of antitraditionalism. The anti-institutional tradition has regarded institutions as restraints on spontaneous expression and as inhibitors of the development of "genuine individuality." Institutions have been regarded by this tradition as the repressive instruments of authority, which are thought to represent the "dead hand of the past." As "progressivism" developed as a secondary tradition, the past was devalued. The present was considered to be the beginning of the future and not so much a moment in the forward extension of the past. Traditions, according to this view, were the means by which institutions imposed the patterns of the past on the present. Tradition was thought to be inadequate to the present and its development into the future. It was thought to legitimate iniquitous institutions—iniquitous in their injustice and repressiveness. Modern intellectuals, particularly those working in certain genres, those whose productive activities had not been highly institutionalized, have been especially prone to the espousal of the anti-institutional and antitraditional secondary intellectual tradition. It has, therefore, been difficult for an understanding and mature appreciation of tradition to be aroused and developed among contemporary intellectuals. "Presentism" and "futurism" together, although in different ways, have caused a certain blindness of the mechanisms of tradition in society and in intellectual production. "Tradition" has become a term of polemic and not an object of analysis.

The anti-institutional and antitraditional attitudes of intellectuals themselves, of course, also belong to traditions. They are paradoxical traditions which have been nurtured in bohemian literary intellectual communities and in the intellectual sectors of revolutionary movements. Since the French Revolution the acceptance of the legitimacy of revolution and of the iniquity

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of tradition has become one of the strongest traditions of intellectuals. This coexistence of the tradition of the antitraditional raises particularly complex problems for analysis.[6]

Nonetheless, intellectuals have by no means unanimously or unambivalently espoused these antitraditional traditions. Many intellectuals have accepted civil traditions and many have espoused and entered into the services of earthly authority. Intellectuals have served authority not only as civil servants. Many have played important political roles, and not always in oppositional or revolutionary parties or movements. Some have become presidents of states, prime ministers, and members of cabinets. There have been many outstanding intellectuals among parliamentarians.

They have for the past quarter century played particularly important roles as economic advisers. As statistics become more and more an instrument of government and administration, eminent statisticians in their capacities or through their pupils have played a vital role in government.

The transformation of technology into a "science-based" activity in numerous fields of industry, agriculture, and communications has changed the standard of life of modern societies, even in underdeveloped countries and some, even much of this, is the result of the application of the work of intellectuals. The development of mass communications industries, themselves partly based on the work of scientists, has required large staffs of literary and journalistic intellectuals, and these in turn have helped to diffuse the idiom and the traditions of those sectors of the intellectual stratum, albeit in a simplified form, into a wider section of the population.

Modern politics have become increasingly "intellectualized," as, on the one side, economic policy and social welfare have become the main issues of civil politics and as, on the other, antitraditionalist traditions have become integral to the armament of ideological politics.

Increasingly since the Second World War, as higher education has become a major criterion in the claim to and allocation of deference, intellectuals have correspondingly come to acquire more and more prominence. The potentialities of scientific research for military technology have also brought about a great prosperity in certain fields of scientific research and a great increase in the number of scientists.

As a result, to a greater extent than ever before, intellectuals have become an estate of the realm. This has, perhaps for the first time in history, brought about a diffusion into the wider population of many of the secondary traditions of intellectuals, as well as some of their primary traditions.

This might have profound consequences for the primary traditions of intellectuals by increasing the quantity of intellectual works, intensifying competition, and possibly bringing certain fields into a condition of exhaustion of their intellectual potential.

The foregoing observations apply primarily to the wealthy large-scale industrial societies of the West. They have an almost equal application to the

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poor countries of Asia and Africa and in a different way in Latin America. The Latin American countries possess, of course, many of the same secondary intellectual traditions as the richer, industrially more advanced countries of Europe and North America. The Asian countries, including the Islamic Middle East, are distinctive in that they have intellectual traditions which are more or less separate and distinct from the modern Western intellectual traditions, both primary and secondary.

Aside from historical continuities such as Greek with Arabic philosophy, they share with the Western countries the possession of an elaborate written culture with great and famous accomplishments. They also share with the earlier history of the Western countries certain identities arising from approximate identities of the roles of intellectuals in a largely illiterate society ruled by bureaucratic oligarchical regimes. The black African societies, insofar as they are not Islamic or Christian, differ from Latin American and Asian countries in their lack of a written indigenous intellectual tradition and in their smallness of scale and poverty, which in the past inhibited the formation of a substantial and differentiated intellectual stratum.

Yet, despite their differences, these three continents now share certain characteristics. They have all become in varying degrees intellectual provinces of the Western intellectual metropolis. They have acquired in varying degrees systems of intellectual traditions derived from contact with or in emulation of the Western intellectual metropolis. In the course of these developments, they have now acquired many of the secondary intellectual traditions of the metropolis. To this they add something which arose out of their common distinctiveness, namely a defensive or protective attitude toward their indigenous culture, resentment against the metropolitan culture, as well as a dissatisfied sense of its superiority. The difficulties are aggravated in those countries which still use the language of the metropolis for their intellectual production and for reproduction at the university level. The burden of intellectual dependence is most painful and distracting there. Those who use their indigenous language, such as Japan and China, still have to live in the presence of intellectual dependence. Having however accepted this superiority, the ruling class and the rulers of their societies have attempted in various ways to implant systems of intellectual institutions. Deferential to the metropolitan model, all of them have in common a faltering achievement of implantation.

All of these changes set new tasks for the analysis of the mechanisms of formation and change of intellectual traditions and the circumstances which affect their operation.

References

1. I leave open, in view of the marginality to the present discussion, whether the dramatic or musical work is constituted by its enactment or the physical precipitate in the form of a book or a musical score.

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2. There are marginal cases of persons who perform intellectual activities which are based minimally on works and who do not produce works. "Primitive man as a philosopher," the wise, reflective, uneducated person are instances of this type but they are of marginal interest to us here.

3. Traditions often become disembodied from constellations or sets of particular works and are referred to in ideal-typical or propositional form. Traditions are sometimes presented normatively so that adherence to them is obligatory. They are sometimes operative through their sheer prominence which gives them a normative intimation.

4. Tasks are at times set from outside the primary intellectual traditions and intellectuals often accept such tasks. There is sometimes a tension in the intellectual community between the disposition to have tasks set by primary intellectual traditions and the disposition to accept tasks set outside the particular intellectual community and its traditions.

5. Auxiliary institutions by their selective functions exert influence on the careers of particular works and therewith on the increment and direction of flow of primary traditions. The mere existence of the stock—the existence of particular works in the stock of works of a field or genre—does not determine the place of the work in the tradition. Its treatment by the auxiliary institutions helps to determine whether a given work sinks to obscurity in the stock or comes forward into effective possession.

6. Of course, the structure of the tradition of science has a similarly paradoxical structure. The interpenetration of the tradition-receiving and the tradition-modifying actions in scientific research is of very great significance.

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FREDERIC WAKEMAN, JR.

The Price of Autonomy: Intellectuals in Ming and Ch'ing Politics

CLASSICAL CHINESE has no word for "intellectual." "Literatus," "scholar," "gentry," yes, but not "intellectual." Yet most of the bureaucratic elite of Ming (1368-1644) and Ch'ing (1644-1911) China did "make a living by plowing with the pen" (*pi-keng hu-k'ou*), and—in the broadest definition intellectuals can give themselves—did have direct access to the legitimizing values of their society. In fact, it is not difficult to draw up a typology of intellectual species in late Imperial China running along a line from public involvement to private *Abstand:* (1) civil statesman and policy-maker, (2) practical reformer and administrator, (3) ethical idealist, (4) aesthete, (5) anchorite or eremite.

The first would be a Confucian civil servant who naturally validated authority by his very participation in government, but who also often viewed himself as a "realistic" reformer forestalling dynastic decline. Since such intellectuals were sometimes forced to ally themselves with eunuchs and corrupt courtiers in order to effect change, their prestige was usually impaired in the eyes of purer, though more ineffectual, outsiders. The second ideal type considered himself a pragmatic reformer of existing government. During this period there even developed a special school of "statecraft" (*ching-shih*) whose practitioners prided themselves upon their intimate knowledge of local government. As conscientious magistrates in office, or students of actual administrative conditions after retirement, they established a tradition of intellectual engagement in governance which would be a powerful source of reform during the late nineteenth century. In partial contrast to that was another sort of literatus whose unbending moral integrity and idealism came the closest to orthodox intellectual dissent. This form of moral opposition to state authority had deep roots in the Confucian canon, but it only became a habitual commitment during the Sung period (960-1279) when scholar-officials increasingly separated moral principles and political practice, preferring resignation to compromise. Finally, even more renunciatory, were the last two ideal manifestations of intellectual behavior: aestheticism and metaphysical quietism.

Ideal types are made to be broken, and in China these paradigms sel-

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dom existed purely. The statecraftsman could verge toward ministerial compromise, as in the case of the seventeenth-century scholar, Ni Yuan-lu. The statesman could lose himself in the metaphysical intricacies of the *Book of Changes*, as in the case of the sixteenth-century grand secretary, Chang Chü-cheng. Even more important to the survival of the traditional order, the range itself between public and private merged in single individuals. Whether expressed by "Confucian in office, Taoist without," or by Joseph R. Levenson's demonstration that an "amateur ideal" characterized both literati-painters and gentlemanly civil servants, this official toleration of private spheres—of the capacity for withdrawal—within public men was even institutionalized in the compulsory three-year mourning period upon the death of a parent. Obviously, therefore, the most expressive form of dissent was embodied in the third intellectual type. For, it was he who restlessly occupied the interface of private and public: not so attracted by quietism as to abnegate political responsibility, and not so involved in office as to forego moral indignation. Accordingly, the ethical idealist retained a visible capacity of choice, which in turn made him the most expressive bestower of legitimacy within that particular political culture.

This was also because two other familiar intellectual types were missing from the scene. One was the technocrat, commanding a body of abstruse or specialized knowledge, whose absence here underscored the Confucian gentleman's belief in moral generalism. The other, more telling, was the Weberian prophet. Not to be confused with the ethical teacher or priest, the prophet is classically defined by his personal access to grace completely outside of sacramental control, and can pose an enormous threat to traditional structures. Such men did seem to exist at times such as the fall of the Han (206 B.C.–A.D. 220) when the Chang family created a Taoist kingdom within the empire, or even during the Ming and Ch'ing when leaders of the White Lotus sect of Maitrayan Buddhism enrolled hundreds of thousands of rebelling peasants. But as the former promised health and survival in exchange for belief, they were more compensatory magicians than true prophets; and as the latter took advantage of harsh times to predict the disintegration of civil life as the Kalpa came to an end, they were merely chiliasts. Once emperors again sat on the throne and famine ceased, such antinomian figures were barely heeded and the normative order was easily restored.

This civil reintegration itself signified the mutual dependence of state and intellectuals. As authority required Confucian legitimization, so did literati need imperial protection against iconoclastic peasant rebels. True, there was a populist strain in Confucianism, but it defined mass revolt as merely an omen of heaven's withdrawal of the mandate from a particular reigning house. And since that higher legitimacy was interpreted by those same intellectuals, it was in their interest to divorce that source from the monarch. However, this strength was also a great weakness. They were

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spared the paramount despotism of the entirely sovereign state, but they were at the same time denied the possibility of detaching sovereignty for themselves alone. They mediated, rather than defined, legitimacy.

Consequently, the relationship between intellectuals and the state was profoundly ambivalent. At once guardian and critic, the literatus did claim a continuous right of independent judgment within a strictly defined perimeter of values shared with authority, but he could not dispense with the traditional state as such. He did not consider himself to have, like our solely modern intellectual, the right to express any idea he wished, and to extrapolate so limited a definition of the genre to Chinese thinkers would be both uncharitable and myopic. What he did have, though, as a single intellectual, was the self-defined right of evaluative dissent. Yet this was only an individual autonomy, purchased often at the cost of mortal sacrifice. The literatus could not, even with *confrères*, conceive of group rights for intellectuals.

Was there then no capacity for transvaluation? There were certain utopian strains within the canon to justify a redefinition of sovereignty and intellectual legitimacy. One was the populism mentioned earlier. Another was the notion of intellectuals banding together to unify the country. These two themes, influenced by foreign theories of the nation-state, ultimately did engender an intellectual revolution to sever the antique link between literatus and throne. Ironically, this break would ultimately disserve the Chinese intellectual, as he surrendered his brokerage in hopes of complete autonomy. I will try to clarify this gamble by contrasting the rhetoric of two famous groups of Chinese intellectuals: the Tung-lin academicians of the seventeenth century and the scholarly reformers of the 1890's.

The Social Basis of Intellectual Endeavor during the Ming

Lacking corporate identity, intellectuals of the Ming tried to strengthen their status identity as gentlemen. Deprived of institutional autonomy, they sought a measure of social independence as members of the local gentry.

The term "gentry" is an omnibus word, meaning both a bureaucratic status group and a *rentier* class. During the Sung this class maintained itself with the income from large estates (*chuang*) farmed by servile labor. By the fifteenth century, however, these great integrated holdings in areas like Chiang-nan (the fertile region south of the Yangtze between modern Shanghai and Nanking) had been parceled into scattered plots tilled by tenants. This tenurial evolution was economically complex and socially gradual, but state policy was one immediate cause for the change. For, after the Ming founder, Chu Yuan-chang (T'ai-tsu, the Hung-wu Emperor, reigned 1368-1398) selected Nanking as his imperial seat, at least 59,000 "wealthy households" of Chiang-nan and Che-chiang were moved to the capital and their lands converted into "official fields" which the government

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rented to tenants. There were three motives behind this decision. One was to punish wealthy gentry for supporting one of his rivals. A second, much more ostensible, was to succor the common peasant. As the "economic treatise" (*shih-huo chih*) of the dynastic history of the Ming explained it:

> Thus, he punished the influential (*hao*) and powerful who at the end of the Yuan had made fools of the poor and the weak. He established laws which [did] much to honor the poor and fetter the wealthy. He formerly ordered the Ministry of Finance to register 14,300-odd households of wealthy people (*fu-min*) [living in the areas administered by] the nine provincial administration offices of Chekiang and the eighteen prefectures and districts of Ying-t'ien (i.e. Nanking), so as to summon them to the court in succession [and have them] move their families to reside in the capital. [These] were called "wealthy households" (*fu-hu*).[1]

Finally, the emperor simply desired to resettle war-ravaged areas and populate his new capital. These immediate motives could temporarily combine but their effect was constant: as the powerful gentry from areas like Chiang-nan were momentarily separated from local bases of prestige and power, their social dependence upon central authority increased. If they were to be an elite, their station would derive from their function as imperial servants and not their independent control of social resources. In fact, this bureaucratic dependence would be even more extreme as the throne regulated the dispensation of prestige by strengthening the civil service examination system, and curbed corporate official interests by abolishing the prime ministership in 1381-1382.

The early Ming saw the examination system replace the National University and the practice of personal "recommendation" (*yin*) of fledgling officials as the dominant channel of bureaucratic recruitment and upward mobility. This made the perpetuation of gentry status both more precarious and more frustrating. As the dynasty refused to set quotas for district candidates but did restrict the number of higher degree holders, the lower ranks became swollen (between 1400 and 1600 the number of *sheng-yuan*—district graduates—rose from 30,000 to 600,000). And even if a student did pass the provincial exams, he had to anticipate years of further study and probable disappointment in the metropolitan tests. The stake of this zero-sum game was so high that the dizzying dream of high office, almost like a national lottery, kept all of those lower degree holders from fundamental alienation. Besides, they did share gentry status, though its growing ubiquitousness led higher-ranking members to cultivate an aristocratic refinement, based upon connoisseurship, which was supposed to characterize fellow *chün-tzu* (the "superior man" or "gentleman").

The examination system also reinforced orthodox Sung Neo-Confucianism. Given the primacy of deferential values like *chung* (loyalty to one's superior) in the Sung texts he favored, the first Ming emperor

> drove the foundations of his autocracy deep into the very matter which gave the gentry its basic identity and its social position—ideology. He thus presented to

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the scholars individually and collectively a conundrum which endured as long as the dynasty: that being orthodox and loyal entailed the loss of all their political effectiveness and of any ability to function as a class either positively in making administrative policy or negatively in resisting the growth of that centralism which was their undoing.[2]

Obligation to these values was remarkably one-way: hierarchical subordinates could not expect imperial gratitude in exchange for their loyalty. Rather, their social insecurity was matched by personal political instability as they lost institutional counterweights to the emperor's increasing personal power.

Despotism and Its Servants

The tendency toward a more centralized despotism did not characterize the Ming period alone. The Sung had already abolished the office of the prime minister or chief chancellor (*tsai-hsiang*), who, as he reviewed imperial edicts, represented the power of the bureaucracy to check monarchic authority. Of course, ensuing imperial councillors did periodically recover a decisive ministerial role, but the throne continued to fight against the formal expression of bureaucratic interests by symbolically treating its highest officials as though they were personal assistants. Within that same ideological nexus, subordinates retained their self-respect by hearkening back to Confucius' paradigmatic *chün-tzu:* the superior man whose ultimate value to a ruler was his moral independence and critical courage. But beyond this symbolic interplay an organizational evolution during the Ming tilted the balance in favor of the despot. At the provincial level single governors were replaced in 1376 by regional commissions which reported directly to the emperor. The center's bureaucratic independence was similarly weakened four years later, when one of Chu Yuan-chang's ministers plotted to usurp the throne. After he was discovered and executed, the emperor first reduced the classic ruler-minister relationship from one of relative moral equality into one of servility and degradation by reviving the Yuan (1280-1367) practice of flogging ministers in court (*t'ing-chang*). Then he altered the central administrative structure by stripping generals of permanent commands, and by dividing the chancellory's function among each of the six ministries. Any who wished in the future to restore the chancellory would—he announced—be killed by slicing.

To handle the routine daily flow of memorials the emperor thereafter employed a personal staff of "grand secretaries" housed in the *nei-ko* ("inner pavilion") of the Forbidden City. However, these men soon acquired an active policy-making function. After the Yung-lo emperor (reigned 1402-1425) fell into the habit of consulting them on extraordinary matters, they customarily received memorials directly. Gradually, one of the grand secretaries assumed responsibility for drafting imperial decrees.

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But although this *shou-fu* (chief grand secretary) thereby resembled a chancellor, his actual rank as secretary was quite low. Despite his functional prominence, therefore, he could not represent the interests of the outer bureaucracy because he remained an employee of the inner court. Nor could the grand secretary even monopolize proximity to the emperor. Still more "inner" than he could be were the eunuchs.

The Ming founder had decreed that there be no more than one hundred eunuchs in the palace. By 1600 there were more than 70,000 of them in the Forbidden City. Ostensibly severed from the sorts of external social alliances which the regular civil service cultivated, they seemed a perfect instrument of despotic rule, so that their numbers and influence grew thanks to the duties they performed as spies, as purveyors, and as secretaries for the person of the emperor.

Their police function was aggrandized after 1420 when they were ordered to establish an Eastern Depot (*tung-ch'ang*) to survey the regular secret police (the Embroidered Uniform Guard). In addition, eunuchs were increasingly detached to the regular military establishment, actually commanding strategic garrisons. At the same time, by managing the emperor's privy purse, they acquired an important fiscal function, which permitted them to commandeer the great naval voyages of the early fifteenth century, the mining of precious metals, and the collection of commercial taxes in the empire's urban centers. But the eunuchs were merely palace servants—dangerous but tolerable—as long as they were forbidden the one skill necessary to classical bureaucracy: documentary literacy. By 1432, however, they had established their own clerical school within the palace, and had interposed a eunuch directorate of ceremonials (*ssu-li-chien*) between the emperor and the *nei-ko*. As its officers shielded the monarch from external contact (between 1471 and 1497 there was not a single ministerial audience with the throne), eunuchs naturally came to control the selection of personnel for the *nei-ko*, which of course made it necessary for grand secretaries to ally with them. Even so powerful a bureaucrat as Chang Chü-cheng, who dominated the *nei-ko* and the ministries from 1572 to 1582, could not hold his position without the help of the powerful eunuch Feng Pao.

Chang Chü-cheng and the Consequences of Centralization

From 1572 to 1582 the central government was dominated by the grand secretary Chang Chü-cheng. As policy-making settled on this single and quite able figure, the empire recovered a stability that it had not known for 150 years. Rising government costs and a declining rural tax base were met with new cadastral surveys and the famous Single-whip Tax Reform. The Mongols were held in military check by encouraging Chinese commanders to train their own personal armies. Funds were even found to repair the

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Huai and Yellow rivers' waterworks after severe floods in 1575. Behind all of these decisions was Chang Chü-cheng's conviction that only a strong and independent *nei-ko* could force a top-heavy bureaucracy to reform existing institutions. Never before or since had the secretariat been so powerful, but Chang had so imperiously wielded his authority that after his death the entire civil service expressed a strong animus against an active executive.

This reaction to central authority was most frequently expressed by the demand that censorial criticism be boldly revived. Ku Hsien-ch'eng, one of the founders of the Tung-lin Academy, even argued that since the censors themselves were no more than "obeisant, sycophantish, cautious, and placatory" functionaries, *any* scholar-official should have the opportunity to present his political views to the emperor.[3] If the dynasty widened the "pathway of words" to include all the empire's *ling-shih* (leading scholars), then the gap between inner and outer courts, between the ruler and his intellectuals, would be bridged by the larger "we" of ideal political unity.[4] While Ku could understand the practical benefits of concentrating (*chü*) power in the hands of chief ministers, and the danger of making administration ineffectual by scattering (*san*) it, he argued for a careful balance in which the greater power (*wei ch'üan*) resided in the outer court. A way of maintaining this proper balance was to recognize the right of outsiders—those "leading scholars"—to criticize institutions like the *nei-ko*. But this solution in turn raised for Ku and others the key dilemma of intellectual politics during the Ming. Scholars alone, acting as individuals, were respectably impotent. Scholars together, constituting a faction, were dubiously partisan.

Public Duty and Private Factions

Well before this time two contradictory concepts of intellectual association had been carefully derived from the classical tradition. One deprecated "parties" or "factions" (*tang*), equating them with selfish partiality. This judgment was corroborated by the canonical "Great Announcement" (*Hung fan*) of the antique *Book of Documents*.

> Without deflection, without partiality (*wu tang*),
> Broad and long is the Royal path.
> Without partiality (*wu tang*), without deflection,
> The Royal path is level and easy.[5]

The second tradition sanctioned comradely groups by quoting Confucius' disciple, Tseng-tzu: "The superior man on grounds of culture meets with his friends, and by their friendship helps his virtue" (*chün-tzu yi wen hui yu, yi yu fu jen*).[6] To "delight in the company of one's friends" (*le ch'ün*) thus implied mutual effort toward apolitical self-cultivation and communal joy in the higher cultural life.

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As the two values conflicted, the latter usually yielded to the former, hobbling most combinations of intellectuals with the factional epithet of *tang*. However, during the great reform struggles of the eleventh century, some respected scholar-officials like Ou-yang Hsiu did try to defend *tang*. His famous memorial "On Factions" argued that only "superior men" (*chün-tzu*) organized true parties. Mean men (*hsiao-jen*) might well form cliques, but these were based on utility instead of friendship and therefore had to be transitory. If the sovereign learned to distinguish between true and false factions, then he could use the genuine parties of *chün-tzu* to draw together men's resolve for the common good of the realm.

By using Confucius' own classification of men into superior and mean, Ou-yang Hsiu's essay disposed later politically involved intellectuals to rigidly judge a group entirely one or the other. This instantly tainted an entire faction with the misdeeds of any of its leading members. Furthermore, cliques had to be leader- rather than program-oriented since even amicable policy debates were avoided within any group of self-styled *chün-tzu* lest they appear to clash like Ou-yang's "mean men." Since the groups were not coalitions formed around complex but common political programs, they defined themselves mainly in terms of their opponents. As that meant a constant defense of their own group, even the best-meaning soon descended to the same level of strident and vitriolic debate as their opponents—a rhetoric which both used and further blackened the term *tang*. Consequently, those who lived through the turbulent factionalism of the late Ming were already somewhat jaded about the potential for amicably disputative party debates. One seventeenth-century writer, Hsia Yün-i, would write:

> Since the period of the three dynasties each dynasty has had its cliques (*p'eng-tang*). The party men of the Han dynasty were all superior men. The party men of the T'ang were largely small men, but were still quite capable. The party men of the Sung were by majority superior men. And so, ever since the theory of parties and cliques arose, it was necessarily involved with the progression of the dynastic cycle. For, when we come to the decline and fall [of dynasties], if there are to be eminent and intelligent scholars who can be pushed to the fore by [the urgency] of their times, then there must be cliques to look over them. In this way spirit and wisdom can both be used for mutual reflection and defense, and [men] will not idly stand by and watch the affairs of state sink into error. However, when we point to men as members of cliques then we also have the following: this clique declines and that clique arises—and the ones that come later are not as good as the ones that come earlier, so that disaster overtakes the imperial ancestors decidedly because of this.[7]

For Hsia, then, cliques had no other function than mechanically to bring good or bad men to power. Morality still counted the most; and cliques, institutionally endemic, were not alone capable of ensuring that. In fact, their ultimate effect was detrimental. As they evolved along with the historical necessity of the dynastic cycle, struggles worsened; and cliques ended

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by bringing out the worst in men so that they became in turn a cause of the decline which those original cliques of superior men had been so intent upon forestalling. In Hsia Yün-i's mind this was the lesson taught by the history of the Tung-lin academy and party.

Academies

Academies (*shu-yuan*) filled the vacuum left by both defunct government schools and declining Buddhist monasteries during the disorder of the tenth century. As they developed during the Sung, these private intellectual centers represented an alternative to the National University's curriculum of officially sanctioned commentaries on the classics. Their rural locations, their monastic aura of contemplation, symbolized a withdrawal from official life and examination preparation. This privatism condemned academies in the eyes of many regular officials, and especially after 1030 many were replaced by the government schools or staffed by the regular educational bureaucracy. Still, they were a sign of intellectual florescence, so that the Ming founder actually encouraged them when he established his dynasty in order to evoke a cultural restoration in the wake of civil war. After 1375, however, the spread of regular local schools (*she-hsueh*) and the emphasis on civil service examinations led to a temporary neglect of academies. Not until the mid-sixteenth century was there an abrupt change, when—during the Chia-ching reign (1522-1566)—were founded one-third of all academies recorded for the entire dynasty.

This sudden rise was caused by two major phenomena. First, there was a marked heightening of both level and expectations of literacy. As copper plate printing made books accessible to most, there appeared—above all in urban areas—a *couche* of students whose numbers far exceeded the current amount of official school-room desks. Private schools appeared to meet this need.

> Today everywhere throughout the country, schools have been established; and education is enlightened. Academies are like the family, village, and district schools. All are for the purpose of cultivating virtue and achieving talent. If the matter rests in the hands of officials then it is difficult for people to approach [the schools]. If teaching can reach the people, then it is easy for them to achieve [talent]. How can one do without these schools?[8]

Although these new academies were expected to retain the rural ambiance—rambling gardens, rustic studios—of their Sung paragon, many of the best known and most prestigious were actually located in those cities where mercantile endowments could be solicited for building and scholarship funds. Such an urban setting further linked them with that new *couche* of students who flocked to the cities in such great numbers—numbers which could be misused by popular lecturers or educational officials to swell their clienteles. The authorities huffily reported that:

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Recently *mores* have become quarrelsome and superficial drivel. People are much more contemptuous. They use young students to assault and berate prefects. They use licentiates to attack and accuse civil officials. They revile their [educational] superintendents by displaying couplets on every street corner. Their popular ballads, full of vengeance, hatred and envy, are engraved on printing blocks.[9]

Their envy was of course fed by frustration—frustration at the incredible competition for a limited number of official posts, frustration at the rote learning required for the examination system, frustration at the discrepancy between the promise of personal enlightenment and the actual grind of philosophic study. These attitudes all formed part of the second major intellectual phenomenon of the sixteenth century: the feeling that orthodox school-work was irrelevant to true learning. As vehicles for the intuitionist philosophies of idealists like Ch'an Jo-shui, Ch'en Hsien-chang, and above all the great fifteenth-century master, Wang Yang-ming, academies seemed to promise an institutionalized opportunity for genuine self-enlightenment, rather than merely being a form of bureaucratic advancement.

The Ming authorities naturally tried to control this great surge in education. One form of supervision was conceived in the person of educational intendants; but because they were themselves literati, their reliability was questionable. Meant to be overseers, they were often prone to attract disciples among their charges. There was even a distinction then between crowd-pleasing and familiar lecturers and ethically sterner, more "conservative" scholars who maintained their hierarchic distance. The former type usually prevailed, if only because he stood to profit so much from a following—a potential clientele—among fledgling bureaucrats. That is, education and bureaucracy mutually invited the formation of vertical factions, and the intendant was correspondingly sensitive in either role (patron to client, master to disciple) to intellectual associations. It is not surprising, then, that Chang Chü-cheng had forbidden intimate relationships between educational intendants and local academies.

If intendants could not be trusted absolutely, then perhaps the simplest course was to prohibit academies altogether. The most famous case of this occurred in 1575 at the behest of Chang Chü-cheng who had so often deplored the "boastfulness" of "private" scholars. The imperial edict which he inspired declared that:

The sages condescended to educate the nation through the classics and thus transform mankind. If one were able to acknowledge the classics in his own person, then why would he need to establish other affiliations by assembling colleagues for empty chat? Henceforth each education intendant shall so supervise instructors and students that they sincerely seek after and personally exemplify the long-taught classical principles, terminating their past practices. They must not be permitted to form separate academies in which to assemble hosts of colleagues, then summon local ne'er-do-wells to chat emptily and neglect their occupations, thereby forming cliques of place seekers and establishing a pattern of patronage.[10]

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By 1579 his campaign terminated with the imperial confiscation of all private academies. After Chang's death in 1582 the prohibition was partially lifted. But the restored or newly founded academies of the next three decades were already too closely linked with bureaucratic politics to avoid involvement in the great factional disputes of the time.

Activism and Quietism in the Tung-lin Academy

The Tung-lin Academy (founded in 1604) and the political movement that bore its name were profoundly influenced by the philosophical dispositions of two types of intellectuals. The first—perhaps best symbolized by the academy's prime founder, Ku Hsien-ch'eng—reacted to the moral ambiguities of late Ming idealism by propounding a philosophy of heroic action. The second—represented by Ku's student, Kao P'an-lung—accepted the ambiguity of most human acts but urged that the good could ultimately be found through meditation before action. Despite the dichotomy of activism/quietism, both wings agreed upon the necessity of social involvement and opposed escapist mediation.

Ku Hsien-ch'eng, born to a merchant family in Chiang-nan, began his classical studies under a tutor strongly opposed to the "neither good nor evil" doctrine of the innate mind which was believed by the followers of Wang Yang-ming. He soon pleased his teacher by rejecting the personally more relaxed emotionalism of the intuitionists in favor of the harsher rationalism (mind as master of the senses, holding the passions in check) of Sung Neo-Confucianists. He was thus encouraged to believe that constant effort was required to keep the mind "straight" by adhering to the path of righteousness. In his philosophy, as in his later bureaucratic involvement, this exertion was to be unhesitatingly partisan: one chose what was right and held to it unwaveringly. Consequently, an act of will would dissolve those long-winded arguments of metaphysicians who declared man to be immersed in a totality of being that was beyond good or evil; and genuine self-cultivation required an outward projection to set the world aright.

> From ancient times the sages and worthies have taught men, saying that they must do good and do away with evil. By doing good, one consolidates that which we certainly have. By doing away with evil, one does away with what is not originally in us. Both our original substance and our [active] cultivation are good. They do not diverge at all. Therefore, how can [Wang] Yang-ming not teach men to do good and do away with evil? Thus, those who say there is neither good nor evil, yet also say that one must do good and do away with evil [are inconsistent]: if they hold to the former idea they must of necessity deny the latter one. How can this be? If the essence of the mind is to possess neither good nor evil, then all that which is called good and evil is not something which we ourselves certainly possess. If it is not something which we ourselves certainly possess, then both [good and evil] are ordained by emotions and knowledge, and both cannot be kept from blocking off our original essence. But how are we going to decide how to act [at all]? . . . The mind's substance is without good and evil, and we

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therefore possess neither good nor evil at all. Yet if we choose to do [good], then it is even more impossible to avoid *being* good. If we choose to do [evil], then it is even more impossible to avoid *being* evil. If there is both good and evil, then it is impossible to say that [our original substance] is neither good nor evil.[11]

Despite his bent toward the Sung School of Reason, Ku Hsien-ch'eng did concede that Wang Yang-ming had stimulated the pursuit of sagehood by shedding light on the problem of intuition. In fact, he admired Wang's bold conviction that each individual's mind was a self-sufficient norm of action, that all cosmic principles were present in the human essence. But Ku refused to accept such consequences of this individualism as Wang's famous declaration that Confucius' authority was unnecessary to prove something right if it was approved by one's own conscience. If one rejected the authority of Confucius would not Buddhist heresy or eccentric self-indulgence ensue? What Wang Yang-ming had said might apply to true sages, but what of ordinary men who could not depend upon their intuitive sense of right and wrong? Would they not have to continue to rely upon "the instructions of antiquity"? Forced to choose between the "inhibition" of the Sung rationalist, Chu Hsi, and the "dissolution" of Wang Yang-ming, he would choose the first as the safer of the two extremes. But this was not a comfortable choice. That is why Ku Hsien-ch'eng—lacking a transcendental certainty, a conviction of the necessity of specific imperatives—resolved his ethical doubts by seeking to confront "critical situations" (*kuan-t'ou*).[12]

The doctrine of "critical situations" was conceived by another Tung-lin philosopher named Shih Meng-lin. Like Ku Hsien-ch'eng, Shih was reacting against late sixteenth-century Wang Yang-ming Confucianists. The most notorious of these, Li Chih, had promised that anyone could become a sage by acting spontaneously. These injunctions to "live in the present" (*tang-hsia*)—said Shih—perniciously encouraged a laxness of behavior in men who did not really possess the discipline and inner strength to attain sagehood. Indeed, he argued, such "contemporary doctrinaires" were so obsessed with being entirely "natural and spontaneous" that they "expended no effort at all."

> This [kind of] "living in the present" is on the contrary a pit to ensnare. [They] do not realize that original essence (*pen-t'i*) and effort cannot be separated. If there exists an original essence then naturally there exists effort. Without effort there is no original essence.[13]

Virtue did not exist apart from activity, by which Shih really meant conduct. The *Analects* had said that men must habituate good behavior by constant "study" and "practice" (*hsi*). This willed self-refinement—not self-expression—was for Shih Meng-lin the essence of true spontaneity (*tzu-jan*):

> This effort is precisely [our] original essence. Such [a virtue] as humaneness was originally of a single essence with respect, reverence and loyalty. How could they be separated? This, then, is the genuine "living in the present"; it is then the genuine "spontaneity."[14]

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Virtue was defined as the norm of behavior. Filial piety was to be filial; and, true to the grammar of classical Chinese, the noun was identical with the verb. But how could one confirm that any particular conduct was virtuous? Presumably, sagehood brought its own sense of certainty. Yet, perhaps excepting those rare moments of enlightenment when principles were internalized, there was no illuminating substantiation of reward—what we might call a sense of grace. And so for thinkers like Shih Meng-lin conviction was sought by testing the integrity of one's commitment in extreme circumstances: *kuan-t'ou*. There was inspiration for this to be found in the canon: Confucius insisting that one must cleave to virtue even in moments of danger, and to sacrifice one's life in order to preserve one's virtue intact (*Analects*, 4.53, 15.8); and Mencius arguing that one must not be bent by force and that one must be prepared to give up one's life for the sake of righteousness (Mencius, 3.2:2, 6.10:1). As Shih interpreted these famous passages:

> Furthermore, "living in the present" must entirely be in critical situations, requiring the highest strength. People today who live in ordinary conditions and conciliable times are capable of treating themselves with respect and reverence, and are also capable in dealing with others of extending their sincerity. [But] when there arrive critical situations of profit or harm, critical situations of honor or disgrace, critical situations of praise or slander, critical situations of life or death, then all fall short. Thus, ordinary respect, reverence and loyalty are none of them true effort (*kung-fu*); and if one does not employ true effort then there is no true original essence.[15]

Shih's theory of "critical situations" appealed to those, like Ku Hsien-ch'eng, for whom "integrity" (*ch'eng*) was ultimately in doubt. We might go so far as to explain the suicidal heroism of the Tung-lin scholars by arguing that late Ming intellectuals *needed* to fail politically, because only then would they finally encounter the *kuan-t'ou*, the "critical situations," certain to convince them that they had been true to themselves. Furthermore, their concern with emotional self-control—quiescence—in these "critical situations" likened them to fellow literati grouped under that other ideal type of Tung-lin scholar: the quietist, Kao P'an-lung.

Kao faced the contradiction between "inhibition" and "dissolution" by trying to minimize the distance separating Chu Hsi (Reason) and Wang Yang-ming (Mind or Intuition). Wishing for doctrinal unity instead of dialectical debate, he grieved that:

> At present everyone has his own [version of the] *Great Learning*. Consequently it is [like] a prefectural court where we have gathered to litigate. How can there be so many [different] causes under heaven? For our own dynasty before the Hung[-chih] and Cheng[-te] period (i.e. 1488-1521) the learning of the empire stemmed from one [source]. But since the Chia-ching period (i.e. 1522-1566) the learning of the empire has stemmed from two [sources]: one being venerable Master Chu, the second being Lord Wang Wen-ch'eng's (i.e. Wang Yang-ming) scholarship and character.[16]

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Though he accepted the basic difference between the two schools, Kao refused to believe those of Wang's disciples who argued that Chu Hsi was only concerned with rote learning and concrete things. Chu Hsi was just as devoted to the search for enlightenment as Wang, except that he rejected empty meditation in favor of realizing moral principles in one's daily social relations. For him, as for Kao, true enlightenment was "silently to remember what one has learned" (*mei erh chih chih*) so as to recover the pure good of our fundamental nature.[17]

Kao P'an-lung's doctrines of "silent remembering" and quiescent (*ching*) enlightenment were drawn both from the fifteenth-century Neo-Confucianist, Hsueh Hsuan, and from a revelation which he himself had experienced in 1594, shortly after being removed from office for protesting the dismissal of a "righteous" minister. After spending the summer traveling in the South, Kao had decided to return to the Yangtze provinces by boat. Leaving Kwangtung behind in late summer he headed north at a leisurely pace, with time set aside for touring famous temples and resting in the better river inns. By early autumn his boat had neared the Fukienese border. At a place called Chiang-t'ou his servants moored for the night. As his boat swung at anchor the full moon arose, sharply setting the mountains against the southern sky. Kao abandoned himself to the evening until he was struck by a strange disquiet. Impulsively he stood up to cry, "This landscape tonight is like other ones, but my inner-scapes, what are they likened to?" Like the great poet Su Tung-p'o at the Red Cliffs, he was suddenly choked with the ache of his separation from pure being, tempted to immerse himself in the night sky, to fall like a drunken poet into the moon. Yet he resisted, convinced that he must retain his self apart, even though his mind "was without comfort."[18]

The night passed and the voyage continued. Shaken by his experience, Kao grew determined to face his loneness by spending each morning in *ching-tso*, ("quiet sitting," or meditation) and the afternoons reading. At night he unwrapped his lute to relax himself with music and wine. Finally their vessel reached the town of Ting-chou in Fukien, where he decided to break his journey by lodging in an inn. There, he one day came across a line by the Sung philosopher, Ch'eng Hao, in a collection which he was reading: "In the midst of the many thousand affairs of the various offices, in the midst of millions of tools of war, one can still have joy, though one drinks water and uses the bended arm as a pillow. The myriad changes are all man's own creations. In reality there is not a thing." And at that Kao had his "sudden awakening."

> "So that is the way it is! Indeed, there is not a thing!" Thereupon as if cut off, all the entanglements of my worries were gone and suddenly something like the burden of a hundred pounds fell with a crash to the ground . . . and thereupon I became fused with a great change. There was no longer a separation of heaven and man, interior and exterior.[19]

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His revelation of Nothingness was by no means unique in the corpus of Chinese philosophy, though there was a distinguishing quality in Kao's realization that one must accept the hubbub of worldly affairs and embrace its transitoriness in order to find the quiescence of sagehood. Still, one always had to return to the contemplation of the study, the quiet of the library, in order to recover that inner strength.

As a man, it is impossible for one to possess the strength to pacify and settle the self without principles. For, each man's defects and difficulties are his own. The great worthies and sages had to have a great inner strength just to remain at peace in the midst of daily affairs. A mere student, though, is short of vigor and volatile, and must devote tens of years to building a thick and strong foundation of pacifying strength. The ones who encounter the most difficulty in this are those who were not instructed when young and hence became imbued with vulgar worldly concerns. For, in the vulgar [world] principles are difficult to grasp. One must bury one's head in books to allow oneself to be immersed in righteousness and reason.[20]

In short, Kao refused to escape from the world of "vulgarity" into pure eremitism. Instead, he tried to accommodate both by creating an intellectual asylum in the academy, where collegians helped each other recover the long-lost strength of the sages.

This was nowhere better expressed by Kao P'an-lung than in his preface to the "Treatise on the Tung-lin" (*Tung-lin chih*).

Heaven and earth are vast; past and present are far apart. How could the students of sages and worthies regard one time and one place as sufficient? Alas, the learning of the Ch'eng's is limited to the Shao-sheng period (i.e. 1094-1097); the learning of Chu is limited to the Ch'ing-yuan period (i.e. 1195-1200). Risky indeed! One's own self cannot be preserved for more than a hundred-odd years.[21]

Personal mortality was contrasted with the continuity, the *ch'uan* (transmission), of the *Tao* (Way) of particular "schools of learning." "Whatever changes is preserved in time. Whatever does not change is preserved in the Way." And through the Way even the temporal self could be revived, the true inner self recovered. This meant, on the one hand, that human regeneration demanded the revival of the parcel of human relationships honored by the sages: filial piety, loyalty, duty.

If people are vile then they will gradually be extinguished. How do we keep people from being vile? [Ku Hsien-ch'eng] told [me]: "In learning—learning and nothing else—men will recover the significance of being men, just as the eye, originally clear, recovers its clarity; the ear, originally keen, recovers its keenness; the mind, originally humane, recovers its humaneness; the physique, originally revered, recovers its reverence; lord and minister, father and son, elder and younger brother, friends and companions—all originally intimate, righteous, orderly, distinguished and trustful—recover their original intimacy, righteousness, order, distinction and trust. What was originally like this is called *hsing* (nature). To know that this was like this, and to recover this similarity, is called learning. If one does not learn then people are vile. If people are vile then their spirit is as

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cut off as breath might be to the body; and in this way the spirit of a thousand autumns could expire in a single day."[22]

Obviously, such reverential norms did not threaten established authority. Furthermore, the goal of the Tung-lin intellectuals was so vague (the regeneration of mankind) and its expression so diametrically specific (filial piety) that they did not—like proselytizers (concrete) seeking salvation (abstract)—conceive of means for the end. Or, to put it another way, the mission lacked steps to realize itself. In fact, given the Confucian ideal of social emulation ("If a superior love propriety, the people will not dare not to be reverent; if he love righteousness, the people will not dare not to submit to his example." *Analects,* 13.4), the mission could be as well realized through self-cultivation as through social action. And so, alongside activists in the academy's ranks, stood the immediate friends or disciples of Kao P'an-lung: metaphysically-oriented colleagues like Hsueh Fu-chiao, Ku Ta-chang, and Yeh Mou-ts'ai; or students of a later generation like Wu Kuei-sen, Chin Ch'ang, Ch'eng Chih, Wang Yu-yuan, and Kao Yü.[23] While some of these men did not take part in the wider Tung-lin political movement, their associations with the academy at least suggested how easy it was for intellectuals of a more yielding temperament to substitute quietism for activism.

The Tung-lin's Political Position

The functional focus of early Tung-lin protest was narrowly restricted to personnel evaluation because its bureaucratic stronghold was in that administrative arena. In 1583—two decades before the academy was actually founded—the Ministry of Personnel was suddenly filled with a new wave of bright young men determined to undo the centralization policies of the just-deceased Chang Chü-cheng. Among these was Ku Hsien-ch'eng himself, who (after a three-year mourning leave) served from 1586 to 1593 as a supervising secretary under the head of the scrutiny office, Chao Nan-hsing (1550-1627). There he and his superior fashioned personnel scrutiny into a powerful weapon of bureaucratic struggle by promoting "righteous" allies in other metropolitan offices. However, after the Ministry of Personnel tried to pack the *nei-ko* with officials of their camp in 1594, the emperor angrily accused them of partisan favoritism and purged the ministry.

Reduced to the status of a commoner, Ku Hsien-ch'eng returned home—accompanied by others dismissed along with him: Ch'ien I-pen, An Hsi-fan, Chang Na-pi, Yü K'ung-chien, Hsu Yao-hua, and so forth.[24] It was this circle which then began to hold "discussion meetings" (*chiang-hui*) at various locales in Chiang-nan, and responded positively to Kao P'an-lung's suggestion in 1603 that they find a more permanent center by restoring the old Tung-lin Academy at Wu-hsi. Ku, understandably cautious, first encouraged prominent members of the local gentry to send supporting letters to the magistrate, prefect, and governor. These officials confirmed local opinion by polling the district's students, and found their own contributions novelly

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matched by public donations. The academy's first public meeting was held between November 29 and December 1, 1604.

At one level, the academy was merely an assemblage of local intellectual coteries loosely attached to the central place. That is, each of the well-known scholar-officials constituting the Tung-lin's inner core brought with him a circle of personal followers and students, often organized into subacademies or literary clubs. Above these *cénâcles* there did exist a larger grouping, represented by large annual meetings that attracted literati from neighboring provinces. These meetings, which were opened and closed with devotional songs and prostration before the portrait of Confucius, consisted of lectures on the classical *Four Books*. Socratic debate or criticism of authority were expressly forbidden by the academy's rules. Rather, the solemn meetings were intended to elevate men from their daily routine into the realm of higher values, so that the *chiang-hsueh* (lectures) preached an ascertainable and unvarying truth.

The reforming impulse of Tung-lin members was ambiguously directed toward public influence because organization on a broader scale was restricted by the moral sustenance each member offered the others as part of the "happy few." Wishing to sustain each other's ethical independence, they were mutually encouraged to swim against the prevailing currents of vulgarity and profit, so that their preachings were personally exhortatory rather than ideological. It was even decided to prohibit private political ("vulgar") discussions within the academy itself, so as to avoid outer charges of intrigue and inner violations of integrity. Thus, as time came on, a split developed between the "pure" academy and the outer movement which bore its name.

The primary extension of the Tung-lin group into politics was the work of Ku Hsien-ch'eng himself, via both a stream of letters sent to friends throughout the empire, and a series of widely disseminated pamphlets. In fact, his interference—for he was still a commoner and had no bureaucratic rights as such—in two major appointment cases in 1607 and 1610 created a countrywide sensation. As the Tung-lin adherents were thus accused of factionalism, the classic Sung arguments over the nature of *tang* (parties) were heard once again. A familiar theme was sounded now much more stridently: political sanity depended entirely upon the spirit of superior men (*chün-tzu chih ch'i*). A Tung-lin patron, Chao Nan-hsing, maintained that:

> The empire will be ordered and at peace as the spirit of the *chün-tzu* is constantly expressed. The empire will be endangered and disturbed as the spirit of the *chün-tzu* is constantly repressed. Since Wan-li *jen-ch'en* (1592) the spirit of the *chün-tzu* has gradually been repressed, until by *ping-ch'en* (1616) and *ting-ssu* (1617), it was severely so.[25]

Just as the academy concentrated their spirit in society, so did the *tang* naturally group superior men together in the political realm. Chao still had to confront the odious connotations of *tang*, but by seeking classical instances

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of *tang* in a nominal sense (did not the *Analects* mention *fu-tang*, "patriarchal groupings," and *hsiang-tang*, "village groupings"?) argued that they were also "natural" groupings of *chün-tzu* joined by common predilection.[26] Thus not only was the invidious distinction between great and small men maintained; there was also a highly elitist conception of intellectual politics, consonant with the philosophical elitism of the Tung-lin school (which, remember, was reacting to the "every man a sage" doctrines of men like Li Chih).

This elitism accounted for Ku Hsien-ch'eng's own opinion that a circle of disciples (*men-hu*) could not be expanded beyond a certain radius. For, only a necessarily restricted coterie of superior men could avoid the petty "divergences of opinions" (*i chih ch'i*) characteristic of larger groups of mean men.

> Whoever can subdue his divergence and opinionation does not have to await being pacified but can pacify himself. Whoever can subdue his [state of] arousal will be of still greater benefit to his country.[27]

Such self-control, even if only practiced by a few members of the coterie, might then inspire the rest, thanks to the intimacy of restricted membership.

Such a belief severely restricted the political capacities of the Tung-lin intellectuals. If the reforming mission of "superior men" depended upon so small and so particular an association then it was bound to be publicly impotent. Group solidarity—emotional intimacy—outweighed the expediency of larger confederations because virtue, not issues, was at stake. And since moral integrity was such a crippling concern, Ku and his friends were haunted by the necessity of compromise. Believing, as they did, that the political world was neatly divided into black and white, they were stricken by the recognition of grey zones. Ku had admitted that he could not label all courageous enough to engage in political struggle as ardent "martyrs," just as he could not characterize the more timid as being "hypocrites and imposters." Yet while he also condemned those who "held fast to their own proposals" so rigidly that the realm was transformed into a battlefield, the only absolute antidote he could conceive of was public concern (*kung*), since the root of conflict was selfishness.

> What is meant by *kung*? Right means right and wrong means wrong without ambiguity (*mo-leng*). Being right one will know its [opposite] wrong; being wrong one will know its [opposite] right, without prejudice.[28]

Fanatically opposed to fanatics, Ku was to die in 1612 confident that he did know both sides, confident that others—not he—were the worst partisans. His belief was never really tested; for the most dogmatic days of the Tung-lin were still to come.

The Height of the Tung-lin Struggle

After Ku Hsien-ch'eng's death the fortunes of the Tung-lin group went through five phases.

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(1) 1615-1620: continuing scrutiny struggles controlled by the three opposition cliques.
(2) 1620-1621: thanks to a new emperor, Tung-lin recovery of power. One brief year of stability.
(3) 1621-1624: though clearly paramount, the Tung-lin group conflicts more and more with its eunuch opponent, Wei Chung-hsien.
(4) 1625-1626: Wei Chung-hsien purges Tung-lin members.
(5) 1626-1629: yet another new emperor restores the Tung-lin affiliates who blemish their image by executing members of the opposition.

These conflicts centered on three contemporary issues: military policies in Manchuria where founders of the future Ch'ing had initiated plans to conquer China, the continuing involvement of academies in politics, and the struggle over imperial succession.

The third was the most bitter. Contemporary accounts referred again and again to the famous "three cases": the cudgel case of 1615, the red pill case of 1620, and the palace removal case of 1621. The first two concerned the survival of an heir favorable to one or the other side, and the last was a fight to control a newly acceded boy emperor. Nothing better symbolized the political vulnerability of the Tung-lin intellectuals than their bickering fixation on this particular issue. Drawn together in the first place to restore orthodox values such as loyalty, the prime concern of the Tung-lin group was ostensibly the "proper relationships" between ruler and minister, and its political programs were always cast as appeals to the throne. Given the discrepancy then between a Neo-Confucian idealization of the enlightened ruler and contemporary reality, such pleas were only to be pitied. The T'ien-ch'i emperor, who ascended the throne in 1620 at the age of fourteen and had only reached twenty-one when he died in 1627, was hopelessly indecisive. Dominated by his former wet nurse, who was in turn sexually manipulated by the eunuch Wei Chung-hsien, the emperor relinquished his control over government to while away his days playing football and building dollhouses. But the postures of ministerial righteousness were so frozen that even the most courageous victims of eunuch purges continued to defend themselves with a rhetoric of personal submission to the throne. For, their loyalty—framed as devotion to a person—was to an institutional ideal that encompassed their entire world-view. Alternatives were unthinkable.

The classic example of this has always been Yang Lien, arrested in 1625 by the secret police for having attacked Wei Chung-hsien's arrogation of imperial authority.

> Thus throughout the palace all know there is a Chung-hsien but none know there is an emperor, and throughout the capital all know there is a Chung-hsien but none know there is an emperor . . . If I should be able to get rid of just Chung-hsien alone, so as not to deprive the emperor of his reputation as a Yao or a Shun, then I should have fulfilled the command of the former emperor and might face the spirits of the imperial ancestors. In the loyal and righteous service of my lifetime,

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the extraordinary grace conferred by the two prior rulers might be recognized. And if some small recompense is wished, I should even die without regrets.[29]

We have no way of knowing if Yang Lien did experience regret at that last moment of agony when eunuch torturers pounded nails through his skull, but I suspect that even then his loyalty remained unshaken. The weakness of an *actual* emperor only made it all the clearer that one was dying for a disembodiment—and thus in the end, solely for one's own commitment to the idea itself.

Yang Lien was to be avenged. A new emperor on the throne, Wei and the wet nurse dead, the Tung-lin faction would recover power only to mar its own image of constant integrity by killing some of its opponents. Even former partisans of the Tung-lin grew disillusioned, so that Kao P'an-lung, reflecting long after the event, came to doubt the applicability of ethical absolutes to politics. The one thing he realized from the years of acrimony was that there was no quick method to identify good and evil, no easy way to extend one's good will and thereby transform things outside of us. It was a mistake to believe that all members of one camp were either purely virtuous or purely corrupt. Yet the only political device conceivable to him itself tended to create absolute moral types.

This [group] considers the other a *tang*. The other considers this a *tang* as well. A *tang* is a category (*lei*). If one wished the empire to be without *tang* then he would have to do without the category of superior men and of mean men. Then, would it not be impossible to speak of *tang*? No matter what kind of *tang* the superior men have, the ruler hates *tang*. Consequently, the *tang* of mean men turn their eyes toward it [treating it] like a *tang*. Once entrapped, the superior men are finished.[30]

The Nature of the Tung-lin Struggle

The Chinese political conflicts of the early 1600's concerned the degree to which a monarch's personal agents controlled the bureaucracy. Not only were Tung-lin intellectuals *not* struggling for the recognition of their legally independent rights; they were also barely fighting to attain a bureaucratically independent right to make political decisions. Rather, their major goal involved clique aspirations toward a general policy influence expressed abstractly with Neo-Confucian symbols like loyalty, and concretely with personnel control, that is, the bureaucratic function most crucial to the clique's survival. Thus, they were undone in the end by a lack of pluralism, both symbolic and concrete. Even in their own institutions they could offer nothing in the way of alternatives to the harmonious familistic images that sustained the state by making dissent a sign of selfish factionalism.

And even though the institutions themselves embryonically expressed autonomous intellectual interests, the academies' genesis as coteries of intellectuals blurred the distinction between informal association and formal

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(that is, associative and disassociative) membership, making it difficult to acquire both a socially and politically separate organizational individuality. Indeed, it was in the gentry's short-sighted interest to avoid creating institutions which might have brought society and polity together, since those organizations could as well be co-opted by the central authority. As patrons in the anthropological sense, the gentry—among which we must include most intellectuals—bridged the interstices between center and locale, increasingly mediating power as the Ming and Ch'ing wore on. As this was an informal, often illegal, function, the gentry was served by the gap between lower social levels and higher forms of authority. The "we-ness" Ku Hsien-ch'eng had advocated would have united society and polity. The reward for his failure was less emotionally satisfying, but more socially advantageous to a later generation of gentry brokers.

Study Societies at the End of the Ch'ing

Clubs and academies did not disappear with the Tung-lin. The *Fu-she* (Restoration Society) played a prominent role in the last days of the Ming, and there were several attempts during the early years of the Ch'ing to revive these intellectual alliances. However, the Manchu founders of the dynasty and some of their Chinese advisers were convinced that most *soi-disant* academies and literary societies were secretly interested in promoting the same kind of political turmoil to which they partly attributed the decline of the previous dynasty. Consequently, the government issued special regulations in 1652 forbidding scholars to meet over political or philosophical issues; and by the eighteenth century very few literary societies still existed. Academies were now financially administered by local officials; and their curriculum, which was devoted to preparing students for civil service careers, was carefully supervised by government-appointed directors of studies. The Tung-lin itself, rebuilt in 1629, soon ruled that such topics as the differences between the Schools of Reason and of Mind should not be discussed. Deprived at first of an official endowment, the academy gradually fell into ruin. Its subsequent physical recovery (the provincial authorities were ordered in 1685 to repair such academies) was illusory. However much lacquer was applied to the façade, its lecture hall completely lacked spiritual innards. Razed by the T'ai-p'ing rebels in 1860, rebuilt again at government request in 1864, it had become by the later Ch'ing heavily endowed but intellectually sterile.

Thus, though academies flourished numerically during the nineteenth century (there were perhaps as many as 4,500 in existence throughout the empire over the course of that period), the great majority of them still just taught the texts necessary for examination success or subsidized degree candidates. There were exceptions, to be sure. The most important was the Cantonese *Hsueh-hai t'ang* (Hall of the sea of learning) inspired by the

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great classicist, Juan Yuan, who sought to revive the notion of a community of scholars united by *jen* (humaneness). In fact, it was out of this circle of intellectuals that came the famous reformer, K'ang Yu-wei.

Inspired by Juan Yuan's revival as well as the censorial ideal of "pure talk" (*ch'ing-i*) associated with such historical heroes as the Tung-lin scholars, K'ang insisted after China's defeat by the Japanese in 1895 that the nation's strength depended upon unity, and the latter in turn upon assembling the divided scholars of the realm in study societies. Up to now this had been impossible because of the early Ch'ing prohibition. But was that caution not now anachronistic? As he boldly memorialized the emperor on June 30, 1895:

> Turning to the periods of the Han and Ming [we see] that the conduct of *ch'ing-i* harmed traitors in power but was of great benefit to the country. But when the Ming dynasty's defectors (*erh-ch'en*) entered the service of [this] ruling house, they feared that people would criticize them and therefore strictly forbade [pure talk]. However, as this is not their time why must we continue to pursue their errors?[31]

Pending imperial sanction of study societies (*hsueh-hui*), K'ang and other younger literati sought the personal sponsorship of high officials. With their hesitant approval, the students met in August 1895 in Peking to form the *Ch'iang hsueh-hui* (Study society [for self-]strengthening) to "inspire customs, enlighten knowledge, and unite the great mass."[32]

This, and a branch office founded later that year in Shanghai, were the first in a series of nationally prominent societies organized by intellectuals devoted to strengthening the country against imperialism. Conservative official approval was fickle, especially as the study groups came at times to resemble a mass movement. Because of that and K'ang Yu-wei's iconoclastic reputation, it was an easy matter for a censor to force the disbandment of the *Ch'iang hsueh-hui* late that same year. But as the international situation once again worsened in 1898 there sprang up successor organizations which were more willing to forego bureaucratic endorsement. The best known of these was the *Pao-kuo hui* (Preserve the nation society), founded by K'ang Yu-wei and 186 others in Peking on April 12, 1898, to "preserve the sovereignty and territory of the entire nation, preserve the independence of the people and the race, and preserve the existence of the divine teachings [of Confucius]."

The *Pao-kuo hui* was only one of a particular type of study society devoted to renovating the "spirit" (*ch'i*) of scholars bent upon rescuing China from what seemed to be imminent dissolution as the powers scrambled for concessions. There were other categories of associations which I have broken down by kind in table 1 (page 58). It is easy to discern a general pattern of society activity between 1895 and 1911. As the list following—which incorporates data on 138 different *hui*, representing 46 per cent of the total 300 societies founded—clearly shows, during this period the two eras of

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highest activity were the years 1897-1898 and 1906-1908. One would assume an immediate difference between these two peaks if only because the first reflected spontaneous nationalist sentiment in the wake of the scramble for concessions, while the latter came thanks to the imperially sponsored reform program after 1902. Table 1 details the differences a bit more meaningfully. The early peak was overwhelmingly characterized by an abstract, non-issue oriented stress on arousing the will or spirit of the intellectual elite (*shih* or *chün-tzu*). Though much more autonomous than Ming societies these were still symbolically rather than organizationally directed, so that the absence of concrete goals suggests a transitional generation somewhere between the Tung-lin and—as the time scale telescopes—the provincial gentry leaders of the early 1900's. Traditional, and only semiautonomous, ideology enabled the transition.

Geographic focus (table 2, page 61) also passed from the will-preserving societies' capital-fixation to new local foci of political involvement. Peking, gathering place for metropolitan-degree candidates, had been during the heyday of the early reform clubs the hub of a wheel whose spokes were members of the national elite so that their "provincial" societies were mainly capital figments. But by the later period, intellectuals had abandoned a vague concern with imperial self-development for the concrete management of local affairs. A new kind of society (category 3) expressed a new concern with nationalist issues specifically influencing local or provincial politics: railway and mining rights.

This tabular contrast does not mean that one entirely different form of political interest simply superseded the other. For, the early *hsueh-hui* were themselves the vehicle of this evolution: a cultural as well as institutional transition for Chinese intellectuals. The cultural facet, obvious enough in their wish to wed occidental "skills" with oriental principles, might even be expressed by the daily timetable of a typical study society. Ch'ang-te's *Ming-ta hsueh-hui*, for example, ordained mornings for Western readings, while the afternoon was to be devoted to Chinese studies.[33] Such schedules, which were printed in great detail in the reform press, marked an important institutional transition from symbolic to organizational orientations, from ritual lecturing to patterned study. Other rules defined membership identity and formalized institutional roles. Since substantial annual fees were required, bookkeeping and auditing procedures were developed. Special attention was devoted to placing the *hsueh-hui* officers under the control of elected gentry board members. "A *hsueh-hui* is not under the control of a single individual"; managers must be checked and "not allowed arbitrarily to usurp [authority]."[34]

Study societies even enjoyed organizational extension via branch associations. The outstanding example of such a network was the *Nan hsueh-hui* (Southern Study Society) which established local affiliates throughout Hunan, tightly linked to the provincial headquarters. This differed sharply

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TABLE 1. Types of Clubs Founded

Type of club	*1895*	*1896*	*1897*	*1898*	*1899*	*1900*	*1901*	*1902*	*1903*	*1904*	*1905*	*1906*	*1907*	*1908*	*1909*	*1910*	*1911*
1. Renovate the spirit of scholars in order to preserve the country	2		8	19						2	1		2	1			
2. Constitutional study and promotion of local self-government (*ti-fang tzu-chih*)											2	8	10	5			
3. Recover railway and mining rights												1			3	1	
4. Reevaluate the classics in terms of statecraft, practical needs, utilitarianism			3	2													
5. Preserve Confucianism (*sheng-chiao*)			2	1								1	1	1	1		
6. Scientific study (especially mathematics and geography), translation of Western books		1	3	3					1		1	6	3			1	

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7. Antifootbinding, antiopium; elevate local customs		1	8	3				1	2			1	
8. Agricultural study (*Nung hsueh-hui*)	1	1				1		3	4	2			
9. Manage schools established by the new dynastic reform (*chiao-wu hsueh-hui, chiao-wu tsung-hui*)							5	2	5	1	3	1	

SOURCE: Wang Erh-min, "Ch'ing-chi hsueh-hui hui-piao" (A classified list of the study societies of the Ch'ing period), *Ta-lu tsa-chih* (The Continent Magazine), Part I, 26.2:14-20 (January 31, 1962); Part II, 26.3:16-23 (February 15, 1962).

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Year	*Number of* hui *founded*
1895	3
1896	4
1897	24
1898	31
1899	0
1900	0
1901	0
1902	1
1903	1
1904	3
1905	10
1906	21
1907	28
1908	13
1909	4
1910	2
1911	3

from the Tung-lin Academy's horizontally crystallized coteries, because the *Nan hsueh-hui* extended down and out, paralleling the provincial bureaucratic establishment. Organizational charters—not just overlapping membership—cemented the structure together. The society did depend upon personal connections at the very top between a reformist governor and its own leaders; but as the *Nan hsueh-hui* supplanted the functions of the commissioner of education, it presaged the later interpenetration of provincial government by gentry associations during the early 1900's.

The New Ideology of Association

The general aim of these societies was expressed by those three founding slogans of the *Ch'iang hsueh-hui:* to inspire customs, to enlighten knowledge, and to unite the great mass. "To inspire customs" (*k'ai feng-ch'i*) was partly an appeal for physical education to create a new martial *chün-tzu* robustly modeled on the samurai instead of the effete literatus. But the fundamental meaning of the slogan was to eradicate such popular evils as opium smoking and footbinding. Influenced by Christian social work, the reformers also wished to infuse Confucianism with a spirit of proselytism in order to revive the sage's doctrine of humaneness (*jen*) which "grieves over the difficulties and hardships of all within the four seas."[35]

To transform ethical teachings (*chiao*) into a religion (also *chiao*) was hardly a fundamentalist revival, just as self-deprecating comparisons with Japanese samurai and Western preachers were not the mark of once-confident Confucianists. Besides, the original Sung notion of a "superior man's" obligations to transform his grief over the lot of mankind into the actual rectification of social evils reflected a determination then to instill

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TABLE 2. Geographic Focus of Clubs

Geographic focus	*1895*	*1896*	*1897*	*1898*	*1899*	*1900*	*1901*	*1902*	*1903*	*1904*	*1905*	*1906*	*1907*	*1908*	*1909*	*1910*	*1911*
1. *Hui* founded in the capital	1		4	2								1	2	1		1	1
2. *Hui* founded in the capital with provincial identity and titles				5													
3. Province-wide (e.g., the Kwang-tung Society) *hsueh-hui* or *tsung-hui*			2	6						1	4	1	9	4	3		
4. *Hui* founded either in provincial capitals or in Shanghai	2	4	10	7				1	1		5	10	6		1		2
5. *Hui* founded by and in districts			11	9						1	1	6	14	10		1	

SOURCE: Wang Erh-min, "Ch'ing-chi hsueh-hui hui-piao."

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Confucianism with the charitable spirit of popular Buddhism. Buddhist influences, especially the paragon of the Boddhisattva who postpones Nirvana to serve mankind, persisted in the ideology of nineteenth-century reformers like T'an Ssu-t'ung. But, judging from the frequent references in reform newspapers to the alarming spread of Christianity, it was this Western creed of charity that renewed the emphasis on good works, drawing literati out of meditative autolatry. Nor was it just a matter of competition. These intellectuals characteristically identified the strength of the West with its Way—and that particular *Tao* was clearly one which energetically sought to convert others. "To inspire customs" therefore meant both reforming vulgar traits of the populace and inspiring common men with a new *religious* sense of Confucian morality. In each case the intellectual's role was redefined. No longer was he, as Confucius really directed, to concentrate on the moral education of the ruler. Nor was he to be content with mere personal cultivation of his own self. Instead, he was to engage in social action by breaking the coterie mentality.

> We will endeavor to carry this out by uniting officials, gentry, scholars *and commoners* as friends in a literary society, using the mighty doctrine of Confucius as our major [creed].[36]

This was far removed from the Tung-lin scholars' spiritual hermeticism.

The society's second motto, "to enlighten knowledge" (*k'ai chih-shih*), distinguished the reformers from official self-strengtheners who wished only to adopt modern technology. The *hsueh-hui* were instead devoted to exposing Chinese intellectuals to all the cultural and political facets of the West. Many societies opened translation bureaus, or published journals describing parliaments, explaining constitutional law, and recounting the biographies of Western statesmen like George Washington. Often a society would sponsor bookstores or schools, and some associations promised to send students to Japan. Many argued that such novel studies were in the best tradition of the seventeenth-century's "statecraftsmen," and insisted that men had lost sight of the "practical" connection in Confucianism between government service (*shih*) and education.[37] Even regular academies asked to be allowed to alter their curriculum from examination preparation to "the study of what is useful."[38] But here, too, extreme innovations were being introduced in the guise of a revival of "true" pragmatic Confucianism. After all, the academies became stultified in the first place because they had indeed been teaching "something useful": how to get into the traditional civil service. It was the context that had now changed. For all practical purposes, "useful" now meant Western learning; and the *hsueh-hui* (study society) itself was even sometimes identified with the occidental university.

The third slogan, "to unite the great mass" (*ho ta-ch'ün*), evoked, familiar images of intellectuals. As the rules for one study society explained:

> The doctrine of the sages strongly emphasizes taking delight in the company [of one's peers] (*le ch'ün*), honoring one's calling, being intimate with worthies,

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and seeking out friends. At the gate of Confucius there assembled three thousand and seventy disciples to discuss every [aspect] of statecraft and the great vocation [of government], so that there was not a single skill nor single capability which was not studied and practiced. Thus, the period of study [was devoted to] actual practice, extending even to [the art of] governing the country and bringing peace to the empire. Today, occidental government emerges from a [kind of] learning which frequently attains the bequeathed meaning of [their] divine canon (the Bible). Indeed when men's talents flourish, the fortune of the country accompanies them. In China, since the prevalence of the examination essay, the ancient learning has become neglected and uncultivated. The reason for establishing this society is our genuine desire to sweep away the practice up until now of such limited and narrow [scholarship], and to collect the talents of our time to aid in reform. Along with our study of Chinese moral principles we will blend the occidental art of enriching [the country] and strengthening [the army]. If we concentrate the massed strength of men, matters will easily improve. If we unite the minds of the learned, knowledge will daily burst forth. [Then we] can preserve both the [Confucian] doctrine and the [Chinese] race along with our sagely learning and ancestral customs. Furthermore, they will spread and flow over the entire globe, so that every country will be willing as our comrades to look into this [doctrine of] moral conduct.[39]

But though it was still believed that the "spirit" of superior men would save the age, the aristocratic ideal of the *chün-tzu* had attenuated. Instead of assembling gentlemen in search of mutual philosophical cultivation, the societies were pledged to create a new kind of intellectual: *yu-chih chih shih* (scholars of resolve). Furthermore, the "scholars" so resolved now encompassed many beyond the earlier status coteries. The *Nan hsueh-hui* (Southern Study Society) founded at Ch'ang-sha in the winter of 1897 adopted the slogan: "Whether official, gentry, scholar, or commoner (*shu*)—once enrolled, they are all members, all equal."[40] Membership replaced status; the *hsueh-hui* created its own "scholars of resolve," instead of the contrary. And as these men now defined their own corporate legitimacy, they could properly be called "intellectuals" in the modern sense.

This declaration of intellectual autonomy was necessarily accompanied by a new derivation of intellectual status. As national defense required technical expertise and a "pragmatic" approach to government, utilitarian skill replaced moral mastery as a prime value. The consequent abolition of the traditional examination system in 1905 would differentiate the intellectual from both the state and the traditional gentry. Such political and social independence virtually demanded an ideology of voluntary intellectual incorporation, which was symbolized by the transition from coterie to club.

Three centuries earlier the Tung-lin patron, Chao Nan-hsing, had been forced to legitimize predilective *tang* (parties) by equating them with natural primary groups like family or clan. Partly a denial of the injurious competition of pluralistic interests within an ideally harmonious society, partly a defense against legalistic and despotic intrusions into society, this

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animus toward the *Gesellschaft* denied the principle of voluntary organization. Other scholars, like the seventeenth-century statescraftsman, Ku Yen-wu, went so far as to condemn all associations (*she*) which had not evolved naturally and involuntarily within society. Coteries like *t'ung-nien* (men who had passed their examinations in the same year) were acceptable, but for him even intellectual clubs were illegitimate.[41] Now, as the spread of study societies legitimized associations, the entire basis of the state was redefined. During the Tung-lin period political dissent was limited by the accepted definition of the *kuo* as a kingdom, ruled by an emperor who held heaven's mandate. The *kuo* was transmitted, not made or formed. Now, the example and theory of study societies suggested a new theory of the *kuo* as a country—indeed, a nation—formed by *association*.

The key to this fundamental change in Chinese political conceptualization was the notion of *ch'ün*. Like many single words in classical Chinese, it had a variety of meanings bound to the various strands of the rich tradition which these reform intellectuals had inherited. We have already denoted one of these in *le ch'ün*—delighting in the company of one's peers. But there was another, even more fundamental concept of *ch'ün* embodied in an important secondary tradition which went back to the philosopher Hsün-tzu (fl. 298-238 B.C.), who once wrote of man:

> His strength is not equal to that of the bull; his running is not equal to that of the horse; yet the bull and the horse are used by him. How is that? Men are able to form social organizations (*ch'ün*), the former are not able to form social organizations.[42]

Ch'ün—the formation of social organizations—was thus the single faculty distinguishing man from the beasts.

Although Hsün-tzu's definition of *ch'ün* influenced Han (206 B.C.–A.D. 220) political thought, this meaning virtually lapsed in later eras. It was not until the late nineteenth century that it was dramatically revived by K'ang Yu-wei, who inspired his student, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, to apply this concept to the definition of the state as such. Arguing that all social organizations were formed by men in concert, Liang went so far as to insist that the country itself was a consequence of *ch'ün*. Men could—together—create (*ch'eng*) a nation; and that startling realization in turn meant that the ruler of such a social aggregate had to rule it in the name of the collective, even in the name of the people.

> Therefore, if one uses a *ch'ün* method to rule the *ch'ün*, the *ch'ün* will be realized. If one uses an individualistic method to rule the *ch'ün*, the *ch'ün* will fail. And if one's own *ch'ün* is defeated, that is to the profit of other *ch'ün*. How can we then speak of individualistic [state]craft? Everyone knows that they have their own selves. They do not realize they also share the empire. The ruler selfishly [looks] to his own regime. The official selfishly [looks] to his own field. The artisan selfishly [looks] to his own occupation. The merchant selfishly [looks] to his own commerce. The individual selfishly [looks] to his own profit. The household self-

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ishly [looks] to its own prosperity. The lineage selfishly [looks] to its own clan. The clan selfishly [looks] to its own surname. The settlement selfishly [looks] to its own land. The village selfishly [looks] to its own hamlet. The teacher selfishly [looks] to his own learning. For this reason the people are as 400 million [entities], so that the country too will be as 400 million [entities], which means no country at all. Whoever knows how to rule well realizes that the ruler and people together make up a single person within a single *ch'ün*.[43]

As *ch'ün* and *hui* (nominally, association; verbally, to associate) were obviously related, the societies themselves were the one device that might bring the people together "into a single entity." In fact, "country" (*kuo*) and "society" (*hui*) were practically synonymous.

Although we want to make all as one, which course are we to follow toward this unity? I have searched through the Three Dynasties in the distant [past], and gazed extensively across the Occident. Those with *kuo* of needs have *hui:* [their] superior men associate (*hui*) in such as this; [their] officials associate in such as this; [their] scholars associate in such as this; [their] people associate in such as this. Every morning, lectured to; every evening, shaped [into one]. Even though the empire is vast, and the myriad creatures many, we can strengthen our country.[44]

Of course, neither Hsün-tzu's definition of *ch'ün*, nor the concept of voluntary association, can alone account for Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's challenge to the traditional theory of heaven-derived imperial sovereignty. As those earlier excerpts show, he was deeply influenced by the discovery of social Darwinism, then being propagated in China by the translator Yen Fu. Furthermore, like so many other reform-movement intellectuals, he was aware of constitutive examples of association (*hui*) in Japan and the West.[45] But it was the connotations, the particular ring, of such classical concepts as *ch'ün* or *hui* which partly sanctioned, partly filtered, the introduction of constitutionalism to the Chinese. However revolutionary the implications, the initial perception was only conceivable in the framework of traditional values.

Witness, for example, the editors of a Hunanese reform newspaper arguing for a national assembly (*kuo-hui*):

If we do not establish a *kuo-hui* then there will be no uniting the citizens' voices. If we do not establish a board of learning then there will be no accumulation of a general record of the myriad affairs. When asked, "What would it be like to establish a *kuo-hui* now?" we answer, "the *kuo-hui* [represents] the people's public duty (*kung-i*)." "But is the *kuo-hui* not then [a representation of] popular rights?" We say that the [imperial] order we have now received, the instructions we have taken, of the public duty to enlighten each other and revive learning is a public undertaking (*kung-shih*) of the people. Considering the public duty to be a public undertaking, and the public undertaking to be a public association (*kung-hui*), what [else] can we call it [but] popular rights? It precisely means popular rights! Besides, popular rights is popular duty. "People" cannot be separated from "having rights." The people devote themselves to their duty, and the people engage in their own undertakings, while the ruler's authority (*chün-ch'üan*) draws together these myriad undertakings. Popular rights is to manage one's own

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undertakings. If the people lack rights they cannot devote themselves to [public] duty. If they do manage their own undertakings, then the sovereign's authority will also reach its utmost. The people can devote themselves to their undertakings, and manage their duties. Such an undertaking therefore means that there is nothing which is not governed. Now, by advocating the *kuo-hui*, we are founding schools; and by advocating schools we are founding a *kuo-hui*. The people [will then] honor their ruler. The people [will then] move in agreement with their own company (*ch'ün ch'i ch'ün*). The country will not be struck some day with the actual disaster of mortal defeat, and the people will avoid the calamity of becoming followers and slaves of some other race. In this way there can be no severing [the connection] between the ruler's sovereignty and popular sovereignty.[46]

Popular sovereignty undermined the very foundations of the throne, but it was presented as a means of uniting the throne with the people, of creating the kind of ultimate "we-ness" even Ku Hsien-ch'eng would have appreciated. For, when the reformer Wang K'ang-nien argued in 1896 that the doctrine of popular rights had deep roots in the Chinese past—

The word *chih* (to rule) in Chinese just means that the ruler governs the people. Only in the Occident were there democratic countries as well as countries ruled jointly by monarch and people. Among Chinese Confucianists none fail to be shocked and astonished by this . . . However, why be astonished when our own ancient precepts about governing all meant consulting the people (*chi yü min*)?[47]

—he was returning to the very same source which had caused Ku to ponder the meaning of *tang* (parties); the *Hung-fan* of the *Book of Documents*.

If you have doubts about any great matter, consult with your own heart; consult with your nobles and officers; consult with your masses of the people (*mo chi shu-min*); consult the tortoise and the milfoil. If you, the tortoise, the milfoil, the nobles and officers, and the common people all consent to a course, this is what is called a great concord (*ta-t'ung*), and the result will be the welfare of your person, and good fortune to your descendants.[48]

Why then—asked Wang—should his readers or even the emperor himself be so prejudiced against popular sovereignty?

Wang K'ang-nien was not just masking novel political innovations with a classical cosmetic. The Confucian tradition which nurtured him was a cluster of symbols that apparently encompassed many different situational usages. The shared ideal of social harmony that was used in the late Ming to crush political formations could be employed in the late Ch'ing to sanction them. On the one hand this made it almost impossible for the last Manchus on the throne to refute the intellectuals' argument for parliamentary assemblies, since they were as bound by the symbol of unity between ruler and ruled as were the constitutionalists. But from another, classically liberal point of view, the very value that intellectuals had used to abet change ultimately denied them procedural means of political expression. The "great harmony" would be contradicted if "selfish" interests were encouraged, so that a conflict theory of constitutional politics could not be expressed. Early republican intellectuals still formed cliques, still substituted

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personalities for programmatic disputes, still sought plurality in the place of pluralism.

Yet in spite of the seeming permanence of such primary values, certain vital conceptual changes did take place. The most important was the transformation of Confucian populism (ruling for the sake of the people) into a theory of genuine popular sovereignty. The change began traditionally enough when mid-nineteenth-century writers like Feng Kuei-fen stressed the importance of holding the people—definers of the Mandate of Heaven—in awe.[49] As popular dissent subtly changed from an omen of heaven's judgment of misrule to an actual denial of the particular sovereign's right to reign, reformist intellectuals came to conceive of monarchy as a national stewardship. A new theory of historical descent virtually snatched the *kuo* away from heaven and the ruling house. Because "our dynasty possesses a people of 10,000 years," and because "the ruler conserves a position of 10,000 years," the country was itself a thing to be preserved, an obligation to be served.[50] And as the country was the collective form of the human beings that had formed it, populism ceased being merely symbolic.

Once again, it was the intellectuals who had abetted this transformation. But their importance was only transitional. By creating an immanent definition of popular sovereignty, they automatically ceased to function as interpreters—brokers—of a transcendental source of legitimacy. Within the perimeter of shared assumptions about sovereignty during the Ming, intellectual dissent may have been organizationally limited but it was at least symbolically ultimate. Now, hoping for everything, the Ch'ing reformers gave up the little they had had. For, by the mid-twentieth century, intellectual dissent would smack of elitism, of betrayal of the democratic dictatorship which embodied the masses. Unable to claim, much less monopolize, the virtue of the people, Communist intellectuals were even forced to revive the heroic model of the Tung-lin scholars—only to stand accused of "right opportunism" and selfish privatism. The ultimate cost of the Chinese quest for intellectual autonomy was political estrangement.

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4. *Ibid.,* 262:46.

5. *Shang shu,* Part V, Book IV, 14 (Legge, *Chinese Classics,* vol. 3, p. 331). This was usually related to another passage from the same classic: "That the multitudes of the people have no lawless confederacies *(yin-p'eng)* and that men [in office] have no selfish combinations *(pi-te),* will be an effect of the sovereign's establishing his highest point of excellence." (*Ibid.,* Part V, Book IV, 10; Legge, vol. 3, p. 10.) *Yin-p'eng* was usually glossed to mean "corrupt parties" *(hsieh-tang);* and *pi-te* was taken to signify "selfish combining" *(ssu hsiang pi-fu).* The ideal, properly Confucian, was that old one-to-one relationship between the ruler and his minister. If a monarch's rule were moral then his ministers would have no reason to form selfish combinations based on "excessive" friendship. Thus, factions implied as such that a ruler had failed to govern well.

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16. Kao P'an-lung, *Kao-tzu i-shu,* in *Ch'ien-k'un cheng-ch'i chi,* 258:7a.

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17. *Ibid.*, 258:3b-4, 9-10a.

18. Cited in Hsieh Kuo-chen, *Ming-Ch'ing chih chi tang-she yun-tung k'ao*, p. 51.

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24. *Ibid.*, 142:31b, 33a; 146:11a; 163:22b, 31a.

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36. *Ibid.* I have added the emphasis.

37. "Ni she-li Su hsueh-hui ch'i" (A petition to establish a *hsueh-hui* in Su-chou), *HHHP*, p. 309.

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BENJAMIN I. SCHWARTZ

The Limits of "Tradition Versus Modernity" as Categories of Explanation: The Case of the Chinese Intellectuals

THE STUDY of the role of intellectuals in developing society has been going on for some time now. To the extent that it has turned the attention of scholars to the concrete study of intellectuals in non-Western societies, it has, of course, been a spur to fruitful inquiry. To the extent that it has attempted to structure the whole experience of these intellectuals in terms of the conventional triad—tradition/development/modernity—without a deeper investigation of the range of meaning of these terms, to the extent that it has been unduly preoccupied with proclaiming supposed universal laws or models of how intellectuals behave or ought to behave in developing societies,[1] it may have actually impeded deeper inquiry.

If the two terminal categories of this triad, tradition and modernity, do not refer to definite, internally consistent, and mutually exclusive entities but are useful only as a short-hand way of referring to vast inchoate and by no means internally integrated areas of human experience, the unreflective use of these terms can only lead to what Whitehead called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. One of the most dire results of misplaced concreteness is that it obstructs our contacts with true concreteness. To be sure, there are many who have in mind more specific polarities when they speak of the polarity of tradition versus modernity. To some the crucial variable may be agrarian society versus industrial, to others authority versus freedom, to still others scientific outlook versus prescientific mentality, and so forth. However, all seem to share the assumption that every other aspect of the society or the culture—always conceived of as integrated wholes—is a function of whatever variable they happen to consider crucial.

What is proposed here is not the elimination of the use of the adjectives "traditional" and "modern." The adjective "traditional" remains a short-hand way (until we find a better one) of dealing with the whole past experience of any society such as China before the impact of the modern West; furthermore, within this past one can indubitably find ongoing, recognizable, coherent traditions. The modern West has certainly witnessed the emergence of qualitatively new developments as well as the acceleration of other de-

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velopments to a point where quantity almost seems to pass over into quality. There is, however, no reason to assume any preestablished harmony among elements called "traditional," on the one hand, or "modern," on the other—nor any necessary a priori incompatibility between modern elements and traditional elements.

It is worthy of note that in the triad the only truly dynamic term is the middle term, "development." Tradition is treated as a kind of static setting whose essential features can be described in terms of a few well-chosen propositions. It is not, of course, denied that diachronic change did take place within traditional societies. It is simply assumed that such changes are not important or relevant. Furthermore while modernity is not contrasted to change—on the contrary some might say that the acceptance of change as a value is one of the earmarks of modernity—the change always tends to be regarded as incremental change within the framework of an established modernity. The recent futurological discussions on the year 2000, in spite of their constant stress on change, particularly in technology, were for the most part based on the extrapolation of certain variables which are regarded as established and irreversible. Indeed certain kinds of incremental change are themselves regarded as an inexorable fixity.

There has, to be sure, been some change in recent years[2] in the treatment of tradition. There has emerged the notion that in some societies, some traditions, far from impeding certain aspects of modernization, may have actually facilitated them. There is some acceptance of the view that the variables which differentiate one traditional culture from another may, from the point of view of certain vital questions, be more important than the features which they share in common. Yet in vast numbers of textbooks which still provide the intellectual food of innumerable schools of secondary and higher learning, the vulgar concept of traditional society has become almost a fixed dogma and has encouraged the philistine view that the total past experience of mankind is irrelevant and, on all important matters, homogeneous. Furthermore, while there has been some progress among those who deal in these matters toward a more complicated view of traditional society,[3] the notion that we all know precisely what we are talking about when we discuss the modernity pole of this triadic formula still remains, on the whole, unchallenged.

Tradition and Modernity—Some General Reflections

As suggested above, the difference between traditional and modern society is most often made to depend on some crucial variable. Among the most convincing and indisputable of these polarities is probably that of agrarian society versus industrial society. If one can assert that all peasant societies are alike in their *essential* features and that all change over time in such societies is inconsequential, one can of course go on to discount all

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the differences in the "high cultures" and in the historic development of these societies which in any event are assumed to affect only the ruling strata or intellectuals.

I shall not dwell here on the features which all peasant societies may share in common. While there are no doubt many, there is a tendency to accept uncritically any dogmatic assertion in this area. I would question the assertion that even on the level of the rural village, differentiating cultural features are inconsequential. The difference between the caste structure of the Indian village and the various structures of Chinese peasant life are of crucial importance from any point of view. While it is often asserted that the political superstructures of these societies have little effect on the daily life of the villager, the differing political histories of China and India have in fact had a great deal to do with the endemic nature of widespread peasant rebellions in China and their relative lack in India. What is more, the iron wall which many erect between the "high cultures" and the "little cultures" is not easily maintained under close inspection. In fact, in all these societies Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism tended in countless ways to cut across the folk culture/high culture barrier in both directions.

When we turn our attention to the so-called "high cultures" or Great Traditions themselves, the question of whether they concerned themselves with "significant" or "real" questions is, to be sure, ultimately a philosophic question, but it also bears most directly on whether traditional modalities of thought, attitudes, and sensibilities derived from the past may continue to affect the outlooks of intellectuals in modernizing and even in modern societies. One of the most facile ways of dismissing the high cultures of the past is to assert that they encompassed a kind of closed symbolic world of concern only to the limited strata who were involved with them and that they had little or no effect on or meaning for the lives of the masses. In fact, one might make precisely the same observation concerning the culture of academic and literary intellectuals in modern societies. The questions discussed and issues raised in our own intellectual media and the language in which they are discussed are more often than not quite inaccessible to the man in the street, in spite of his literacy. In fact, quotations from the Confucian classics were probably more immediately available to the discourse of the masses in China than passages from George Lukacs, Lévi-Strauss, or Herbert Marcuse are to our own masses. Yet this observation can hardly be used as a way of determining whether our intellectuals deal with problems of the "real world" or problems of concern to mankind in general. Given our own particular criteria of relevance, the issues which divided Ch'an Buddhists from Neo-Confucianists in Sung China, or Chu Hsi from Wang Yang-ming, may or may not appear significant. However, the fact that their discourses and debates may or may not have found an echo in every village can by no means be used as a criterion for judging the general human significance and relevance of their preoccupations.

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I have here spoken of issues, questions, and debates. These words tend to imply the existence of both synchronic and diachronic conflicts and tensions within the Great Traditions. This, of course, is quite contrary to the view of these Great Traditions as essentially static, integrated, unproblematic wholes which can be described in a few well-chosen propositions. It is by no means my intention to deny the presense of persistent and predominant tendencies within traditional cultures or to deny that there were in them limits to the range of alternative approaches to human experience. Yet the more closely we examine these Great Traditions, the more we are impressed with the broadness of the range and the variety of alternatives within them; also, the more we are conscious of the significance of change over time.

Even if we focus our attention on one coherent dominant tendency within the culture such as Confucianism in China, we soon find that Confucianism itself has had a complicated and turbulent history replete with unresolved problems. To be sure, it is possible to treat Confucianism in a kind of static sociological-anthropological way by asserting that the heart of Confucianism is the Confucian family ethic and that this has remained fundamentally unchanged over time. The Chinese social structure is marked by the centrality of the family; Confucian values provide the operative norms of this structure. Hence, whatever debates may have gone on among Confucian literati and Confucian philosophers can hardly have affected the central social function of Confucianism. They were probably concerned with matters of secondary importance.

One of the characteristic features of this particular sociological view of the role of norms within a social system is that it tends to ignore the gap between norms and the way things actually work. Yet many of the most eminent ethical philosophers down through the ages have been concerned not only with the contents of given value systems but precisely with the question of how and to what extent any values are ever realized. Within the sociological perspective, the whole persistent tragic sense of tension between the ideal and the actual which has existed among sensitive spirits in every higher civilization simply disappears from view. In China, the lament that the ways of the world were far removed from the higher values of Confucianism was so persistent down through the ages that it became a cliché of Chinese literature, while those literati (probably the vast majority) who were complacently prepared to define the current state of affairs as Confucian were dismissed by the more creative intellectuals as *su ju* (vulgar or conventional Confucianists).

Even if one assumes that Confucian family morality was more or less successfully actualized over large areas of Chinese society and over long stretches of time, there is a serious question whether Confucianism can be simply equated with the family ethic. The centrality of family values existed before Confucius and was rooted in pre-Confucian Chinese religion.

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If Confucius had, what seemed to his followers, a fresh message to proclaim, it did not lie here. He may have accepted filial piety as an ultimate value, but he placed it within a new context. His contribution lay in his attention to the problems of inner self-cultivation—what might be called the subjective springs of morality—on the one hand, and on the manner in which he related himself to the whole sociopolitical realm on the other. The family becomes simply one element within this larger frame.

If Confucianism is viewed in this light, one can immediately understand why the efforts to realize its higher values led to enormous and even tragic problems for serious thinkers and sensitive spirits. How is the Confucian ideal of individual self-realization ever to be attained? What is the relation of knowledge to ethics? What indeed is the relationship of personal ethics to action within the political realm? Is centralized bureaucratic organization compatible with Confucian values? What is the relationship of technical administrative capacity to morality? Was the bureaucratic state structure which had emerged after the Ch'in compatible with the Confucian stress on personal relations? Weber calls the Chinese system "patrimonial bureaucracy" but many Confucian idealists down through the ages found it far too bureaucratic and far too little patrimonial. To what extent are Confucian ethical sociopolitical values realizable at all in the world out there? What is the relationship of the aesthetic to the ethical realm? Some of the general problems which arise in the history of Confucianism when separated from the framework of specific Confucian assumptions within which they are constrained may be recognized as real issues even by those of us who live in the heart of modern Western society. As in all societies, of course, these issues became deeply enmeshed in complex ways with conflicts of material and political interest, but in this respect traditional China was no different from any society, traditional or modern.

I have dwelt here on the kinds of tension and conflict which can be found within the dominant strain of Confucianism. When one adds to this the counter-Confucian tendencies which have often been vaguely grouped under the headings of Taoism, Buddhism, and Legalism, and the complex relations of these tendencies to various aspects of Chinese folk culture, the picture of an immobile traditional setting simply fades from view. Incidentally, the notion that the countertendencies of Chinese culture simply faded away in the last few centuries of Confucian orthodoxy also becomes more doubtful the more we immerse ourselves in the concrete specificities of Ming and Ch'ing history.

Thus, a common conventional picture of the Chinese literati who first confronted the modern West in the early nineteenth century is that of somnabulant mandarins complacently embedded in the unchanging essence of Chinese tradition. Here again we must, of course, draw a sharp distinction between the unreflective mass of conventional literati and the

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serious thinkers. The latter were in fact profoundly troubled by the situation in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century China and profoundly involved in the intellectual debates of their times. Thus at the end of the eighteenth century a strong reaction had set in against a kind of prevailing scholarly positivism which was found to be increasingly irrelevant to the problems of the time. There was, on the one hand, a revival of interest in problems of statecraft and, on the other hand, a revival of interest in philosophies of personal ethics. There was even some revival of interest in Buddhist transcendentalism. Within this context, the problems created by the "sea-barbarians" were simply a somewhat novel problem in statecraft. Thus what we are dealing with here is not so much paralytic immobility as a sense of assurance that somewhere within the rich and cumulative range of experience provided by the Chinese past could be found ways of coping with all of her contemporary problems. The past provided not so much an integrated tradition as a reservoir of conflicting responses to human experience. (There was in fact no Chinese word for "tradition" in this large and vague sense; the term *chüan-t'ung* as a general term, while Chinese in origin, came back to China from Japan as a neologism.) It is only at the end of the century that we find a generation which finally began to question whether this range of experience was any longer adequate to the situation which now confronted China and which thus became open to new ideas from the West.

If tradition cannot be reduced to a simple integrated system, what can we say of modernity? Since our focus here is on intellectuals, we must be interested in modernity not merely as descriptive of certain processes of action but also as embodied in certain modes of thought and sensibility. For purposes of convenience, I shall here draw a distinction in somewhat ad hoc fashion between modernization as referring to processes of development in economic, political, legal, military, and other realms of action and modernity as referring to certain modes of thought and modes of sensibility. In dealing with modernization as a system of action I shall treat it in terms of Weber's conception of "rationalization," for it seems quite clear that the Weberian conception has been the dominant influence in the American social scientific use of this term. Modernization refers to all those realms of life in which man can achieve the ends of world mastery by the individual and collective employment of rationally effective means. To the extent that modernization is linked to an idea, it is precisely this idea of the mastery of the world of nature as well as of the social world of man.[4] While many of Weber's conceptions of the prerequisites of *Zwecksrationalität* in various areas have been challenged, the validity of the general framework will be assumed for purposes of this essay.

What then as been the relationship of modernization in this sense to all those ideas, ideologies, attitudes, and orientations which have emerged in the modern world since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? One

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might presumably resolve this question quite easily by asserting that all ideas which facilitate or are congenial with the process of modernization should be labeled modern while all ideas which are contrary to or uncongenial to the process of modernization might be considered nonmodern or antimodern. Leaving aside the highly controversial nature of this question in itself, the overwhelming force of general usage has tended to label as "modern" all sorts of tendencies and ideas which may stand in a very questionable relationship to modernization (such as the modernist movement in literature). The force of ordinary usage here seems to be quite sound and defensible, for in fact there is even less warrant for assuming that modernity is an integrated whole than that tradition is. The eighteenth-century enlightenment itself contained many mutually contradictory tendencies. Yet all of these tendencies were new tendencies.[5] Some may insist on using the word "modern" as a eulogistic value term descriptive only of the particular values which they happen to cherish, but the term can never shed its primary sense as a time-reference term. Rousseau was not less modern than Voltaire nor was Immanuel Kant a whit less modern than Jeremy Bentham. Many of the conflicts central to the French Revolution may have been quite tangential to the business of modernization as here defined. In fact, Saint-Simon, the father of the term "industrialism," in looking back over the revolutionary days felt precisely that all the sound and fury, all the frenzied moralism of the Jacobins, had been a diversion from the serious technological business of mankind. Yet would any one really deny that revolutionism has continued to be an important part of the experience of modern man or that Rousseau's pathos—which sees the whole question of society as a social ethical drama—has been as much a part of the experience of modern man as the pathos of those who have seen the problem wholly in terms of social technology?

What indeed is the relationship between modernization—the mastery of the world—and other values such as liberty, equality, democracy, and collectivity, which figure so prominently in the sociopolitical "isms" of the modern world? One cannot assume an a priori logical relationship because rational men have differed from each other profoundly concerning these matters. One can conceive of liberty, equality, and democracy without modernization. Montesquieu, Jefferson, and Rousseau were, of course, convinced that obsessive concern with economic growth was detrimental to democracy, while Max Weber himself, who was a political liberal (and probably never thought of raising questions concerning the modernity of liberalism), was profoundly agonized by the implications of the bureaucratization of society incident to modernization for the survival of political liberty. He saw not a functional relation but a profound tension between these two elements of modernity.

To be sure, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been rich in social philosophies which assert on various grounds all sorts of necessary

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functional relationships between the process of modernization and particular political social values. One might say that an underlying shared assumption of these ideologies is that all the factors of progress must be harmonious with each other either immediately or ultimately. Such political and social values are often presented as either a necessary concomitant or function of the modernization process or a final outcome of this process. One way of viewing mature Marxism is to see in it the assertion that the process of modernization, here described as the capitalist mode of production,[6] must itself lead to the realization of socialism, while American social scientists have often seen in liberal values as they understand them the final culmination of the process of modernization. The doctrine of the "end of ideology" does not involve a rejection of given sociopolitical values. It rather involved the assumption that the modernization process, in its mature phase, will itself achieve these values without the intervention of moral and ideological passions. This is, of course, not the place to undertake a consideration of the modes of reasoning which enter into these various ways of linking modernization to sociopolitical philosophies. Suffice it to say that these controversies remain unresolved and that a non-Western intellectual looking in at the intellectual scene in Europe and America during the whole span of the twentieth century could not help but be aware of profound conflict and confusion on all these matters.

Beyond the unresolved controversies concerning sociopolitical ideals and modernization, what are we to say of such an important and recurrent movement of the modern spirit as romanticism? Romanticism may share with modernization a certain Faustian striving for mastery, but in this case it is not so much the mastery of the machinery of material and social technology as the conquest of the world of affective experience and sensibility. Of course, what it rejects most emphatically is what it regards as the desiccation of feeling in the cool and gray pathos of the machine-like world of modernization as a socioeconomic process.

What are we to say finally about the whole modernist movement in literature and art, which often reflects a range of attitudes toward modernization running the gamut from vehement negativity to indifference? C. P. Snow loudly lamented the lack of congeniality between one of his two cultures and the other, but it never occurred to him to impugn the modernity of the literary culture. One is reluctant to use the cliché word "alienation," yet it does say something about the nature of much of our profoundest modern literature.

One could of course extend ad infinitum the discussion of the tensions, conflicts, and incommunicabilities within the world of modernity. One could point to such diverse phenomena as the complete noncommunication between the worlds of Anglo-American linguistic philosophers and French existentialists; to the ambiguous relations to modernization of the various movements spawned by Freud in spite of his own self-conception as a

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thoroughly modern engineer of the soul. Enough has been said, it seems to me, to make it quite clear that the word "modernity" refers to no simple entity.

It may, of course, be true that at a deeper level many of the disparate movements and clashing ideas of the modern West may rest on certain unexpressed common assumptions. Perhaps they all share a pervading anthropocentrism, a tendency to view the nonhuman universe as meaningless and valueless. The various specific social and political ideologies may share with the more technocratic orientation a tendency to think in terms of the management and transformation of macroscopic social structures and of institutional frameworks (systems) rather than in terms of personal self-transformation or personal ethics. Yet whatever may be the underlying common premises, the horizontal tensions and conflicts among the various currents and countercurrents of the modern world make it impossible to think of modernity as any kind of completed or synthetic whole.

Chinese Intellectuals, Tradition, and Modernity

If Chinese tradition refers to a vast and variegated experience which we have only begun to study in depth and if modernity refers to a complex and unresolved state of affairs, this does not suggest that we are likely to discover a simple development model which will adequately explain the behavior of the Chinese intelligentsia during the period of transition (a period which, it seems to me, has hardly ended) from one to the other.

What makes the construction of such a model even less likely is that in dealing with the concrete experience of intellectuals within any given society we must introduce between tradition and modernity another crucial variable, namely the concrete specificities of history. In China the end of the examination system in 1905, the Japanese incursion into China, Mao's all-out cultural revolutionary assault on the intelligentsia—to mention certain events at random—are specific historic movements which must figure in any effort to understand the experience and the responses of Chinese intellectuals within the time period with which we are concerned. None of these specificities are reducible to the vague abstractions "tradition" and "modernity." One's interest in Chinese intellectuals cannot simply be in their role within some preestablished sociohistoric scheme. One must be intrinsically interested in the situations in which they find themselves and in how their ideas and passions relate to their situations. Out of this may emerge either an enrichment or stretching of the triadic scheme or perhaps even an abandonment of it in favor of more adequate conceptions.

Whether we deal with large tendencies, groups, or single individuals, the tradition/modernity polarity will in itself seldom, if ever, be adequate to the subject of our investigation.

Thus, if we consider what might be called the transitional generation

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which reached its creative peak in the last decade of the nineteenth century and first two decades of the twentieth century and which included among its leading figures such luminaries as K'ang Yu-wei, Yen Fu, Chang Ping-lin, Lin Shu, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Wang Kuo wei, T'an Ssu-t'ung, and others, we find a group whose early life had been profoundly molded by "traditional" China. To a degree, this remains true of the younger generation of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Hu Shih, Lu Hsün, and even of the student generation of May 4th (a generation now in its seventies). Depending upon a wide variety of social and geographic circumstances, many of the latter also spent their earliest childhood years in traditional China. Nevertheless, if one's conception of psychology allows one to concede that the second decade of the life cycle may be as crucial as the first, one must give enormous weight to the different life experiences of the two generations. The first decade of the twentieth century was to witness the demise of the imperial examination system and the scramble of the young to find new educational paths (largely in westernized schools) into an unknown future. All of this took place largely within an urban environment which was itself undergoing unprecedented change at an ever accelerating pace. In contrast, the older generation of intellectuals had still faced all the rigors and frustrations of the examination system and still had some expectation that the political system would continue to hold together.

It still was at home in the medium of classical Chinese,[7] with its rich burden of allusion, metaphors, and quotations derived from the culture of the past, and continued to be comfortable with traditional life styles. Some of its leading figures found the traditional family system quite tolerable on a personal level even when they were already prepared to criticize it severely on the abstract intellectual level. Few of them seemed to find traditional family practices as unendurable as they were to become for some young men and women of the next generation.

Above all, this generation lived sufficiently within the Chinese cultural stream to see it not as a harmonious integrated tradition but more as an arena of tensions, alternatives, and conflicts. It was thoroughly familiar with the intellectual tendencies of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century China and the animosities aroused by the relations among the various schools of literati even continued to shape their relationships to each other. The youthful K'ang Yu-wei had turned against the narrow "irrelevance" of the still dominant scholastic philological school (*K'ao cheng-p'ai*) which, in his view, had so little to say about the sufferings of men and the higher truths of Confucianism. He had for a time turned back to the thinkers of the Sung and Ming who had placed such stress on personal self-realization and had even been attracted by the radical transcendentalism of Buddhism. In the end, however, he believed that he found in a certain strain of early Han dynasty thought (the New Text School) the basis for a kind of redemptive philosophy of history which offered new hope for the collective future of

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mankind. At this point, to be sure, he was probably already in contact with Western theories of progress which he must have read back into his New Text philosophy. Yet the point is that this new Western element was fed back into a mental world still formed by the *Problematik* of nineteenth-century Chinese thought.

And yet, it was precisely this generation[8] which was to move well beyond the available range of Chinese thought and which was to prove eminently receptive to ideas from the West. Indeed, the more closely we examine their writings, the more impressed we are with the degree of openness and responsiveness to every variety of modern Western thought.

A common pervasive preoccupation of most of them[9] (particularly after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895) was the concern with China's survival as a sociopolitical entity. As a group which still thought of itself, first and foremost, in typical traditional terms as a state service class, one might say that its public concern with the nation's survival and its private status anxiety moved in the same direction. It was thus this generation that directly confronted the dread question: Were the resources of the culture of the past adequate to preserve China as an independent political entity? One of their number, Yen Fu puts the matter quite baldly: "We have no time to ask whether this knowledge is Chinese or western, whether it is new or old. If one course leads to ignorance and thus to poverty and weakness . . . we must cast it aside, if another course is effective in overcoming ignorance and thus leads to the cure of our poverty and weakness we must imitate it even if it proceeds from barbarians."[10] Having put the matter in this way, having subordinated other values to the survival of the nation state, they have crossed the divide between what Western students of China call "culturalism" (what the Chinese call *pao-tao* or "preserving the Way") and modern nationalism. This is true even of those conservative nationalists such as Chang Ping-lin who continue to place heavy emphasis on the importance of preserving traditions of the past in the interests of identity. We are often struck by the degree to which Western ideas and "isms"—equality, liberty, socialism—came to be viewed in China in terms of their efficacy as a means to the achievement of national wealth and power as well as ends in themselves.

This concern with nationalist goals implies more than nationalism as such. It implies nothing less than a positive orientation to modernization and the Faustian-Promethean values underlying modernization. One is astonished by how Weberian are the prescriptions which one finds in the writings of K'ang Yu-wei, Yen Fu, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. Whatever their differences, they are all concerned with the rationalization of the economic, bureaucratic, military, and legal spheres of life.

Yet while Western ideas and ideologies are often viewed as instrumental to national goals, they are also viewed in terms of their own intrinsic meanings. One finds an influx of a wide variety of specific sociopolitical "isms"

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of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe (albeit in a somewhat crude and simplified form) as well as all the puzzles involved in Western theories concerning the relationship of such ideologies to the process of modernization. Thus alongside of the scientific pathos of Yen Fu, who looks to nineteenth-century England as the teacher of piecemeal social engineering, we find the passionate revolutionary pathos of those who steep themselves in their own versions of Rousseau, the epic of the French Revolution, and the activities of contemporary Russian revolutionaries.

This openness to the variety of Western thought when combined with the ongoing sense of the variety of Chinese thought leads this generation to perceive not only antitheses but also affinities, similarities, and compatibilities between specific elements of Chinese traditional thought and specific varieties of modern Western thought. Some of this is, to be sure, disingenuous and even puerile and quite explicable in terms of the need to salvage national pride. Much of it is no doubt simply wrong and yet may reflect the brute fact that these people are inevitably forced to use the categories of thought and language available to them to assimilate the new ideas of the West.

I would submit at this point that there are no a priori grounds for assuming that all such attempts to find affinities and compatibilities are wrong in principle. There may indeed be elements of Chinese traditional thought which are similar to or compatible with elements of modern Western thought.[11] Only a careful, profound, and subtle study based on a thorough knowledge of the history of ideas and feel for language in both cultures can in the end determine whether any proposition of this type is valid or invalid and we find ourselves only at the very beginning of such transcultural investigations. When Yen Fu in his reading of T. H. Huxley[12] confronts the problem of whether human behavior can be wholly explained in terms of biological propensities or whether culture must be introduced as an independent variable, it occurs to him that *on the most general level* this debate had gone on in Chinese culture and that the Hsün-tze had adopted a position strikingly similar to that of Huxley. He had also believed that the anarchic biological propensities which man derived from nature can be brought under the control of the countervailing force of human culture. At the same time, Yen Fu is also acutely and even insistently aware of what is radically new in the Darwinian interpretation of biological reality. When others see identities between Rousseau and the book of Mencius, we cannot dismiss their claims out of hand but must examine the extent to which they may or may not be founded. We should not be deterred by culturalistic-historistic dogmas that there cannot possibly be any comparison between the thoughts of a Chinese literatus living several centuries before Christ and the neurotic social philosopher in eighteenth-century France.

Again, when T'an Ssu-t'ung finds in Buddhist philosophy as well as in Taoism and even some strands of Confucianism a kind of transcendental

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ground from which he can carry out an all-out attack on the ontological foundations of many of the forms and structures of contemporary Chinese society, he can find such grounds because they did indeed exist and had even been used in the past for similar purpose. When he uses this anti-formalistic mysticism as a kind of bridge to a cult of energy and dynamism of the Western type he has obviously added something new. Finally, while China may have never known revolution in the Western sense there were available utopian motifs and apocalyptic themes which could be fused in a potent blend with certain revolutionary tendencies out of the West as they indeed do in the writings of some anarchists and revolutionaries before 1911.

The complex dialectic of conscious and unconscious relations between the culture of the past and modernity is not confined to the pre-1911 generation, although it was most clearly illustrated in the life of experiences of that generation. It continues on into the present in complex and unresolved forms.

To be sure, in the generation which reached intellectual maturity after the 1911 revolution,[13] the concept of Chinese tradition or culture as an integrated whole to be rejected as a whole, does indeed emerge. Here we have a generation obviously less inside the Chinese past than the older generation. It was also a generation which keenly experienced the failures of the 1911 revolution and the political disintegration which followed that revolution. The experience of the years 1911-1919, certainly lent plausibility to a totalistic view of the traditional culture as a vast, inert, and uniform incubus strangling the vital spirits of the nation. One Chinese scholar, Lin Yu-sheng, has suggested that this totalistic rejection of Chinese culture in the May 4th period (which was, of course, not universal at this time or later) may itself be an unconscious reflection of a predominant traditional tendency to regard the cultural and political orders as one and indivisible. (This had not led even in the past, however, to any necessary consensus on the true nature of this cultural-political order.) With the collapse of the political order all aspects of the culture of the past lost their credibility. A totalistic view of culture led dialectically to a totalistic rejection of culture and beyond that to the yearning for a new totalistic cultural-political order of the future. Even in this generation, as Mr. Lin would gladly concede, when one focuses one's attention on its more creative individual representatives such as the writer Lu Hsün, one finds that the totalistic rejection of the past is often complicated by countermotifs. One finds here a vehement fury against the "man-eating" Confucian society of the past combined with a sensibility which is still under the spell of many aspects of Chinese folk culture and even of certain strains of the high culture of the past. Alongside of the rejection of the past we find a profound suspicion of many aspects of modern European urban culture and particularly of the contemporary Chinese "all-out Westerners" who represent this culture in China.

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Nevertheless, in general the rejection of the Chinese past did lead to a search for answers in the modern West. So powerful had the categories of Western thought become that even those who now chose to defend tradition sought their arguments not in Chinese literature but in the writings of Bergson and Babbit, Eucken and Russell. The modern West, however, yielded no unitary answers. One could find totalistic formulas which would sum up the Chinese past but one could not find unitary formulas which would sum up all the conflicting ideas and "isms" of modernity. Chinese intellectuals were confronted with all the conflicts and unresolved tensions of modernity as well as with the difficulty of applying any variety of modernity to Chinese conditions. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, one of the great spokesmen of totalistic anti-traditionalism, drifted from a kind of French liberalism to Marxism-Leninism to a quasi-Trotskyite version of Marxism-Leninism to a kind of belief in social democracy, while Hu Shih had come to regard himself as a spokesman of John Dewey's variety of liberalism. Accidents of individual fate often partially conditioned such philosophic decisions. The fact that Hu Shih was a student at Columbia University under John Dewey led him to a quite different version of modernity from that of many of his peers who studied in Tokyo. This reminds us once more of the degree to which the varieties of modernity in the West itself have been defined by the confining boundaries of disparate national cultures. Again, others of a more literary-poetic bent such as Hsü Chih-mo, Yü Ta-fu, and Kuo Mo-jo fell under the spell of Western romanticism. They saw China's cultural crisis much more in terms of the mystery of their individual existence than in terms of national destiny or the tasks of modernization.

We shall not attempt to recount the troubled intellectual history of China (that is, the intellectual history of the small but crucial intelligentsia) between 1920 and the rise of the People's Republic. Suffice to say that the intellectuals who rejected the past did not arrive at common conclusions concerning the essence of modernity nor did the totalistic rejection of the past abolish the continuing influence of that past, for good or ill, on the shaping of the present. For one thing, the vast majority of the Chinese rural population still continued to live habitually within the framework of a popular culture inherited from the past and continued to look to types of local intellectuals such as secret society leaders, Buddhist monks, Taoist priests, leaders of Confucian uplift societies, and popular sects. The latter did not look to Bergson or Babbitt for justification although some Western notions did creep into their fund of ideas. Not only were the intellectuals forced to confront this fact but their own relationship to the past continued to be complex on many conscious and unconscious levels. Nor can one dismiss the ideas of such neo-traditionalists as Feng Yu-lan, Liang Sou-ming, or Hsiung Shih-li merely on the ground that they defended Chinese traditions in terms of Western categories.

One can perhaps make a certain case for the assertion that the intellectual

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history of China after 1920 conformed to a certain pattern common to all developing countries. Certain types of political and economic liberalism were not to flourish among the Chinese intelligentsia although they continued to be represented. All the objective factors which have proved inimical to Western liberalism elsewhere could certainly be found in China. One might add here that however much the "higher civilizations" of the past may have differed from each other in terms of their ethical orientations, they have, on the whole, shared in common a negative attitude toward the pursuit of individual material self-interest and have, on the whole, striven for the achievement of consensus in commonly shared truth rather than for pluralism and dissent. From this point of view, to the extent that Western liberalism is identified with a capitalist ethic and/or pluralism as an ideal it is probably the most exotic and subversive product of modern Western thought. The resistance to these aspects of liberalism has, as we know, gone on in the heart of the modern West itself and antiliberal tendencies in China whether of right or left have from the outset been able to draw much of their doctrinal sustenance from the West itself. In this sense, antiliberal intellectuals in China and the developing world in general have been thoroughly contemporary with powerful ongoing tendencies in the Western world.

One must add that the word "liberalism" is a semantic monster burdened with an enormous accumulation of accretions of meanings. Looking at the fate of Chinese intellectuals on both the mainland and Taiwan from the perspective of 1971, one becomes aware of the fact that they had, after all, not remained untouched by all strands of liberalism and that Mao Tse-tung is not entirely wrong when he accuses them of a kind of ineradicable liberalism. It would appear that even intellectuals who had long since committed themselves to the Chinese Communist movement had to a greater or lesser degree continued to believe in intellectual autonomy and in the much abhorred doctrine that "all men are equal before the truth."

In any event neither the dichotomy liberalism/antiliberalism nor the dichotomy tradition/modernity are, it seems to me, ultimately illuminating in attempting to explain the specificities of Chinese developments since 1949, particularly as they affect the intellectuals.

This is, of course, not the place to consider the intellectual biography of Mao Tse-tung. Yet if we are to say anything about the fate of the intellectuals in the People's Republic we must say something about their main protagonist.

Mao's mistrust of the intellectuals[14] has early roots and was highly developed by 1949. The urban intellectuals were isolated from the realities with which he had been contending since the early Hunan-Kiangsi days. Their individualistic vanity led them to insist stubbornly on the validity of their own mistaken ideas. They had a built-in tendency to complicate simple truths and to seek ironies and ambiguities. They could not give

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themselves unreservedly to the battle and submit to the general will of the masses as Mao understood that will.

Nevertheless, it never seemed to occur to Mao before 1949 that the intellectuals were dispensable. Their thoughts would have to be transformed but they were necessary to the tasks which lay ahead. If the tasks of revolution in China had been reducible to simple maxims, the tasks of building socialism would probably be difficult and complex (as Soviet experience had demonstrated). Indeed, as we know, during the Hundred Flowers experiment of 1956-1957, he even experimented with the possibility of an enlarged area of freedom for intellectuals on the assumption that they had been "basically transformed." The results of that experience were, of course, to reconfirm his worst suspicions of them and to lead to the grander visions of both the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution—visions which projected the truly radical possibility of a Chinese road to modernization without intellectuals. The older intellectuals continue to embody all the corruptions, ambiguities, and cultural superfluities of both traditional Chinese culture *and* the modern West. They are the inveterate enemies of that new morality which would show the world that modernization and national power were not incompatible with a life of collective simplicity.

When one asks whether this vision is traditional or modern, one emerges with no clear answer. To the extent that it involves commitment to further modernization, it is, of course, modern. To the extent that it embodies primitivist yearnings, it may draw on Mao's early and ardent admiration for that type of Chinese literature which depicts the untutored yet pure-hearted tough guys (*yu-hsia*) of Chinese history as contrasted to the corrupt mandarins. It may owe something to the primitivist critique of the over-complexity and corruption of "higher civilization" which finds expression as early as the Book of Lao-Tzu and which remains a persistent motif of Chinese culture ever after. It may even draw on the facile moralism of certain varieties of Confucianism. One can look here to the Sage-Kings of hoary antiquity who transformed the hearts of men through their mana-like virtue.

Through Marxism-Leninism and other Western influences, one can also point to Western sources, to the kind of deep resentment of the vanity, insincerity, and selfishness of fellow intellectuals which one finds in Rousseau. One can point to many highly relevant attacks of Robespierre on the treachery of *les esprits* and their exasperating inability to align themselves with the general good. One can even point to *The Greening of America*.

If one asks oneself how it is conceivable that the primitivist critique of high civilization can be found in undeveloped traditional societies and the modern West, it must be pointed out that development may be very much a matter of perspective. To the author of the Lao Tzu, Chinese society of his time was already overcomplicated and full of needless artificialities and therefore corrupt. In all of this we may be dealing with an orientation

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which transcends the dichotomy of both East and West, of both tradition and modernity.

But what of the intellectuals themselves? Their experience since 1949 has indeed demonstrated that the Chinese intelligentsia, like intellectuals everywhere, do dwell on complexities, are attuned to ambiguities and ironies, and do indeed tend to develop a strong stake in their own ideas. In this sense they are the enemies of simplicity although in other contexts they may also be the great yearners for simplicity. When given the opportunity they continue to find meaning in the culture of the past, they continue to be attracted by various tendencies in the West, and they continue to stress theoretical complexities.

What then of the future? If Mao's experiment does not succeed and a new generation of intellectuals does emerge (the Maoists have practically succeeded in stilling the voice of the older generation), where will it go? If it reacts against the Cultural Revolution will it finally achieve modernity? The entire drift of what has been said above would suggest that the only proper approach to these questions is one of Socratic ignorance—an openness to unforeseen possibilities. Since Mao has carried out an across-the-board attack against the Chinese cultural past, the whole gamut of modern Western culture, and the pretensions of technological expertise, one might, in China, expect, at least for a time, a common front among the representatives of all these tendencies. What they share in common, after all, is a defense of cultural complexity and the values of high culture. Under conditions of relaxation one would expect to see Chinese intellectuals renew their interest in the West, but the modern West of 1972 is not the West of 1919. It is more deeply involved than ever in its own unresolved intellectual and moral crises. One would thus expect a new Chinese intellectual generation to be far less passive and far more critical in its relations to various tendencies in the West. (This is already visible in some of our Chinese students.) Some tendencies out of the past might witness a strong revival, and the dialectic of relationship of traditional and modern factors would continue to produce novel combinations. Since China's objective situation remains vastly different from that of the West (for example, the overwhelming weight of its agrarian population), China may indeed have to develop its own patterns of modernization. Thus neither tradition nor modernity provide the image of China's future in a world where the future of modernity itself remains unclear.

References

1. In all thinking in terms of "development models" one often finds, even in the same author, a constant oscillation between a descriptive-determinist approach and a prescriptive-projective approach. One speaks of how intellectuals will necessarily behave in terms of the laws of development or how they ought to behave if the

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project of modernization is to succeed. In the one case the intellectuals are included within the whole impersonal process. In the other, modernization is conceived of as a project and the intellectuals are conceived of as standing outside. They navigate the ship of history for the rest of mankind.

2. Particularly among students of Japan. Also noticeably in the work of Professor S. N. Eisenstadt.

3. It is interesting to observe that Max Weber, whose concept of "traditional modes of domination" is one source of the prevailing more generalized concept of traditional society, was himself almost obsessively concerned with the *differences* among the higher civilizations of the past.

4. This leaves open the question of the ulterior purposes of this mastery, which, it seems to me, is left somewhat vague in Weber.

5. It is, of course, impossible to say that any of them were new in any absolute sense. They may all have deep roots in Western culture, as Carl Becker insisted. Whether absolutely new or not, there were serious and profound differences in the world visions of Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Hume, and the Marquis de Sade.

6. Of course, Marx's concept of modernization incorporates the moral conflict element of class struggle.

7. Here again, the term "classical Chinese" covers a complex history of stylistic conflicts—conflicts in which the transitional generations continued to participate.

8. We are here speaking, of course, of the creative minority.

9. But not all. Wang Kuo-wei was very soon to turn away from the preoccupation with national power to his more fundamental concern with universal problems of human suffering. Significantly he was greatly attracted to Schopenhauer.

10. *Yü Wai-chiao pao chu-jen lun chiao-yü shu* (Letter to the editor of *Wai-chiao pao* on education) cited in my *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 49.

11. This does not necessarily have optimistic implications. It may not be the best elements of both cultures that are compatible.

12. See Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power.*

13. We may loosely call this the "May 4th Generation" if we include both the older vanguard figures such as Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao, Hu Shih, and so forth, and the students of 1919.

14. In Chinese terms he must himself be classed as an intellectual or marginal intellectual. He is not a peasant leader in the Zapata sense.

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ROBERT N. BELLAH

Intellectual and Society in Japan

At the beginning of the Chinese tradition as at the beginning of the European stands an intellectual who derived a conception of order in society from a conception of order in the Soul.[1] Both Confucius and Plato developed an idea of the Good (Chinese: *jen;* Greek: *agathon*) which provided a norm or measure for centuries of subsequent political thought. Though Confucian thought was long influential in Japan and much later Greek thought has not been without consequence, no such profound intellectual conception stands at the beginning of the Japanese tradition. Rather, the givenness of society, radically challenged in their very different ways by Confucius and Plato, has survived as the central focus of reflection in Japan.

I

Shōtoku Taishi (573-621), prince-regent under the Empress Suiko, is perhaps an archetype of the Japanese intellectual. A semilegendary figure associated with the beginning of the effort to establish a centralized imperial state on the Chinese model, he is credited with the first explicit statement of the normative order of Japanese society (the so-called Seventeen-Article Constitution) as well as with the first writings that give evidence of a profound grasp of Buddhism in Japan. For present purposes the authenticity of the documents is less important than their symbolic significance in subsequent Japanese thought. The Seventeen-Article Constitution ransacks the resources of Chinese culture to express the essential ideals of Japanese society.[2] Article one stresses harmony (*wa*), perhaps the quintessential Japanese social value, and subsequent articles extol in various ways the virtues of group solidarity, individual submission to group interests, and the self-sacrifice of high and low alike for group ends. Though almost all the language is in some sense Confucian, except for article two which is explicitly Buddhist, the Confucian idea of the Good (*jen*) is mentioned only once, in article six, and that in passing.

Shōtoku Taishi has the peculiar distinction of being not only the first

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in a long line of intellectuals to express in foreign concepts the nearly inarticulate sociocentric emphasis of Japanese culture; he was also the first to use foreign ideas to cast doubt on the self-sufficiency of that emphasis. If he was the first "official intellectual" he was also the first "critical intellectual." The form of his criticism was his deep Buddhist piety expressed in his oft repeated phrase, "The world is empty and vain; only the Buddha is true."[3] Of course the dichotomy of "official" and "critical" is too simple. The proclamation that there is a transcendent reality which renders empty all earthly values had little sociological implication other than the establishment of a Buddhist monastic community (*sangha*) independent of political control. On the other hand the Seventeen-Article Constitution was obliquely critical in that it stated an ideal of general submission to the emperor when in fact Soga no Umako had dominant power at court and the Soga clan had for some decades effectively dominated the imperial family. Indeed the constitution may have been written after 645 when the Soga were overthrown and attributed to Shōtoku Taishi in order to help legitimize the Taika reforms dating from that year. In any case Shōtoku's difficulties with the Soga seem to have been real enough, so that he found himself in the typical predicament of the Japanese intellectual: having to deal not only with the relation between foreign culture and the Japanese tradition, but also with the problem of arbitrary political forces which frustrate political idealism. His decision to withdraw more and more into Buddhist devotion in his later years was also prophetic.

There were clearly some remarkable minds at work in Japan during the seventh and eighth centuries when virtually the whole range of Chinese culture and social institutions were imported into Japan. Along with the rest came the Chinese (Confucian) idea of education and the competitive examination system for officials. But the educational and examination system was one of the earliest casualties of the process of erosion of Chinese institutions which set in almost at once. A secular intelligentsia oriented to bureaucratic office on the Chinese model did not develop, largely because the aristocratic clans managed to keep effective control of the land and to appropriate the newly established ranks and offices. The court aristocracy was literate as the rising local military families later would also be, but neither showed much interest in the theoretical aspects of the Chinese tradition, either metaphysical or political. Rather they inclined toward poetry and fiction if they became interested in literature at all. Their writings tended to be in Japanese rather than in Chinese and to be a vehicle more for emotion than thought. Theoretical culture was kept alive among the monks and was of course mostly Buddhist, though Confucian texts continued to be studied. The split between abstract foreign culture carried by relatively isolated intellectual coteries and emotional native culture more widely shared among the people has never been entirely overcome.

Until the seventeenth century intellectual life, with the partial exception

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of belles-lettres, was largely confined to the religious—Buddhist monks and later Shinto priests. Shinran (1173-1262) in the Pure Land tradition and Dōgen (1200-1253) in the Zen tradition carried Japanese Buddhism to its highest peaks. Both broke through the givenness of Japanese society in their demand for absolutely transcendental loyalty, but it proved difficult sociologically to capitalize on these breakthroughs. Shinran's intense spirituality in the preaching of absolute "other power" had an electric influence during his lifetime but no very stable organization crystallized after his death. It was not until the time of Rennyo (1415-1499), the so-called second founder of the True Pure Land sect, that a powerful organization was created and that was in part because Rennyo included a great deal of Confucian ethics in his teaching along with "other shore" piety. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in some areas True Pure Land sect believers actually established independent political control, but not until they had come to mirror in large part the hereditary leader-follower social pattern of the environing feudal society. Loyalty and self-sacrifice were to be devoted to Amida and the sect leaders, not to the feudal lords, but the structure of relations was quite similar. Any chance that these religious structures might develop alternative patterns of social life was lost when the secular power of the religious sects was crushed by the great military dictators of the late sixteenth century, Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi.

The vigorous and independent life of the Zen monastery at the time of Dōgen later declined and the Zen monastery tended to become an educational center for the dissemination of Neo-Confucianism. Closely in touch with currents of thought in China the Zen monks, particularly of the Rinzai school, were broadly educated and made excellent advisers for shogun and daimyō. In fact Zen became associated with the samurai class and made significant contributions to its gradually developing status ethic, later called Bushidō.

To sum up the picture of Japanese intellectual life before the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1600 we may say that there were two periods of marked vitality and originality: poetry and fiction in the Heian period (794-1192) and religion in the Kamakura period (1192-1333). Some works of history were written from the early eighth century on which contained some political and social reflection, but no major work of political or social philosophy was produced in the entire period. Confucian morality continued to percolate throughout the society, to rationalize leader-follower relations, and to alter some features of traditional Japanese society, such as lowering the status of women in the samurai class. But the givenness of society was largely its own justification. When in the course of the centralization of Japan leading up to the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate the decision was made first to restrict and then to extirpate Christianity it was partly parallel to the destruction of the secular power

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of the Buddhist sects, partly because of the fear of the foreign powers behind the missionaries, but partly because Christianity was seen as a threat to the givenness of the social order. Fabian, Catholic apostate turned Buddhist, criticized the first of the Ten Commandments, "Thou shalt venerate *Deus* alone," as undermining the social order by advocating rebellion against lords and fathers. Rather, he said, "It is the way of man to live in accord with the rules of the Shogun who is the ruler of Japan, so long as one lives in Japan."[4]

II

Whatever the continuities, in its intellectual life, Japan at the beginning of the Tokugawa period was significantly different from the time of Shōtoku Taishi. Buddhism had stirred the hearts of the masses and had brought even the remotest villages into touch with universal ideas and national movements. In a somewhat inchoate way the needs of the peasants had begun to be articulated by the popular sects and resistance against samurai pressure had occurred, even though ending in defeat. Both Buddhism and particularly Confucianism had contributed to the development of a rigorous status ethic among the samurai and to the construction of a model of political relations which now had to be generalized to the whole country. Even if the emperor as descendant of the sun goddess still reigned and the round of village ritual with its Shinto observance only lightly colored by Buddhism continued as it had for centuries, the native tradition alone was far too inarticulate to provide a conscious conception of the new order which was to arise from the Tokugawa peace. One source from which ideas might have come was now excluded. The door had been firmly shut on a Europe which was about to produce a Spinoza and a Descartes, a Hobbes and a Locke. The only available tradition which could provide a self-picture for the new society was Confucianism, and it was to Confucianism that the early Tokugawa shogunate turned.

It should not be imagined, however, that the Tokugawa system was the creation of intellectuals, Confucian or otherwise. As Ogyū Sorai later pointed out, Tokugawa Ieyasu, the founder of the house, was a Sengoku daimyō, a feudal lord of the warring period, and the system he constructed was what you might expect from such a man.[5] Although it did not meet the systematizing standards of Sorai, the system put together by Ieyasu and his vassals and retainers, with only a modicum of advice from intellectuals, was a powerful and effective one, as has so often been the case in Japan. Warfare between feudal lords was eliminated and strong political control, direct in the central domain of the shogunate itself, indirect elsewhere, extended throughout the entire country. The natural consequences were a rapid advance in the agricultural and merchant spheres of the economy, rapid urbanization, and a general cultural efflorescence.

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What the Confucian scholars were not asked to construct they were asked to explain and defend. It is no accident that the school of Confucianism which Ieyasu chose to patronize and which later became the official school of the shogunate was that of Fujiwara Seika (1561-1619) and his pupil Hayashi Razan (1583-1657), followers of the Chu Hsi or Sung Confucian school in China. Sung Confucianism had for some time been the official orthodoxy in China largely because it gave nearly absolute endorsement to established authority in family and state. The system developed by Chu Hsi and his immediate followers was one of great complexity and profundity, but its use in later centuries, perhaps not unlike the use of Thomism in the Catholic church, was largely defensive. It tended to identify the existing social order with the order of nature itself and to preach an ethics of submissiveness within the inherited status system. But as is usual in Japan no single intellectual tradition provided the legitimation of authority. Ieyasu made a great point, as Nobunaga and Hideyoshi had before him, of his reverence for the emperor. The Kyoto court, though deprived of any real power, was lavishly subsidized and the emperor was recognized as the ultimate source of legitimacy for the shogun. Seika and Razan duly included a solemn exposition of Shinto myth (explicated in edifying Confucian concepts) as part of their teaching. In addition, Buddhism, though not contributing any appreciable element to the intellectual foundation of the regime, was patronized organizationally. As part of the system of thought control leading to the extirpation of Christianity all Japanese were required to become members of a Buddhist parish. This "establishment" of Buddhism among the masses was occurring just when Buddhism as a system of ideas was losing its hold among the elite.

Nonetheless it was only gradually that the intellectual role, almost identical with that of Buddhist monk in previous centuries, began to establish itself independently. Though sharply critical of Buddhism, Fujiwara Seika was himself a monk and it was not until 1691 that the head of the shogun's Confucian school was allowed to be a layman. The founder of the school of philological studies which resurrected the language and thought of ancient Japan, Keichū (1640-1701), was a monk and Matsuo Bashō (1644-1694), the greatest of the haiku poets, lived a semimonastic existence. But by the end of the seventeenth century a number of independent secular bases for intellectual life had been established. The Tokugawa peace brought a new interest in education and literacy and the demand for teachers was high.[6] The samurai, no longer primarily warriors but civil administrators, were admonished to combine literary arts (*bun*) with the military ones (*bu*). Though the samurai class was largely a salaried bureaucracy, not, as in China, a landed gentry, it took on something of the character of a stratum of literati for the first time in Japanese history. Confucian scholars as teachers, advisers, and administrators became increasingly important

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throughout the period. Official schools of the shogunate or the fiefs provided employment to significant numbers of such scholars.

But in addition to the official intellectual world, urbanization and the growing cultural interests of wealthy townsmen and peasants provided the social basis for a "free intelligentsia," independent of either monastic or governmental structures, for the first time in Japanese history. Well-known scholars were able to establish their own schools in the cities and larger towns and to make a good living from their students and from lecture tours. Medicine was a high status free profession which was followed by such diverse intellectuals as Andō Shōeki, Motoori Norinaga, and Yamagata Daini. Literacy, estimated to have reached approximately 40 per cent by the end of the Tokugawa period,[7] was sharply on the increase during the seventeenth century and provided a basis for the first time for a mass publishing industry which could support full-time writers.

It would be surprising if in this welter of cultural activity we did not begin to see the emergence of "critical intellectuals." Political criticism and protest are evident during the Tokugawa period but they occur so spasmodically and in so devious and muted a form that their absence is a larger problem for explanation than their presence. Part of the answer, of course, is the oppressive hand of the shogunate. Its encouragement of the Chu Hsi school implied a criticism of other intellectual tendencies, though only when the shogunate perceived a direct political threat was there actual suppression of nonorthodox scholars and even then with nothing like the severity shown toward Christianity. Censorship of the theater and popular books was concerned as much with enforcing Confucian morality as with political orthodoxy. Perhaps as important in minimizing dissent as pressure from above was the view shared by all schools (in China as well) that political criticism was a form of faction, and faction a form of rebellion. Only with the greatest difficulty in the Tokugawa period would it have been possible to legitimize political dissent, criticism, and controversy. No conception of a free marketplace of ideas in this sphere existed.

One form of social criticism was allowed, however. Indeed it was almost required. This was the conservative form of criticism which denounced the present for not conforming to the purer customs of an earlier day. Both Chinese and Japanese governments welcomed such criticism, especially when it denounced sons for being insufficiently filial and retainers for being insufficiently loyal. Denunication of the wealth and ostentation of prosperous townsmen and peasants was also highly approved. Only when such criticism became strident and led to insistent demands for government intervention, especially if the criticism and demands came from nonorthodox scholars, was the government inclined to crack down. Kumazawa Banzan (1619-1691), a follower of the school of Wang Yang-ming, the Ming Dynasty rival of Chu Hsi, was placed under house arrest during the last years of his life; his protector, the daimyo of Okayama, was pressured into abandoning

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the teachings of his school[8] after Banzan intemperately offered direct reform proposals to the shogunate. Yamago Sokō (1622-1685) opposed the teachings of Chu Hsi and argued for a return to the teachings of Confucius himself, unencumbered by later interpretations. He was thus one of the founders of what came to be called the Ancient Learning (*kogaku*) School. The vigor of his views earned him exile. Nonetheless neither the Wang Yang-ming nor the Ancient Learning School was suppressed and they continued to produce important (and occasionally critical) scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Conservative criticism, unless it became too strident, was no threat to the status quo because it never questioned the givenness of the social order. It criticized latter day fallings away from that order, not its fundamental principles. With Ogyū Sorai, however, criticism, though conservative on the surface, reached a profound level and the implications of his teachings changed the Tokugawa intellectual world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[9] Sorai was the son of a physician and was educated to follow his father's career. However, at a fairly young age he abandoned medicine for Confucian studies. Sorai was the greatest representative of the Ancient Learning School and like his predecessors he rejected the teachings of the commentators in favor of a return to the primary texts of Confucianism. His greatness, however, transcends membership in any school. Sorai was almost unique in the history of Japanese Confucianism in the extent to which he identified himself with the Chinese culture in which he was steeped. His Sinophilia was so great that he willingly called himself an "Eastern Barbarian" (a term used in China to refer to the Japanese) and upon moving his residence in Edo announced that he was pleased with his new residence in a more easterly quarter of the city "because it is closer to China."

Looking coldly at Tokugawa society and its problems from his Chinese perspective, Sorai was perhaps the first Japanese intellectual to subject the foundation of his own society to skeptical criticism. He developed his own conception of the Confucian Way. For Sorai the Way governing society was not derived from the natural order of the cosmos (as the followers of Chu Hsi taught) nor from the nature of the human heart (as the followers of Wang Yang-ming taught) but from the sage teachings of the ancient Chinese kings. The Way of society is a humanly constructed order and even though the ancient kings had the highest wisdom, every age must to some extent construct its own institutions. Sorai takes the Confucian notion of the Good, *jen*, as the most basic teaching, as a norm for social and personal order:

> In Confucian doctrine Jen occupies the most important place. Why is this so? It is because Jen is that which advances and embodies the Way of the Former Kings. The Way of the Former Kings is the Way of giving peace and security to the world.

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Jen is the term used to refer to those qualities in a man which promote the growth and development of mankind and give peace and security to the people. This is the great virtue which was possessed by the Sages. "The great virtue of the universe is life." The sage conforms to this.

Jen is the Way of "nourishment." Hence in ruling the state one should "raise up the straight and set aside the crooked, and thereby make the crooked become straight." In personal conduct, too, the individual should nourish his good qualities, and thereby his evil qualities will disappear of themselves.[10]

While Sorai spent much of his life as an independent teacher with his own school, he served the Daimyo of Dewa, a member of the shogunal government, for a period and late in life was a frequent adviser to the shogunate. Much of his thinking, therefore, was directed to problems of government and its reform. Perhaps the most profoundly shocking of Sorai's opinions was that the shogun was the legitimate ruler of Japan and the emperor was superfluous, an almost unheard of view before modern times. Sorai traced much of the troubles of the regime to its founder Tokugawa Ieyasu, also a rather shocking procedure in terms of the pieties of the period. Whereas Ieyasu should have founded a new regime on broad and systematic foundations, he was, said Sorai, after all just a Sengoku daimyo, and merely projected on a national scale the experience he had had in extending power from his own domain as a base. Sorai felt the time had probably passed when the regime could undergo a fundamental reform and went to his death full of gloomy forebodings about the future of the country under leadership which he regarded as incompetent.

The particular measures which Sorai advocated were a mixture of radical and conservative elements. He advocated a strong central bureaucratic administration under the shogun with the feudal lords all but eliminated. Offices would be filled by merit rather than heredity, which meant primarily that lower ranking samurai would have a better chance, though Sorai had no objection in principle to townsmen or peasants holding office, providing they were men of talent. In these respects Sorai can be said to have anticipated the Meiji period. In other ways he was extremely old-fashioned. He was suspicious of the money economy and would have liked virtually to eliminate merchants and cities. The samurai would return to the land, and therefore no longer need money payments, and an idyllic rural existence would be enjoyed by a population of samurai and farmers. Such notions were reiterated by other thinkers of the period since they conformed to old Confucian ideals, but even many Confucian scholars recognized that they were utterly impractical. It was not, however, Sorai's particular proposals which were influential but rather his whole way of thinking which opened up for conscious reflection aspects of the cultural and social order previously closed to thought. The implications of Sorai's views had become sufficiently clear by 1790 to lead the shogunate to issue its famous ban on heterodoxy, aimed chiefly at the followers of Sorai, which led to the expulsion or conversion of scholars other than those of the Chu Hsi

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school in the shogunal university and the fief schools. In various ways, however, the views of Sorai continued to influence thought in the nineteenth century, making a significant contribution to the open-minded reflection about institutional change which characterized the leaders of the Meiji Restoration.

The curious influence of Sorai's thought was paradoxically present in a man who was almost his opposite, Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801),[11] the greatest figure in the National Learning School (Kokugaku), which was as radically committed to ancient Japanese culture as Sorai was to ancient Chinese. The logic of Sorai's return to the ancient texts and the radical commitment to the Way he found in them was followed by Norinaga, even though the texts in question were different and commitment to them had different consequences. Norinaga was one of the best educated of Tokugawa intellectuals and was influenced by many traditions other than that of Sorai. Especially important to him was the philological tradition going back to Keichū, mentioned above, and the Confucian Shinto tradition of Yamazaki Ansai (1618-1682). Whereas Sorai had been of samurai origin and became an adviser to the shogun, Norinaga was of merchant background and remained all his life a doctor and private teacher. Norinaga studied Confucianism in Kyoto with a teacher deeply influenced by Sorai. In the end, however, Norinaga concluded that the Confucian Way is the Way of governing the empire or a country and not the Way for an ordinary person or "small man" like himself.[12] Neither Norinaga nor later leaders of the school devoted themselves directly to political thought, partly because the leaders were all commoners and the movement appealed mainly to merchants and wealthy peasants,[13] though it was not without influence among samurai especially late in the period.

While remaining largely apolitical the thought of Norinaga and his followers had at least latently radical consequences. The ancient Way that Norinaga discovered in the ancient Japanese texts was not, like that of Sorai, a humanly constructed Way. On the contrary it was divinely instituted, indeed, a Way of the gods. Norinaga harshly rejected the notion that rulership should depend, as in Confucianism, on virtue. The Japanese emperor rules because of his descent from the sun goddess, regardless of virtue or the lack thereof. By implication the whole social order is validated by Norinaga's logic—not, as in Chu Hsi Confucianism, because it is alleged to conform to natural reason, but because it rests ultimately on arbitrary divine decree. Nonetheless Norinaga's critique of foreign, especially Chinese, culture had some subtle implications. For Norinaga true Japanese culture is natural, emotional, and even "feminine," whereas Chinese culture (in Japan largely samurai culture) was artificial, calculating, and "masculine."[14] However much the latter might fit the Chinese it was, in Norinaga's opinion, pernicious in Japan. It was Norinaga's dissatisfaction with ruling class culture that was for a long time the major subversive in-

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fluence of the National Learning School. Norinaga's reverence for the emperor did not preclude profound loyalty to the Tokugawa regime, which after all also professed a high regard for him. Only at the very end of the Tokugawa period were National Learning School ideas used to undermine the Tokugawa regime,[15] and then mainly by outsiders since most official teachers of the school remained steadfastly apolitical.

Sorai's ideas had more explosive consequences in the hands of a man like Yamagata Daini (1725-1767),[16] who combined them curiously with the Shinto Confucian tradition of Yamazaki Ansai. Daini agreed with Sorai that the samurai should be returned to the land, but as commoners. Daini argued that the whole period of military rule had been a mistake and that only an abolition of the samurai class and the combing of the country for talent under the restored rule of the emperor could solve the nation's problems. Daini, himself of samurai origin, had been an official of the shogunate as well as a private doctor and teacher. In 1766 he apparently planned a rising against the shogunate involving samurai and armed peasants. He was arrested and executed. Daini had no immediate followers and the significance of his thought and action should not be exaggerated, but he was the first to move from critical thought to direct action and his example was not lost on the restorationist intellectuals at the end of the Tokugawa period.

The great fief of Mito, belonging to a collateral house of the Tokugawa family, had been the center of historical research even in the seventeenth century. The later Mito School under the leadership of Aizawa Seishisai (1782-1863) and Fujita Tōko (1806-1855) and perhaps under the influence of an infusion of ideas from the school of Sorai directed its attention to the Tokugawa institutional system and its need for reform. The Mito School, officially committed to Chu Hsi Confucianism and Shinto, worked out the theory of the National Polity (*kokutai*) and the duties and obligations of subjects (*taigi meibun*) which would become the major ingredients of the orthodox version of the Meiji emperor system after 1890. This did not mean that the Mito School was itself subversive. As in the case of the National Learning School, the ideas of the Mito School were not used against the regime until the shogunate began to prove unable to cope with the foreigners after 1853.

One significant late Tokugawa opposition intellectual did not apparently owe anything to Sorai. He is worth discussing as an example of the critical possibilities within the Wang Yang-ming school of thought, which would be influential at the end of the Tokugawa period and in early Meiji as well. His name is Ōshio Heihachirō (1793-1837)[17] and his influence is by no means dead even today. Ōshio was of samurai origin and a hereditary retainer of the shogunate. He served for some twenty years as a magistrate in Osaka, where he was noted for his zeal and honesty. After 1830 he passed on his post to his adopted son and occupied himself as a full-time teacher.

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His teaching took the form of a rather ardent monism in which the usual distinctions between inner and outer, self and nonself, active and passive are overcome. From this point of view self-cultivation is identical with public moral action and the evil actions of men in society is experienced as pain interior to the self. In the light of his radical monism he viewed evil in society as the result of mistaken distinctions and differences. The people and the emperor should be united in unbroken harmony but instead the shogunate and the samurai class stand between and oppress both emperor and people.

The intensity of Ōshio's convictions finally led him to carry out an uprising which was perhaps the most significant in the Tokugawa period before the 1860's since, unlike numerous peasant rebellions, it had a conscious ideology. More religious than political, this ideology nonetheless broached themes that would have abiding significance. The rebellion itself was ill-planned. Though about one quarter of the city of Osaka was burned it took the troops of the shogunate only two days to restore order. Ōshio and his son fled and about a month later committed suicide by sword and fire when capture was imminent. If Ōshio expected success at all it was not through rational strategy but through the suasive effect of a pure moral act, striking enough to bring in a new dispensation at one blow. Conspiratorial planning would have been precisely the kind of "partial" and "separate" action which he was attempting to overcome. Similar problems, arising from the structure of Japanese values and group life, affected many later activists, including Mishima Yukio, who took Ōshio as his role model.

So far we have considered mainly elite thinkers and movements. There were also a number of movements in the Tokugawa period whose leaders were intellectuals of a sort even if they did not have a highly sophisticated education. Ishida Baigan (1685-1744)[18] and Ninomiya Sontoku (1787-1856) who worked, respectively, among the townsmen and peasant classes are perhaps the best known. Such movements, even though using mainly Confucian vocabulary, were concerned with inculcating self-discipline and self-respect among the common people and providing motivation for improving their material situation.[19] Similar in consequence though deriving more from Shinto and Buddhist concepts was the spate of popular religions which sprang up in late Tokugawa times: Tenrikyō, Konkokyō, Kurozumikyo, Maruyamakyō, and the like. None of these movements was explicitly concerned with political change and a number of them, for example Shingaku in its later phases, were co-opted by the shogunate as part of its apparatus of ideological control. Most of them espoused an ideology of harmony and obedience which would have made rebellious actions almost unthinkable, but they did nonetheless give expression to the autonomous drive for self-improvement and dignity among the commoner classes and implicity opposed the callous and utilitarian attitudes toward them of

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at least some samurai thinkers. These movements together with such mass phenomena as the periodic great pilgrimages to the Grand Shrine of Ise, sometimes involving several million people, also served to break down the narrow confines of village and fief and to develop the beginnings of a common consciousness among the Japanese people. In contributing to the development of an incipient national consciousness they did among the commoners what the major elite intellectual movements discussed above did for the upper classes.

A survey of Tokugawa intellectual life up to about 1850 would hardly make one believe that a regime was about to fall. On the contrary it would be more apt to convince one of the effectiveness and perhaps the oppressiveness of a regime which was able to maintain the loyalty of the vast majority of its intellectuals and to blunt criticism so that it dealt more often with surface symptoms than with basic principles. Few of Sorai's successors had his critical perspicuity. From the vantage point of 1850 Yamagata Daini and Ōshio Heihachiro could be viewed as isolated and insignificant figures. The main currents of intellectual life followed the channels which the regime had marked out for them. If leading thinkers did not loudly extol the shogunate, and most of them did, they at least proclaimed the virtues of harmony and obedience. In those few cases where opposition did break out it took the form of dramatic and, at least in the immediate outcome, futile expressive gestures—rebellion and/or suicide—rather than sustained organization of a political opposition, for which the society supplied few cultural or social supports.

It is no surprise then that there is little consensus on which Tokugawa intellectual movements provided the main impetus for the Meiji Restoration. None of them provided much impetus in that direction until the shogunate itself began to display flagrant incompetence in the 1850's and 1860's. Under pressure, most of the prominent traditions, including Chu Hsi Confucianism, could rationalize a change of regime. But what was presented as an alternative was neither very clear nor very radical. The idea of a restoration of the emperor was powerful emotionally (the Tokugawa shogunate had itself claimed to be an imperial restoration) but lacked content. The notion of a greater degree of centralization and greater utilization of talent from all classes had long been at hand in the well-understood system of Chinese centralized empire. Basic issues about Japanese society—the place of the emperor, the nature of authority, and obedience in family and state—were not raised.

It is difficult to state with precision what was the role of intellectuals in the process leading up to the Meiji Restoration. Certainly intellectuals, almost exclusively samurai intellectuals, first saw the need for a radical change of regimes and organized the first efforts to bring about such change. The initial attempts, however, were not much more effective than the earlier efforts of Yamagata and Ōshio. Small groups of samurai or

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rōnin conspiring in the cities were unable to mobilize any effective support to sustain an opposition movement. Only when the great western fiefs turned against the regime was there a power base sufficiently strong to succeed. Of course the work of the intellectuals in creating a national climate of opinion favorable to restoration and a revival of national consciousness was essential. But the young administrators who moved into commanding positions in the new Meiji government were not among the most ideologically fervent. Behind the Meiji Restoration stood no Locke or Rousseau, no Marx or Lenin, no Gandhi or Mao Tse-tung, but only a group of open-minded young men, ready to learn, committed to Japan, but with no determinate vision of the future.

III

The curious thing about Japan compared to most non-Western nations is how well the young men succeeded. They and their successors have continued to rule Japan for a hundred years—through enormous successes and occasional severe setbacks. They have never been successfully challenged by a political opposition led by ideological intellectuals. They have never been overthrown. Unlike most major nations in the world the word "revolution" can be used in Japan with respect to the future or not at all.

It would not be correct to say that intellectuals had nothing to do with the formation of the Meiji state. Most of the Meiji leaders were themselves at least part-time intellectuals, but their ideas were put at the service of practical exigencies rather than vice versa. Their real creativity lay in organizational ingenuity rather than in the production of novel concepts. As was true in the Tokugawa period many of the autonomous intellectuals were co-opted by the government, especially in the early Meiji period, and served it well, including some who had begun as sharp critics of the regime such as Katō Hiroyuki and Mori Arinori. But the Meiji leadership was concerned with Japanese survival first of all and then with increasing wealth and power. It had no quarrel with the givenness of Japanese society except where it impeded these goals. It was not committed to a new conception of man or a new idea of society but rather to a defense of the old ones insofar as erosion of old conceptions and ideas threatened the more pragmatic goals.

Since the government was both effective and moderately repressive, intellectuals in the Meiji period and later have had some of the same problems as intellectuals in the Tokugawa period. The content of many of the modern ideologies has had a high degree of social relevance and has conceived of intellectuals as socially responsible, as did Tokugawa Confucianism. Since intellectuals have always been kept on the margins politically the tension has been severe. The traditional temptations of dramatically expressive but practically ineffective opposition or withdrawal into the private sphere of aesthetics or religion have remained strong throughout the modern period. The most powerful control on freewheeling intel-

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lectuals has been the strong sense of national identity, with its deep symbolic implication of life-giving maternal acceptance, that has been building up since the seventeenth century and has with almost mathematical regularity pulsated periodically ever since. Opposition which has not been justified in emotionally nationalist terms has been difficult to sustain, especially in periods, such as the present, when nationalistic sentiments are on the rise.

Even though there are important continuities in intellectual life between the Tokugawa and the modern periods there are of course very great differences. Above all, the range of cultural possibilities in Japan was enormously broadened by the reception of Western culture after 1868. The Japanese capacity to accept foreign culture without losing its own coherence and continuity, already severely tested by the reception of Chinese culture, was stretched to the breaking point. But in spite of enormous problems the flexibility of the Japanese pattern has once again been demonstrated.

Before discussing a few of the intellectual tendencies in modern Japan and the role they projected for intellectuals (even a sketch of Japan's convoluted modern intellectual history would be far too ambitious for this essay) we may consider briefly the occupational basis and career pattern of modern Japanese intellectuals.

Those few Japanese who could use a European language in 1868 were in an enormously advantageous position. Many were quickly taken into the government. Others established their own schools on the old Tokugawa private school model, teaching English and European studies rather than Confucianism. Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) founded such a school in 1868 and it eventually became Keiō University, one of Japan's two greatest private universities. Other schools were much more transient. For awhile during the 1880's Christian schools and universities were predominant—they were the best financed and the best staffed schools in the country and ambitious young men flocked to them. But while private schools and universities continued to exist, the government system of higher education became preeminent after about 1890. Graduation from one of the great national universities was subsequently a necessary key for entry into the intellectual elite, and eventually for entry into any kind of elite, as is true in most modern societies.

While the universities had a certain degree of academic freedom and were not used, as were the lower schools, for nationalist indoctrination, there were still severe limits on intellectual life in the universities before 1945. In 1892 Professor Kume Kunitake of Tokyo University was dismissed for teaching that Shinto was a "survival of a primitive form of worship." In 1920 Professor Morito Tatsuo was dismissed from Tokyo University for publishing an article on the social thought of Kropotkin. During the twenties further firings occurred, including the dismissal of most of the economics

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department at Kyoto University. Many famous professors lost their jobs in the 1930's. In spite of these pressures the universities, especially after the growth of radical student movements beginning in 1918, were a major source of dissent until all opposition was silenced in the late 1930's. Even then students who could not read Karl Marx read Max Weber as the next best thing and continued to think radical thoughts. After 1945 the university has clearly been the main source of criticism and dissent with respect to Japanese society and politics.

Intellectuals have played an important role in the Japanese popular press, newspapers and magazines, from the early Meiji period. Fukuzawa Yukichi was also one of the first to publish a newspaper and he wrote regularly for it during his lifetime. During the Meiji period many significant intellectuals lived mainly from their work on newspapers and magazines. Even as late as the 1920's and 1930's an outstanding intellectual such as Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945) supported himself outside the university by journalism alone, and one could find a few examples in the postwar period as well. But after 1920 most influential intellectuals, however often they wrote for the popular press, tended to have a university appointment as their main occupation. Before 1945 government censorship was a constant problem. The press along with the universities was a major source of political and social criticism.

In the early Meiji period the intellectuals came mainly from the samurai class and there was much similarity of background between them and government officials. Even though the critical intellectuals tended to come from families who were formerly Tokugawa retainers or at least from fiefs other than Satsuma and Chōshū, which provided the main body of government leaders, there was some circulation between the two groups. The educational system had not yet crystallized and there was much movement between journalism, politics, and teaching. As late as 1917 Nagai Ryūtarō left Waseda University to go into politics and in 1920 Nakano Seigo left a successful career in journalism to enter the Diet. But over time such transitions have become increasingly difficult. The vertical structures of Japanese society have become stronger and more differentiated and it has become more difficult to move between them.[20] This does not mean that intellectuals have become less influential. The vast expansion of higher education and of the mass media has tended to give intellectuals, professors and writers, larger audiences than ever. But such intellectuals are largely cut off from personal contacts with other elites. Even though in the late thirties Prince Konoe, the last premier before Tōjō, collected a brain trust around him, the Shōwa Study Group, which supplied him with ideas and slogans, the wholesale movement of intellectuals into positions of administrative responsibility such as occurred in the American New Deal would have been impossible. Since the war the barriers have only increased. The government has its technical advisers, such as the "defense intellec-

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tuals," but significant use of intellectuals in executive and diplomatic posts in the manner of John F. Kennedy would be unthinkable in Japan. These developments represent general trends in modern Japanese society rather than any special encapsulation of the intellectuals.

These are, again, mainly elite intellectuals. Even when, as in recent times, elite intellectuals have been drawn from many class backgrounds, the samurai origin of the intelligentsia has continued to affect its attitudes. A certain aloofness and disdain toward the common people can be detected though the intellectuals are denouncing the government in the people's name. It has been possible for a Japanese Marxist to believe that he has a correct understanding of the role of the working class even if the workers themselves are too stupid to realize it. Compounding the aloofness of the intellectuals is the fact that they have been far more profoundly penetrated by Western culture than any group in Japan and suffer disequilibrium from this exposure. As before intellectuals were specialists in alien Chinese culture, now they are specialists in alien Western culture. Many have vacillated between extreme acceptance of some aspect of Western culture and wholesale rejection of it. The common man has largely escaped the inner agonies, the identity problems, and the (sometimes multiple) conversions from one to another intellectual position which has been the lot of the intellectuals. Alienation of intellectuals because of class differences and differences in degree of exposure to foreign culture are common in non-Western (and often Western) countries and not especially extreme in Japan. Since the war the gap has closed as ever larger percentages of the population attend college and as the media disseminate elite culture to the masses. Nonetheless many Japanese intellectuals have felt the obligation to "go to the people" as an uncompleted project.

There have also been, as in the Tokugawa period, secondary intellectuals, occasionally of great influence. These were secondary school teachers, village postmasters, and the like—men of some education but not graduates of the best national or private universities. Often they provided the local base for conservative or nationalist political or ideological movements. Suspicious of the city, foreign culture, and the modern sector of the economy, they sometimes contributed to the defeat of movements favored by the elite intellectuals. Occasionally such men have broken out of their anonymity to affect the national scene, as in the case of Makiguchi Tsunesaburo (1871-1944), founder, and Toda Josei (1900-1958), postwar president and major organizer, of the phenomenally successful new religious and political movement, Sōka Gakkai. Makiguchi was the principal of an elementary school and Toda was one of his teachers.

The first major Western current of ideas to affect Japan in the early Meiji period was the democratic and liberal thought of France, England, and the United States. Perhaps the spirit of this new thought can be expressed in the famous opening words of Fukuzawa Yukichi's *An Encourage-*

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ment of Learning (*Gakumon no Susume*), a book that sold over 3,400,000 copies during Fukuzawa's lifetime and set the tone of an era:

> It is said that heaven does not create one man above or below another man. This means that when men are born from heaven they are all equal. There is no innate distinction between high and low.[21]

According to Fukuzawa such distinctions as exist in the world are, or should be, now that the artificial status distinctions of the Tokugawa period have been swept away, based on real achievements, not on innate differences. And, since real achievements require knowledge, education—practical education, not merely the "study of obscure Chinese characters"[22]—is the royal road to self-advancement and dignity in the world. There are highly individualistic implications to Fukuzawa's teachings, but, as *Encouragement of Learning* quickly makes clear, there is a national context which, if anything, takes precedence over individual considerations. In a section entitled "National Independence Through Personal Independence" he writes: "As I have said above, all nations are equal. But when the people of a nation do not have the spirit of individual independence, the corresponding right of national independence cannot be realized."[23] Thus Fukuzawa's call for personal independence and achievement is as much or more for the sake of the nation as for the sake of the individual.

The political expression of such teaching as Fukuzawa's, and the many translations of Western liberal writings such as the Declaration of Independence and works of Rousseau and Mill, was the Popular Rights Movement (Jiyū Minken Undō) which demanded representative constitutional government in Japan. There is no question but that there was a genuine widespread enthusiasm for "freedom" in the early Meiji period, a natural response to the long period of narrowness and rigidity under the Tokugawas. What freedom actually meant of course varied from group to group. For some of the ex-samurai leaders of the movement it undoubtedly meant a new mode of access to political power from which they were excluded by the dominance of the Satsuma-Chōshū ruling clique. For many of the common people in the towns and villages it meant autonomous self-assertion of relatively oppressed groups in the face of arrogant and unresponsive bureaucratic control. Perhaps the major contribution of the movement was the way it swept ordinary Japanese all over the country into the arena of national politics and modern thought. Irokawa Daikichi has recently stressed the role of wealthy peasants (*gōnō*) as mediators of modern consciousness in the village context.[24] As he observed, involvement in the movement did not necessarily mean a break with traditional village collective consciousness but an intense autonomous concern to express that consciousness and defend that collectivity in the face of external powers and authorities. In a sense the Popular Rights Movement was the successor of late Tokugawa popular movements in breaking down village

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and local parochialism and bringing some kind of national consciousness to the common people. As such it contributed to what is currently called "political mobilization" more than any number of bureaucratic decrees from Tokyo could have done.

The widespread enthusiasm for the Popular Rights Movement in the late 1870's and early 1880's began to give not only the government, but even astute intellectuals like Fukuzawa, cause for alarm. Rules for political struggle did not exist and the dangers of "factionalism" in the Confucian sense were acutely felt. As early as 1875 Fukuzawa was pointing out that too great a concern for the part can lead to the destruction of the whole.[25] By 1881 he was turning his attention explicitly to the imperial house as the fulcrum of unity for the nation and people: "At this moment we are most anxious about the imperial house. The groups called political parties each have different doctrines; some are termed liberal or progressive and some conservative. Although we say that these are struggling over issues, in truth they are struggling for power: each is trying to seize the handle of power for itself . . . In Japan who can fully control the world of human feelings and preserve habits of virtue and righteousness? Only the imperial house."[26] In that same year the government announced that a representative assembly would convene in 1890, thereby relieving much of the pressure for immediate constitutional government.

For our purposes the most important thing about the liberal movement of the first twenty years of Meiji is that it opened up, even if hesitantly and indecisively, some questions about the givenness of Japanese society which had not been asked before. Very few of the Popular Rights thinkers went so far as to advocate a republican system. Very few criticized the root values of loyalty and filial piety. But the whole idea that the political institutions of Japanese society might be radically restructured by a movement from below was dramatically novel. It gave a role to popular initiative and creativity that was certainly not present in the largely intra-elite maneuverings that led to the Meiji Restoration itself. At the same time it led to serious questions about the viability of Japanese society, questions such as those raised by Fukuzawa. Much of the subsequent history of social thought and the involvement of intellectuals in politics in modern Japan has been organized around that point counterpoint.

We cannot expect to trace in this essay all the subtlety of those developments. We are fortunate in having in Irwin Scheiner's recent *Christian Converts and Social Protest in Meiji Japan*[27] a brilliant account of how Christian social thinkers deepened the conceptions of the Popular Rights Movement and gave them in the 1880's and 1890's a theoretical and religious basis alternative to the emperor system. Kenneth B. Pyle has also recently made a significant contribution to our understanding of the rise in the period 1885-1895 of a critical school of "Japanist" thought which was by no means a simple apologetics for the official governmental ideology.[28]

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But here we must confine our remarks to the so-called Meiji emperor system which was not fully worked out until the 1890's and which Maruyama Masao and others have argued remained a kind of orthodoxy from that time until 1945.

In the first place the simultaneous acceptance of the idea of a constitution and representative assembly and the construction of the mature emperor system is a kind of prototype of the way bureaucratic dominance has been maintained in modern Japanese society. It is echoed again in 1925 when the Diet voted for universal suffrage at almost the same time that it passed a greatly strengthened Peace Preservation Law which severely hampered political dissent. Even in the postwar period the combination of democratic reforms (from on high) and continued bureaucratic dominance and unresponsiveness to popular needs shows much the same form. In each case the intellectuals have in a sense "lost while winning."

The Meiji government managed to make the constitution itself a keystone of the refurbished emperor system. Above all it made the constitution an expression of the givenness of Japanese society rather than a challenge to it. The preparation of the constitution was kept completely secret until it was unveiled on February 11, 1889. The day was significant for it was Kigensetsu, the national holiday celebrating the mythical founding of the nation in 660 B.C. The constitution was the gracious gift of the emperor and its preamble derived sovereignty exclusively from the "sacred and inviolable" imperial house. When Nakae Chōmin (1847-1901), leading Popular Rights thinker and translator of Rousseau, insisted in the first Diet session of 1890 that the constitution be submitted to the Diet and voted on article by article, he was ignored.[29] He later resigned in disgust. Even though it was obvious that the constitution was a carefully contrived document—and indeed Itō Hirobumi (1841-1909), its chief architect, had undertaken the most careful research, including trips to Europe to talk to constitutional experts—it was to be received almost as a natural object, protected from criticism by the charisma of the emperor. There was a tendency after 1890 to include under the term *kokutai*, "national polity" defined as the unique Japanese relation between emperor and people, all those things which could not be touched, which university professors could lose their jobs for criticizing, which were to be forever removed from any popular tampering. Not only were the imperial house, Shinto religion, and the military establishment part of the *kokutai*, but later when socialist agitation became acute, private property also was declared to be one of its constituent elements.

It is important to disentangle to some extent the image of the emperor from the emperor system as such. The imperial institution is far older than the Meiji emperor system and has survived the collapse of the latter in 1945. It has indeed been argued by some that the emperor system was a perversion of the true imperial institution. At any rate it does seem possible

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to extricate two rather different symbolic pictures of the emperor which have had different consequences in modern Japanese social thought. What the Meiji government tried to create was what might be called a samurai image of the emperor. He was a man in a resplendent military uniform, riding on a white horse, remote and unapproachable. As such he stood for governmental authority and military duty. He was a heroic leader but a cold and demanding one. Credit for Japan's success in its first modern half-century was attributed to the genius and leadership of the Meiji emperor. This image might be called the image of the emperor as a father figure.

But even in the Meiji period, when the actual emperor came closer to this image than either of his two successors, this was not the whole story. Much in the emperor's role evoked an older and deeper image than the samurai or father figure emperor. For one thing the commonest form of communication from emperor to people was the thousands of *waka* poems which he composed for many occasions. Unlike the stiff Chinese formality of imperial rescripts, the *waka* were written in poetic and emotional Japanese and spoke of cherry blossoms, autumn leaves, and other delicate things. Often they expressed deep concern for the welfare of the subjects and the future of the country. This was the emperor whom politicians were always wishing to "shield from anxiety" and nearness to whom, symbolically or actually, was the greatest reward in Japanese public life. Perhaps it is not going too far to see in all this an image of the emperor as a mother figure. Of course the Meiji leaders, probably without being consciously aware of the distinction I am drawing, also made use of this aspect of the emperor's image. But full control of this image evaded them, and repeatedly aspects of it were used by those in opposition.

Perhaps we can even argue that these two aspects of the emperor image represent two dimensions of Japanese social structure. The first image represents the external relations between groups of differing power in Japanese society. In particular it represents the samurai-bureaucratic-elitist notion that some groups should dominate other groups, that those below should submit with stoic obedience to those above no matter how heavy the demand. This was the military image of Japan which was very much part of the emperor system between 1890 and 1945. The second image, however, represents the internal nature of Japanese group life, its warm, accepting, *Gemeinschaft* (Japanese: *kyōdōtai*) nature. While the first image denotes separation, hierarchy, duty, the second denotes unity, fusion, fulfillment. The problem with the second image is that it is drawn from the structure of primary groups in Japan, or at most of particular institutional structures, such as a village or company or government ministry. The second model has never accurately described Japan as a national community, though, especially when conscious of the outside world, most Japanese do feel a strong emotional sense of Japanese identity overriding differences of status. The second model, then, even though it is thoroughly "traditional,"

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operates in some degree of tension with the actuality of Japanese society with its strong elitist authoritarian tendencies. We have already seen that the *Gemeinschaft* model of Japanese society, the fusion of emperor and people, could lead to direct political action in the cases of Yamagata Daini and Ōshio Heihachiro. It has continued to do so in the modern period. Perhaps the 1877 rebellion of Kyushu samurai, led by Saigō Takamori, had something of this quality and was not simply a revolt of the disgruntled seeking to retain their ancient privileges.

Most modern Japanese intellectuals, with some notable exceptions, have been critical of the first, elitist and hierarchical, model of Japanese society. They have been much more ambivalent about the second, *Gemeinschaft,* model. Some contemporary Japanese intellectuals, called, with more than a little pejorative overtone by their critics, "modernists," have been as opposed to the structure of primary group relations in Japan as to the elitist authoritarian control structures.[30] Indeed they have argued that the two augment and complete each other. These modernists would stand outside both aspects of the traditional *kokutai* ideology and argue for the importance of universalism and individualism in a truly modern, democratic Japan. They draw mainly from Western sources, Christian, liberal, and radical, but they also refer to the more transcendent aspects of Buddhism and Confucianism for some support in the Japanese past. Whereas in the 1930's such modernists were being attacked for being too pro-Western and undermining traditional Japanese society ("overcoming the modern" was a major slogan among intellectuals during the Second World War), today they are attacked for being too pro-Western and undermining Third World values and solidarities.

But many Japanese intellectuals and intellectual movements have not been able to make up their minds on this issue. For populists, socialists, and even Communists the symbol of the "people" or the "working class" has been redolent of the warm, maternal fusion of Japanese *Gemeinschaft.* Through the mediation of this symbol, men who have been sharply rebellious and antiauthoritarian have been able to modulate themselves into a form of "restorationism" and start talking about the unity of emperor and people.[31] Highly sophisticated students of Japanese philosophy or art have been able to move from conceptions of the "unity of subject and object" in Japanese religious or aesthetic life to a social philosophy of harmonious union of government and people under the emperor.[32] Even a radical Christian like Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930), whose followers were among the few Japanese consistently to oppose the militarist imperialist policies of the late thirties and early forties, was in a state of tortured ambivalence whenever he experienced direct conflict with the national community.[33] Of the many leftists who underwent a "change of thought" (*tenkō*) in the 1930's under government pressure, most phrased their change as a return to the national community understood as *Gemeinschaft.*[34] The

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contemporary rise of what may be called a populist tendency in the Japanese intellectual world, though bitterly critical of the Meiji emperor system and bureaucratic arrogance, may also be a form of neo-*Gemeinschaft* thinking, a matter which becomes apparent from its attacks on "modernists" and dogmatic Marxists.

Perhaps the context of the two models of Japanese society, bureaucracy and *Gemeinschaft*, will help us understand the enormous popularity of Marxism among Japanese intellectuals since 1920. Many reasons have been adduced.[35] Marxism has been seen as a natural successor to Confucianism since both are collectivistic and concerned with social welfare. Marxism's claim to be "progressive" made it popular in Japan where there has been a perennial desire to "keep up with the times." That Marxism would create a society *more* advanced than the West was an added inducement. Another feature of Marxism which made it attractive to politically marginal intellectuals was that it offered a powerful theory to oppose a powerful government. The breadth, abstractness, and coherence of Marxism as a system of total world explanation have worked in its favor. But one other feature of Marxism which has probably made it attractive in Japan (as elsewhere in the non-Western world) is its nostalgia for the lost world of *Gemeinschaft* and its promise of a new *Gemeinschaft* after the revolution. One thing which tends to reinforce this interpretation is that Marxism has been far more effective as a world-view or a theory than as a form of organization. In particular the Japanese Communist party has always been small relative to the large number of Marxist intellectuals. The hierarchical, bureaucratic, disciplined nature of the party has been repellant to most of those for whom Marxism was an alternative to the bureaucratic authoritarian side of Japanese society.

The modernist critics of Japanese society hold that one of its greatest weaknesses, in either its bureaucratic or *Gemeinschaft* forms (the two are not mutually exclusive for Japanese bureaucracy is formed of a network of *Gemeinschaft* groups), is its lack of individualism. If by individualism one means, as they do, the kind of institutionalized individualism found in a civil society or voluntary organization, they are right. But Japanese society has developed its own forms of individualism not lacking a sense of autonomy (*shutaisei*). Japanese bureaucracy would not have been so effective if it could not stimulate and utilize a great deal of individual initiative, even though it maintains important constraints.

Even more striking is the kind of romantic individualism associated with "restorationism," the effort to make the whole society into a radical *Gemeinschaft*. Indeed some of the most remarkable individuals in modern Japanese history (as in Tokugawa history) fall into this category. Kita Ikki (1883-1937) wanted to "remove the barriers which have separated the emperor from the people."[36] After an adventurous life in the underworld of Meiji socialism, the Chinese revolution, and Taisho radical nationalism he

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was almost against his will adopted as the intellectual mentor of the young officers who staged the attempted coup of February 26, 1936. Probably innocent of any knowledge of the coup he was executed with its leaders. Nakano Seigo (1886-1943)[37] started out as an extreme liberal in the Taisho period. During the 1930's he experimented with a variety of organizational forms designed to bring about the union of emperor and people and the overthrow of the oppressive bureaucrats and capitalists. For him the restoration of the emperor was a symbol of the release of autonomous individualism among the people. He was a devotee of Wang Yang-ming thought and Ōshio Heihachiro was one of his heroes. He was one of the few Japanese openly to criticize the Tōjō government during the early years of the war and committed suicide under police pressure in 1943. The latest example of this Japanese form of romantic individualism is, of course, Mishima Yukio, who was influenced by both Ōshio and Nakano. He preached a "positive nihilism" which would sweep away all the corruptions and distortions of postwar Japanese life and return the Japanese people to a pure unity with the emperor.[38] Organizational ineffectiveness and the dramatic expressive gesture (standing alone against the entire nation even if it means death) are the hallmarks of this tradition.

Much more could be said about forms of intellectual protest and opposition in modern Japan. But it is the bureaucracy which has continued to rule. It has shared its power with some other groups. First it created the great corporations, known before the war as the *zaibatsu*, and allowed them to have a continuous influence on subsequent policy. Then it created a parliamentary system and eventually political parties to go with it. Not without strain it accommodated itself to sharing political power with the established parties. In the postwar period the alliance of bureaucracy, corporations, and the Liberal Democratic party has been singularly successful. The 1946 constitution was almost as much a meteorite from the sky as the Meiji Constitution had been. It, together with other reforms of the occupation period, made important gains in the fields of civil liberties and popular rights. The arbitrariness of the bureaucracy has been seriously hampered by these gains, but the givenness of Japanese society has not been broken through. Postwar democracy was not the popular enactment of the democratic visions of the Japanese intellectuals. It came from the occupation through the hands of the bureaucrats. Though enjoying an unprecedented degree of freedom the Japanese intellectuals have most of the same problems they have always had. They have yet to find the organizational forms through which they can have a decisive impact on their own society.

IV

If there is one among the many omissions in this essay that is more serious than the rest it is the degree to which I have ignored the apoliti-

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cal tradition among Japanese intellectuals. That tradition is in many respects more important than the political traditions and more revealing as to the interior structure of Japanese life. Perhaps I can make up in small measure for this defect by quoting the poem by Dōgen with which Kawabata Yasunari began his Nobel Prize acceptance speech in 1968:

In the spring, cherry blossoms,
In the summer, the cuckoo,
In autumn, the moon.

And in winter,
Cold, clean snow.[39]

References

1. On the relation between order in society and order in the soul in Plato see Eric Voegelin, *Order and History,* III, *Plato and Aristotle* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), Part I.

2. I have relied on the paraphrase and commentary of Muraoka Tsunetsugo in his "Kenpō Jūshichi-ken no Kenkyū" (A Study of the Seventeen Article Constitution) in *Nihon Shisōshi no Shomondai* (Problems in the History of Japanese Thought) (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1957), pp. 7-71. A translation of the constitution can be found in Ryusaku Tsunoda, William de Bary, and Donald Keene, *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 50-53.

3. Even J. H. Kamstra in his *Encounter or Syncretism: The Initial Growth of Japanese Buddhism* (Leiden: Brill, 1967), accepts the authenticity of this saying, pp. 379-381. Kamstra offers an extreme demythologization of Shōtoku and goes further in this direction than any Japanese scholar. For a reasoned defense of the authenticity of most of the texts attributed to Shōtoku see *Futaba Kenkō, Kodai Bukkyō Shisōshi Kenkyū* (A Study of the History of Ancient Buddhist Thought) (Kyoto: Nagata Bunshōdō, 1962).

4. Nakamura Hajime, *A History of the Development of Japanese Thought from A.D. 592 to 1868* (Tokyo: Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, 1969) I, 142.

5. J. R. McEwan, *The Political Writings of Ogyū Sorai* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 33.

6. R. P. Dore's *Education in Tokugawa Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, A Publication of the Center for Japanese and Korean Studies, 1965) is an excellent description of scholarship and education in the Tokugawa period and I have relied on it extensively in this section.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 317-322. I have given a summary figure where Dore gives a cautious series of estimates based on school attendance.

8. John W. Hall, "Ikeda Mitsumasa and the Bizen Flood of 1654," in Albert M. Craig and Donald H. Shively, eds., *Personality in Japanese History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, A Publication of the Center for Japanese and Korean Studies, 1970), pp. 65-66.

9. On the central significance of Sorai in Tokugawa thought see above all the very influential book of Maruyama Masao, *Nihon Seiji Shisōshi Kenkyū* (Studies in the

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History of Japanese Political Thought) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1952). This book has influenced not only my treatment of Sorai but my entire treatment of Tokugawa thought.

10. McEwan, *Ogyū Sorai,* p. 9. The three paragraphs are independent passages from different places in Sorai's writings and are not continuous.

11. We now have in English an excellent book on Norinaga, perhaps the best book on any premodern Japanese thinker: Shigeru Matsumoto, *Motoori Norinaga, 1730-1801* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). Maruyama, *Nihon Seiji Shisōski Kenkyū,* treats the relation between Sorai and Norinaga in chap. 1, sec 4.

12. Matsumoto, *Motoori Norinaga,* p. 32.

13. On Kokugaku at the end of the Tokugawa period and its influence among the upper stratum of peasants see Sonoda Minoru, "Bakumatsu Kokugaku no Shisōshi-teki Mondai" (Problems in the History of Kokugaku Thought at the End of the Tokugawa Period), *Kokugakuin Daigaku Nihon Bunka Kenkyūsho Kiyō,* no. 18 (1966), 1-31.

14. See Matsumoto, *Motoori Norinaga,* especially chap. 2 and conclusion. In the contrast between Sorai and Norinaga we already have the contrast between the bureaucratic model and the *Gemeinschaft* model of Japanese society which will be discussed below.

15. On late Tokugawa political thought see Harry Harootunian, *Toward Restoration: The Growth of Political Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, A Publication of the Center for Japanese and Korean Studies, 1970).

16. I am indebted to Tetsuo Najita for his paper "Restorationism in the Political Thought of Yamagata Daini (1725-1767)" presented at the colloquium of the Center for Japanese and Korean Studies, University of California, Berkeley, December 2, 1970, for my knowledge of Yamagata Daini. His series of papers on the restorationist strand in Japanese thought, others of which will be cited below, have influenced my whole conception of the relation between thought and action in Japan.

17. Tetsuo Najita, "Ōshio Heihachirō (1793-1837)," in Craig and Shively, eds., *Personality,* pp. 155-179.

18. Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion* (New York: Free Press, 1957), chap. 6 and appendix 1.

19. On these movements see Yasumaru Yoshio, "Nihon no Kindaika to Minshū Shisō" (Japanese Modernization and Popular Thought), *Nihonshi Kenkyū* (Japanese Historical Studies), no. 78, pp. 1-10; no. 79, pp. 40-58 (1965). Yasumaru is rather critical of my argument in *Tokugawa Religion,* feeling that I attempt to explain too much with a notion of "traditional values" and ignore the particular historical circumstances of the various movements. Though there are important theoretical differences between us this article is an important supplement to my book.

20. Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, A Publication of the Center for Japanese and Korean Studies, 1970). This is a somewhat revised translation of *Tate-Shakai no Ningen-kankei—Tanitsu Shakai no Riron* (Human Relations in a Vertical Society—A Theory of Homogeneous Society) (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1967).

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21. Fukuzawa Yukichi, *An Encouragement of Learning,* trans. David A. Dilworth and Umeyo Hirano (Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1969), p. 1.

22. *Ibid.,* p. 2.

23. *Ibid.,* p. 23.

24. Irokawa Daikichi, *Zohō Meiji Seishinshi* (A History of Meiji Consciousness), enlarged ed. (Tokyo: Kōga Shobō, 1968). See also his *Meiji no Bunka* (Meiji Culture) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1970) and *Minshu Kempō no sōzō* (Creation of a Popular Constitution) (Tokyo: Hyōronsha, 1970). The latter contains drafts of constitutions drawn up in the local areas in the 1870's and 1880's. I have profited from several conversations with Professor Irokawa during his stay in Berkeley in January and February of 1971.

25. Albert M. Craig, "Fukuzawa Yukichi: The Philosophical Foundations of Meiji Nationalism," in Robert E. Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 117.

26. *Ibid.,* pp. 133, 134-135.

27. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). See especially chap. 8, "Loyalty and Criticism."

28. Kenneth B. Pyle, *The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885-1895* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).

29. Ryūichi Kaji, "The Introduction of French Political Ideas—Nakae Chomin: The Man and His Thought," *Philosophical Studies of Japan,* Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 7 (1966), 67.

30. See the collection of writings edited by Hidaka Rokurō, *Kindai-shugi* (Modernism), *Gendai Nihon Shisō Taikei,* 34 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1964). This collection features such writers as Otsuka Hisao and Maruyama Masao. For a vigorous if somewhat wide of the mark attack on this school see Irokawa Daikichi, *Meiji no Bunka,* chap. 8, "Seishin kōzō to shite Tennōsei" (The Emperor System as a Spiritual Structure). Irokawa accuses the modernists of elitism in their critique of Japanese *Gemeinschaft.*

31. William D. Wray has an interesting discussion of the left wing socialist Asō Hisashi in this context in his "Asō Hisashi and the Search for Renovation in the 1930's," *Papers on Japan,* 5 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard East Asian Research Center, 1970), 55-99. The right wing socialist Abe Isō took up the slogan of "a second restoration" in the period 1929-1930. See Tunoda, de Bary, and Keen, *Sources,* pp. 816-820.

32. Nishida Kitaro spoke of the imperial house as the "contradictory identity of subjective unity and the multiplicity of individuals." Quoted by Ueyama Shumpei in *Kindai Nihon Shisōshi Kōza* (Symposium on the History of Modern Japanese Thought) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1959), vol. 4, p. 80. Nishida argued that "it was neither the whole opposing the individual nor the individual opposing the whole, but rather that with the Imperial Household as the center, the individual and the whole mutually negate themselves." Quoted by Tatsuo Arima in *The Failure of Freedom: A Portrait of Modern Japanese Intellectuals* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 11. Okakura Tenshin took a similar view. He always insisted on the aspects of harmony, oneness, and *advaita* as basic in Japanese culture and society. He said, "The true infinity is the circle, not the extended line. Every organism implies a subordination of parts to a whole. Real equality lies in

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the due fulfillment of the respective function of each part." Quoted by Maruyama Masao in "Fukuzawa, Uchimura, and Okakura—Meiji Intellectuals and Westernization," *The Developing Economies*, vol. 4, no. 4 (Tokyo, 1966), 14.

33. Lois M. Greenwood, a graduate student at Berkeley, has recently underlined this aspect of Uchimura's behavior in a very interesting paper, "Uchimura Kanzō: A Study in Japanese Identity," unpublished.

34. Patricia Golden Steinhoff has discussed this aspect of *tenkō* in her 1969 Harvard doctoral dissertation on the subject.

35. Two suggestive efforts to account for the appeal of Marxism in modern Japan are that of Albert M. Craig in John Fairbank, Edwin Reischauer, and Albert Craig, *East Asia: The Great Transformation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 552-554, and Yuzuru Okada in the Introduction to vol. 2, no. 1, of the *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan*, devoted to the subject of Japanese Intellectuals, p. 4.

36. George M. Wilson, *Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki, 1883-1937* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 69.

37. An extraordinarily interesting discussion of Nakano is to be found in Tetsuo Najita's unpublished paper, "Nakano Seigo and the Spirit of the Meiji Restoration in Twentieth Century Japan."

38. See the article which appeared just two months before his death: Mishima Yukio, "Kakumei no Tetsugaku to shite no Yōmeigaku" (Wang Yang-ming Teaching as a Revolutionary Philosophy), *Shokun* (September 1970).

39. Yasunari Kawabata, *Japan, the Beautiful, and Myself*, trans. E. G. Seidensticker (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1969) (Japanese original and English translation). I have taken the liberty of altering Seidensticker's translation of the poem.

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MICHAEL CONFINO

On Intellectuals and Intellectual Traditions in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Russia

As a genre this essay stands half-way between an interpretative paper and a program of research. As such it is therefore ill-defined and probably has the shortcomings of both and the virtues of neither. For a period extending over two hundred years, it is possible to mention only a few of the sources and secondary works used; to do more would result in a bulky volume and bring the essay to a third genre, the bibliographical one, which was not exactly its purpose. I raise questions for which, at the present moment, I have no clear answer, and I doubt at times whether the questions themselves are methodologically justified or worth being explored. This is indeed a discussion paper, intended to invite comments and criticism. It is based on the hope and assumption that in the development of a subject of study, there are junctures where tentative hypotheses, generalizations, and queries may be no less useful than a new monograph giving precise answers on points of detail.

This, therefore, is no more than a tentative reconsideration of certain features and of the pattern of coordinates into which intellectuals and intellectual traditions are usually set within the Russian context. One of these features is the existence in Russian history and historiography from the late 1860's on of the term "intelligentsia." Created by intellectuals, it conveyed at one and the same time a sociological concept, a psychological characterization, and a moral code. However, none of the definitions given during the past sixty years or so has been found entirely satisfactory, and recent research has clearly shown the vagueness of the term, its many ambiguities, and the strains between the outlook and self-image of those who used it and the social and intellectual reality it is supposed to represent.[1] Thus, it is understood that the intelligentsia was a group of sorts—but what sort of group? It is agreed that it cannot be defined in terms of an economic group; it was not a class. It was not an estate. Was it a stratum—and of what kind? It cannot be delineated by the professions of people supposedly within it; some had none, and most professionals were not included. It cannot be defined by level of education; the range covered by its members

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ran from autodidacts to university professors, but not all autodidacts (of course) and university professors (so much the more) were necessarily considered members of the intelligentsia. It could not be defined by a set of ideas: many were radicals (of different shades), not all were revolutionaries, some liberals were "in," some others were "out."

In spite of these difficulties, the accumulated research provides a set of features and attitudes which seem to characterize the Russian intelligentsia, and these seem to be accepted by most authorities in this field. Briefly summarized, these features are: (1) a deep concern for problems and issues of public interest—social, economic, cultural, and political; (2) a sense of guilt and personal responsibility for the state and the solution of these problems and issues; (3) a propensity to view political and social questions as moral ones; (4) a sense of obligation to seek ultimate logical conclusions —in thought as well as in life—at whatever cost;[2] (5) the conviction that things are not as they should be, and that something should be done.[3] On the assumption (in view of point 4) that the intelligentsia not only felt that something should be done, but also did something, the aggregate result of these features is the delineation of a group (of sorts) in a state of potential or actual dissent (not necessarily political). In the absence of a better method of classification and definition, these features, then, will identify the intelligentsia and differentiate it from other segments of the society in which it lived. And in this sense the term "intelligentsia" will be used here. I will use the term "intellectuals" in a broad sense, as given in other essays in this volume,[4] and as a stratum including bureaucratic intellectuals, professionals, as well as scientists and the teaching staff in institutions of higher learning, religious specialists, teachers, freelancers, and, of course, artists. I will assume therefore that the terms "intellectuals" and "intelligentsia" are not synonymous,[5] and leave the clarification of this assumption to later parts of this essay. For somewhere, sometime in this period of Russian history, "intellectuals" and "intelligentsia" may meet, or overlap, but in the beginning this distinction is necessary in order to avoid confusion.

Intellectuals in an Age of "Revolutionary" Reforms

As in the case of several fields of development in the course of Russian history, a major turning point in terms of structure and content of intellectual life occurred during the reign of Peter the Great. The beginning of the eighteenth century represents, therefore, a meaningful starting point and offers a relatively clear dividing line between "Old" and "New" Russia.

Until that period the main channels and agents of intellectual accomplishments were ecclesiastical centers and personnel. Largely under church control, intellectual life was undifferentiated institutionally and qualitatively —religious. To be sure, during the seventeenth century there was a noticeable process of secularization of learning and wisdom, but in the main it

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remained very slow and limited in terms of intellectual growth and the number of individuals whose intellectual aspirations had some effect on the advancement of knowledge and on altering the traditional pattern of cultural isolation and antirationalism.

The substantial change in intellectual life that took place under Peter the Great stemmed from several innovations. The government promoted and encouraged the creation of new types of intellectuals and men of learning—laymen, trained in the West, or according to the then prevailing Western standards. It created new institutions and societal centers of intellectual life, rather than attempting to adapt the old ones to new goals and orientations. Peter I nourished a distrust of theological philosophy, which he considered a foe of secular learning and science, and of the clergy's attitude toward modernity in general and his institutional reforms in particular; accordingly, he chose to circumvent the church's institutions of learning and established new ones for the diffusion of knowledge. All were financed by the state and under tight government control.[6]

The new trends in intellectual life were secular and nonreligious, located in new institutional structures (Academy of Sciences, School of Mathematics and Navigation, Engineering School, Ciphering Schools). Another innovation was the increased concern with science—above all, applied and practical science. The cultural realm proper remained, at best, a secondary goal; changes in it occurred mostly as a by-product of Peter's reforms in general (institutional, social, and economic), not necessarily of changes in the structure of intellectual life.

The role of intellectuals (a tiny group including, for instance, A. Kantemir and V. Tatishchev) and their attitude toward the old tradition and the new one should be viewed within the context of the over-all orientation and ethos of the tsar's reforms. Under Peter change became institutionalized; rejection of traditional tradition became a policy; creation of a "new" tradition became a major goal.[7] All this was done by decree: an Academy of Sciences by decree, a *Kunstkamera* by decree, a translation of Vlacq's *Tabulae sinuum* and of Pufendorf's works by decree, new manners and shaving off beards by decree, Russian students in foreign universities by decree, and intellectuals by decree. The new intellectuals had to be created. They were created by these same reforms. Their assignment, their *raison d'être,* was to destroy the old tradition and create a new one. They themselves understood it in this sense and fulfilled precisely this role in the "revolution from above" initiated by Peter. On the other hand, Peter conceived of this revolution almost as permanent (for at least one generation), all-pervading, total,[8] with continuous change as one of its basic ingredients, and with its impetus initiated and directed by the state. The role left, therefore, for these "intellectuals by decree" (not because of their small number, but structurally and "genetically") was to implement and further these politics of change and policy of changing one tradition with another.

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The corollary of this policy, brought about by a "revolution from above," was that everything seemed possible. Moreover, everything was legitimate: the tsar (a "usurper" and "Antichrist"), the powers, and the new tradition being, in a way, illegal and illegitimate, everything became legal and legitimate, including the legitimation of the "Antichrist's" authority by the theologian Feofan Prokopovich; there was no possible change or innovation too daring or too wide in scope. Everything was permitted, even recommended, and dissent against tradition was encouraged and rewarded. This was, indeed, a golden age in Russia for crooks and intellectuals, native and international alike.

Everything was permitted except conservative attitudes and traditionalism. Strictly speaking, those were in Petrine Russia the true dissenting attitudes. If so, then, according to a recent model,[9] the only true intellectuals of the period were the tsarevich Alexei and a quasi-conspiratorial group from among the most conservative Orthodox clergy. Being in conservative-traditionalistic dissent, they got—according to Voltaire, although himself a dissenter—the fate they deserved: severe trial and physical liquidation. Thus, for his refusal to serve in the army and to reject tradition, the antirevolutionary religious-minded tsarevich died as a rebelling and dissenting intellectual, this inversion being very much in the vein of A. Besançon's *Tsarévich immolé*, symbolizing the inverted oedipus complex inherent, in his view, in the course of Russian history.[10] To the extent that the father killing the son symbolized a generational conflict, this event also shows that in Russian history resistance to change and defense of tradition were not always the attitudes of the older generation.

Intellectuals in Times of Stabilization and "Enlightened Despotism"

Although Peter's "revolution," carried on in the style of a "crowned terrorist" and a *Jacobin avant la lettre*,[11] lasted longer than Robespierre's revolution of reason and rejection of dogmas (both of which came to a dialectical end with the dogmatic Cult of Goddess Reason), it nevertheless subsided and finally died sometime around the sudden death of the tsar himself in 1725. The developments from that moment on, during the rest of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, will be sketched under two headings: first, an overview of some general trends; second, an analysis of events at the end of the period.

The over-all trends are the consolidation of the political regime in the early 1730's and of the estates system in general and the mechanism of the Table of Ranks in particular, with its important role in elite formation. These trends were parallel to a stabilization in the whole sphere of intellectual activity. Thereafter and throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries changes were small, inconspicuous, and chiefly quantitative.

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All personnel in intellectual fields and centers were legally and existentially state servants.[12] The group as a whole was a tiny one. Scientific pursuits were mainly concentrated in the St. Petersburg Academy and the Moscow University (founded in 1755). Foreigners represented a large majority of the scientists; among the latter, particularly the Russians, specialization was low, and there existed an overlapping between the scientific and aesthetic fields. The classical example was Lomonosov—a mathematician and physicist and also a *littérateur* writing indigestible odes in a pseudo-classical style. The aesthetic field included essentially literary works, in prose and verse, mainly by representatives of the educated part of the nobility. The members of this last group appeared in all fields as dilettantes; their education was usually informal and oriented toward the arts. Intellectual endeavors within the church concerned only a few ecclesiastical dignitaries, the rank and file clergy being notorious for their appalling ignorance.

An important feature of the period was the consolidation of the new tradition—that is, its official establishment as the only acceptable one, a social code for the political, bureaucratic, and intellectual elite. The existence of a deep and all-pervading ignorance, rude manners, and superstition among the major part of the nobility, as well as a different, popular way of life and thought among the peasantry—that is, 96 per cent of the population—does not belie this assessment, since such behavior was considered by the elite as deviant.[13] Theirs was the norm, the "European" behaviors and states of mind. A remark concerning the church is also to the point here. Although the political elite used the church extensively as a submissive "ally" and instrument, they nevertheless considered scholasticism and religious thought an aberration; they thought the intellectual and spiritual food bestowed by the church as appropriate only to the simple folk, or, at a higher level, as a device for checking and fighting "dangerous" ideas. They gave the church the external marks and symbols of authority necessary for the performance of that task.

Intellectuals displayed a conspicious continuity in their attitude toward established tradition stemming from Peter's reform: under Peter they served loyally as instruments of change when change was the basic orientation of the powers; they now served loyally as instruments of conservation and consolidation when conservation (of the new tradition) was the chief orientation of those in authority.

This latter orientation did not imply a total rejection of Peter's political and intellectual heritage, but only of his style of action, his "revolutionary" way, and his overt terroristic manners. It was more a matter of form than of content. By discarding unnecessary roughness, Peter's heirs also opened the way for a reconciliation with the church (already submitted to tsar and government through an evolution brought to an end by Peter's reforms) and with the remnants of groups still dreaming about a return to the ways

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of pre-Petrine Russia. This reconciliation was arrived at successfully, thus excluding any serious ideological conflict, for a number of reasons. First, Peter succeeded in neutralizing the church and submitting it to the state, but, it should be remembered, he did not reject any of the cardinal beliefs of Russian Orthodoxy. The reconciliation meant, therefore, giving the church the role of guardian of morals, thought, and behavior (of the noneducated and the too educated); and going a step further, replacing neutralization of the church with its mobilization in the service of tsar and state. Second, the political powers and the church began to discern that borrowing from the West did not in itself determine values, content, ideologies. There were many different kinds of Europe to be borrowed from and many different ways of Westernizing. There were some things to be taken from the West, but in respect to others, Russia's borders had to remain closed and her customs officers' eyes open. The church, like the customs officers, filled this role of watchdog; so did the Academy of Sciences and the university. For the powers this stand did not amount to an abandonment of the Westernizing orientation; it meant, rather, a course of selective Westernization, a policy of judicious shopping. It meant also, essentially, an instrumental and utilitarian attitude toward knowledge and science, and a close control on the import of ideas. In both cases, Western devices and innovations, intellectual and scientific pursuits, were tested not primarily as sources of cultural progress, but rather as a means of acquiring for Russia a Great Power position on the European scene (and such was also the intellectuals' way of looking at things). For this reason the growth of national consciousness in eighteenth-century Russia did not entail a rejection of Westernization or any serious ideological conflict. Throughout the eighteenth century the powers in Russia were a strong Westernizing force (in their own way), as they were also in the nineteenth century, the basic patterns remaining essentially the same.

Most of the nobility showed, as a rule, a conspicuous lack of interest in intellectual pursuits, higher learning, or formal education;[14] those noblemen who achieved eminence in these fields in the eighteenth century were atypical of the class and/or began their studies as commoners (*raznochintsy*) and arrived at the status of nobility through state service in the army or in the bureaucracy. University study was also recognized as active government service and taken into account for advancement in the Table of Ranks. While the great majority of the gentry remained appallingly ignorant,[15] the elite had a vague interest in general education and were amused with the latest intellectual fashions. All in all, the system produced a number of enlightened state servants and heads of families capable of instilling an interest in books and respect for knowledge in their children.

The intellectuals' attitude toward the major problems in Russia at that time reflected their loyalty to those in authority. They were committed to uphold the new tradition and to support the political and social status quo,

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autocracy and serfdom, and imperial Russian foreign policy. Similar to that of the powers, their attitude toward Westernization, modernity, intellectual pursuits and knowledge, was utilitarian and instrumental. This included also—philosophically and existentially—their outlook about man and about the nature of human destiny: they were themselves (and accepted this human condition) instruments in the hands of a higher authority—the powers; they were themselves (most of them personally and directly) masters of the "souls"—the serfs, using them as instruments for social advancement and source of income; and all of them (whether serfowners or not) were living in a society in which nearly half the population were deprived of all civil and most human rights. Western enlightenment had yet no effect in this respect and did not lead to criticism of existing social institutions. If two of its basic tenets were liberty and property, then well till the end of the eighteenth century the intellectuals did not ask for either of the two to be respected and extended to the whole of society. Using exaggeration for the sake of emphasis, Mikhail Speransky wrote at the beginning of the nineteenth century: "I find in Russia only two classes—serfs of the autocrat and serfs of the landlords . . . In Russia there are in reality no free people excepting beggars and philosophers."[16] Certainly few intellectuals wanted to become beggars; most could not be philosophers.

The intellectuals' loyalty to the powers went beyond state policy and general principles; their commitment to the status quo was also reflected in their specific scholarly subjects, whether scientific or humanistic. Academicians and university professors, often serving as censors, were no exception to this rule, and foreigners were often among the most loyal to the policy of the powers.

To be sure, quite a number of intellectuals, including Catherine II, were "Voltaireans"; some understood what this meant; others did not; still others apparently adopted a selective way of reading Voltaire's works, very much along the lines of the powers' selective Westernization. Alexander Herzen did not exaggerate much when saying that whereas Voltaire's philosophy had freed Frenchmen of old prejudices and transformed them into revolutionaries, in Russia it reinforced the slave-like dependence of the people on the whims of the absolute monarch.[17]

Catherine II, main symbol of the powers and "enlightened despot," had a keen interest in Voltaire, in other prestigious Western enlighteners, and in enlightenment in general. It is probably on that account too that I. I. Betskoi, an enthusiastic promoter of educational ideas and practices in her time, is said to have remarked that "Peter I created men in Russia, but Catherine II gave them souls." In so doing, she reserved the supreme prerogative of determining what kind of souls were to be given, then entrusted this task to her intellectuals. They were, therefore, not only masters of the "souls," but also "engineers of the souls" *avant la lettre*—an omen that was to go a great way.

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A series of important trends and events occurred near the end of the century that influenced, directly or indirectly, intellectuals and intellectual traditions in Russia:

(1) The emergence of a somewhat larger group of educated noblemen and the growth in scope and content of their intellectual interests (namely, in history, philosophy, and *belles lettres*).

(2) The progress of Russian historical writing, being at one and the same time a scholarly undertaking (collecting sources), a means of finding new aspects of Russian culture to give historical depth to the new tradition and to the growing feeling of national unity, and, since historiography sided as a rule with serfdom and autocracy, a weapon of official ideology and new traditionalism.[18] In the main, historians were either Russian noblemen or foreign scholars, usually from German-speaking countries.

(3) The increase in the number of scientists and the diversification of their interests. Science began to be conceived of as a functional component of Russian culture; most scientists were still foreigners and the Russians—not of noble origin.

(4) An overt and aggressive fear of Western ideas on the part of those in authority from the mid-1770's, especially after 1789, leading to tighter control of institutions of learning, more restrictions on imports of books, and a sharp increase in censorship, turned into a professional system for implementing the ideological curbs imposed by state and church. This attack on freedom of thought was enforced by an expanding system of secret police.

(5) Attempts at intellectual independence and qualitative dissent, although examples are few. Two cases were significant in their own time and in view of later developments: Nikolai Novikov (1744-1818) and Alexander Radishchev (1749-1802); both were noblemen and government officials. Novikov devoted himself to several fields of intellectual activity—journalism, publishing, education, literature—and worked for the dissemination of enlightenment and the "moral regeneration of the elite."[19] In Catherine's Russia he became one of the leaders in the Freemasonry movement. Then he was imprisoned for four years (1792-1796), and thereafter withdrew gradually from all public and social activity to live on his estate, looking after his serfs and trying "new husbandry." Mysticism and Freemasonry provided Novikov with inner freedom while he lived in the midst of political and social servitude. He rejected them in his mind and soul, and opened to himself a rich and boundless world of thought and feeling, while staying politically inoffensive. It was dissent by withdrawal and intellectual and psychological escapism.

Radishchev studied jurisprudence, literature, and medicine at Leipzig University. A critic of Russia's social and cultural order, he put his thoughts on paper, published them in 1790, stood trial, and, on Catherine's request, was sentenced to a ten-year exile in Siberia. Among Catherine's intellectuals, Radishchev stands as a solitary figure, striving for freedom of thought and

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of man, and against the institution of serfdom, monarchical absolutism and tyranny; also against scholasticism and superstition, war as a means of national policy and international relations.[20] In the main, *mutatis mutandis*, these same issues were faced by intellectuals in later generations. But in his own day Radishchev felt alone and frightened, and after his return from exile he apparently could find no way out but suicide. In a sense, there was in this end a common denominator with Novikov's withdrawal. For some intellectuals at that time, and also in later times, the alternative seemed often to be, in their view, between different kinds of suicide. Radishchev preferred this one.[21]

At his trial Radishchev declared that he had acted alone and had had no accomplices; over the next fifty years there were few successors. Well into the 1840's, most Russian intellectuals, following patterns established in the eighteenth century, remained state servants and maintained a basic identification with the autocracy and its attitude on the major problems of social and cultural order. Alternatively, they kept their thoughts to themselves or preserved them for future generations, sometimes in beautifully written personal diaries.

True, there was the uprising of the Decembrists in 1825 which introduced two qualitatively new features: a preestablished program for social and political reforms and the secret society as a means of structuring dissent and implementing the program. But the Decembrists were army officers, not intellectuals, with the exception of the poet Ryleev and the generous dreamer Kuchelbecker. The remaining more than one hundred men sentenced by Nicholas' courts were primarily soldiers, although some of them were well educated and familiar with philosophy, history, and literature. Nevertheless, they were professional soldiers, not intellectuals.

There might be a mild paradox here. For many a witness the intellectuals' attitude seemed understandable, while the Decembrists' one—puzzling. Said the Count Rostopchin: "I can understand why the Parisian rabble would rise in order to obtain rights; I can't understand why Russian noblemen would rebel in order to lose privileges." In Rostopchin's day many Russian intellectuals, although moved by the Decembrists' trial, could not understand either. Some did a decade later, partly because of the emotional imprint that this event left in educated society, and partly because of trends and developments within the wider social and intellectual context. The few who found a message and a legacy in the Decembrist uprising,[22] emerge in traditional historiography as "the first generation of the Russian intelligentsia" to which I shall now turn.

The Idea of a Free and Autonomous Intellectual Activity[23]

There are several features to be accounted for when discussing the phenomenon called "the first generation" of the Russian intelligentsia. First, the word "intelligentsia" did not exist in this period; it seems that writers,

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thinkers, bureaucrats did not need such a word. Those who supposedly belonged to the intelligentsia were designated, by themselves and by others, with the current equivalents of "intellectuals" ("educated men," "enlightened people"). It does not seem that anybody felt the need of a term to name them differently than, say, the Slavophiles, or Pushkin and Lermontov (whom, by the way, nobody ever proposed to see as belonging to the "intelligentsia").

Further, the dozen persons usually mentioned as representing the first generation of the intelligentsia represented only themselves.[24] Quantitatively they *were* the so-called "first generation." They were not part of a wider group. All evidence and personal testimony show that there were three circles of close friends: the Moscow Circles—Ogarev's, Stankevich's, and the Slavophiles'. "Thirty years ago," wrote Herzen recollecting these days, "the Russia of the *future* existed exclusively among a few boys, hardly more than children, so small and inconspicuous that there was room for them under the heels of the jackboots of the autocracy."[25] On Herzen's retrospective historical perspective regarding these circles' roles I shall not comment; the facts indicate that thirty years earlier they consisted of "a few boys." It is not much to make a "generation," at least quantitatively. It remains to be seen whether it might have been a "generation" qualitatively.

These men, the men of the 1830's and 1840's, were no *déclassés*, uprooted, rootless, or alienated. They were not going nowhere out of ennui, *Weltschmerz*, or Byronism; at any rate not more than well-integrated young bureaucrats and army officers, and certainly much less than fashionable *à la* Pushkin and Lermontov. They were not ascetics isolated from the world and humanity; they liked good company, good entertainment, good food, good books. They did not sever the ties that bound them to their families, their milieu, their class—the nobility, society in general, or society in Moscow in particular, with all its social conventions and mundanities.[26] They were frequent callers at aristocratic parties and literary salons *à jours fixes*, at Prince Odoevsky's, at Chaadaev's, and at Madame Elagina's, the headquarters of their supposed worst enemies, the Slavophiles—a clear indication that attachment to ideas and differences of opinions were not basic determinants in shaping their social and personal relations.

True, their circles were bound not only by ties of friendship, but also by ideas. These ideas covered a broad spectrum, with nuances ranging from right-Hegelian liberalism to socialism. Their common features were: attachment to liberty of conscience; belief in science and education; hope for Russia's integration into liberal, progressive, and enlightened Europe. More specifically, they aspired to freedom of man (meaning, first and foremost, emancipation of the serfs) and freedom of speech (primarily, of the press). On the first point, the main differences between this group of intellectuals and those in authority concerned the timing and

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manner of carrying out peasant emancipation, with timing gradually becoming the crucial issue. On the second point, the government consistently held a diametrically opposite view on the issue per se and on the underlying assumption of free and autonomous intellectual activity. On that issue the men of the forties clashed with autocracy and were therefore considered dangerous elements (and so were the Slavophiles too). Although this widened the gulf between them and the political regime, the men of the Moscow circles still hoped that progressive reforms and liberal evolution could be initiated and successfully carried on by the powers in general and by an enlightened tsar in particular.

This is not to belittle, of course, the fact that they rejected, in their mind and soul, established traditions in the political-institutional sphere (autocracy and government by bureaucracy) and in the social-cultural one (serfdom and its by-products), which seemed to them by now as a repulsive offspring of Asiatic tyranny and ignorance, and German drill and pedantry.

However, while in Russia, they did not form "centers" for the implementation of their ideas and did not try to organize and carry out a political action. They did not try to find adepts, to proselytize. Their dissent was and remained their own; it did not spread beyond the small circle bound by ties of friendship and ideas. In Herzen's words: "There were no secret societies, but the secret agreement of those who understood was immense."[27] True, there was the perennial problem of "thought and action." But some died young, before they had to consider translating their thoughts into action (Stankevich and perhaps Belinsky); others faced this dilemma, viewed action (like Pushkin[28]) as consisting of the spoken and written word, found this freedom negated in Russia, went to the West, and stayed there for the rest of their lives (Herzen, Ogarev, and Bakunin); still others chose the half-way point of a veiled emigration (Turgenev); a few (Granovsky) remained in Russia, trying to navigate safely in the narrow path left between voicing discontent and personal safety, or between keeping one's thoughts to oneself and keeping one's moral integrity—a hard cruise in the "dark night [that] fell upon Russia and lasted seven years."[29] In Granovsky's words: "It was easy for Belinsky, for he died at the right time."[30]

But in all that there was no break, no chasm, no major change; there was only an existential choice for a few individuals. It could be argued that emigration was a kind of escapism and of dissent by withdrawal; it could be considered a new feature, a new tradition of Russian intellectuals, because it was prompted by political and ideological reasons. And in a sense it was, though emigration as such (mostly veiled and for different reasons) was a current device in the way of life of the Russian nobility. In this respect, the "men of the forties" set an innovation, a new pattern, although they actually emigrated as Russian aristocrats, remaining in the West as political exiles.

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Later in their lives, they maintained much of the psychological make-up of Russian *grands seigneurs*—a paternalism in relations toward children and wives, coupled with aristocratic permissiveness in their own sentimental affairs; a certain respect for the tsar and the establishment in spite of some verbal abuses; a somewhat sentimental acknowledgment of the historical role of the educated nobility, created and raised by Peter the Great, and a view of themselves as its heirs in general, and as heirs of the immediately preceding generation—the Decembrists—in particular. In this conception of their cultural, social, and political antecedents there was no room for feelings of guilt, and these men were not "guilt-stricken noblemen," a fact that must be stressed in view of later developments. As Isaiah Berlin put it, they represented a phase "neither mystical nor introspective, but on the contrary, rationalist, bold, extroverted, and optimistic."[31]

There is, therefore, not sufficient evidence to consider this group of men the first generation of the intelligentsia. They do not represent a generation, and do not present most of the features usually attributed to the intelligentsia.[32] The view that they were a generation of the intelligentsia is apparently a myth created by intellectuals of a later period. The first generation has to be looked for at some other time.

As Isaiah Berlin aptly remarked, these men were "the first Russian intellectuals, men of ideas, who conceived of intellectual activity as free and autonomous, and consequently, as standing in no need of any external justification."[33] In this respect they were certainly among the first, and they stand out from most intellectuals of their own day, as well as from the later intelligentsia, for it cannot be argued that the intelligentsia conceived of intellectual activity as being in no need of external justification. Quite often —just the opposite, although with changing external justifications.

There were, no doubt, a number of common ideas shared by the men of the forties and the men of the sixties—by the "fathers" and the "sons." It remains to be seen whether these common ideas suffice to create an ideological continuity, a sociological genealogy, and a psychological filiation.

The First Generation of the Russian Intelligentsia

The "second generation" of the Russian intelligentsia, also called the "generation of the sons," emerges in the late 1850's. Its first phase, which has nihilism as a central phenomenon, lasted during the 1860's and for that reason the intelligentsia of this phase is also called "the men of the sixties."[34]

Two sets of changes leading to a break in intellectual tradition are usually cited in explaining the emergence of nihilism: (1) a shift in the social origin and composition of the group, (2) the new ideological trends in the intelligentsia in general, and in this movement in particular. Both changes led to a wide gap between this generation and the previous one, and to a bitter opposition of sons against fathers.

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The first point in this interpretation is the disparity between the two generations with regard to the social origin of their members. The first generation was noble; the second is said to have been characterized by a massive influx of commoners, *raznochintsy*, coming from the ranks of the people—priests, peasants, artisans, merchants.[35] This assumption provided a basic explanation of the process under discussion: ideological radicalization was closely connected with, and even resulted from, a democratization of the social basis of the intelligentsia. The more numerous the commoners, the more radical the ideas. Quantity was thus turning into quality; new ideas were founded on a new social basis and had a sociological explanation.

It seems, however, that during the ninety-six years of its existence, this interpretation has not received, as far as I know, the support of convincing and precise data. Rather, available evidence indicates that within the ranks of the so-called intelligentsia the gentry represented quantitatively a large majority during the 1860's and 1870's. Qualitatively, they kept a leading role in all intellectual developments. The nihilists themselves were chiefly young men and women of gentry origin. Finally, from the 1840's through the 1860's the percentage of *raznochintsy* in institutions of learning seems to remain steady or to fall slightly.[36]

Raznochinets prishel ("the commoner arrived"). The author of this famous expression, N. K. Mikhailovsky, was probably the first formulator of the myth it conveyed.[37] It contributed to the historical justification of the populist movement and fitted its theory of progress through the extension of culture. This was, indeed, a great idea, *bene trovata*. It was democratic, it was plebeian, it was equalitarian. But, for the 1860's, it was an anachronism. Most certainly, the *raznochintsy*, although a minority, had a role in shaping the intellectual and psychological features of this generation, but theirs was not a leading role, and their influence was not the result of a mechanism defined by the simplistic equation: "low social origin → radicalization." If their percentage was more or less steady in the 1860's as compared with the 1830's and 1840's, how is their increased influence in the 1860's to be explained? Why then and not twenty years before?

Now to the other point of this interpretation. Nihilism, first stage of the "second generation" of the intelligentsia, has usually been presented as a new and radical set of ideas, viewed as an "ideological movement" (say, within a continuum which would include later on populism and Marxism), and discussed in the framework of an ideological and political conflict between the nihilists and the men of the forties.[38] Thus, the emergence of nihilism might mean a rejection of political, social, and cultural traditions, including the ones (or some of them) formulated and established by the previous "generation of the intelligentsia"; the main cause for this rejection, and for the phenomenon as a whole, would be the new set of ideas taking over and influencing this generation. What was that set of ideas (the "ideology"), typical of and specific to nihilism? The central tenets of

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the nihilist outlook were a positivist, philosophical materialism, fading into scientism; a belief in the intrinsic value as well as in the progressive social function of the natural sciences; a somewhat rudimentary aesthetic realism. Some nihilists were populist-minded, standing somewhere between Herzen and Lavrov (and on that account Franco Venturi calls them "the *enfants terribles* of Populism");[39] some were not populists and may be viewed as "non-socialist radicals";[40] some believed in the redemptive role of the peasant commune and in the evil inherent in capitalism and industry; some, more typical, as Bazarov and Pisarev, despised the peasantry for their ignorance and superstitions and believed in an intellectual elite, enlightened capitalism, and industrial development. All had great faith in education. None can be meaningfully classified along the lines of Westerners versus non-Westerners. They all were both and neither.

What, then, was basically new in this set of central tenets? What were the elements that created a new tradition? Why and how did this set of ideas (most of which were not new indeed) bring about a conflict between sons and fathers?[41]

The nihilists did not raise many substantial ideological issues against the "first generation"; even on points where differences could be seen, they were considered marginal. The main attack leveled at the men of the forties was that they were "men of knowledge without will" (or "idle men" and "superfluous men"), that is, people who refrained from action, an issue on which the nihilists elaborated at length.[42] The nihilists' reproaches stemmed from a certain conception of what one's behavior ought to be after posing and answering the great questions of existence and the major problems in social, cultural, political, and personal life. The essence of this criticism was that the men of the forties, although knowing the correct answers (and among them that things are not as they should be), did not feel that something ought to be done; they lacked a sense of duty to arrive at ultimate conclusions, a sense of personal responsibility and genuine concern for these problems; they failed to see that these social and political problems were also moral ones. This failure led them to a sort of moral indifference, and, since they had the knowledge, this indifference amounted to a lack of personal integrity and intellectual impotence. They behaved as Oblomov in Dobroliubov's interpretation, or as Chernyshevsky's *Russkii chelovek na rendez-vous*.[43]

More important than the issue of whether this criticism was justified is the question: according to what sort of code and values was this criticism raised? It appears that the code contained precisely the set of attitudes usually attributed to the intelligentsia. If so, these attitudes may have emerged and crystallized at this juncture; in such case, how is this emergence to be explained?

One of the common denominators between the men of the forties and the nihilists is that both represent in Russia different phases of "the mod-

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ernist revolt."[44] They stood in conflict with various aspects of the political, social, and cultural order, a conflict between two sets of dialectically opposed values: on the one hand, hierarchy, tradition, authority; on the other hand, equalitarianism, individualism, secularism, positive rights. This attitude toward man and society fascinated the generation of the sixties and had a great impact on the ethos of subsequent groups of Russian intellectuals. How did it happen that twenty to thirty years before, this same set of values, although advocated by a much more gifted, talented, and intellectually powerful group of men, went almost unnoticed, or at least did not bring about a break, a chasm, a major change? In the sixties, according to agreed interpretations, this same set of values led to an alienation of intelligentsia and students not only from the powers, authority, and tradition, but also from their intellectual and ideological forerunners: the men of the forties. As "types of ideas"[45] they remained the same, but the pattern of dissent was suddenly different. Or, if there were no basically new ideas, nor a major change in the social composition of the group, what were the circumstances that gave these old ideas a new function and led to the creation of a new tradition?

One answer might be that the nihilists took action while the men of the forties did not. But that, obviously, is a technical and simplistic explanation, even if one believes that "revolution is at the end of a gun." Even then, it would remain to be explained why some acted while the others did not. Certain relevant features must be considered:

(1) A representative sample indicates that a considerable number of the so-called nihilists were born around 1840, in gentry families, and formed—when they met in and around the universities from 1857-1858 on—a clearly delineated age group.

(2) All had followed the same *gimnaziia* curriculum, shaped and restructured by Nicholas' reforms after 1848-1849. Behind these reforms was a growing fear of liberal and subversive ideas; they resulted in a sharp curtailment in the teaching of history, philosophy, literature, and classical studies (considered as a source of dangerous republican thought). The vacuum created by the reduction in the humanities was filled in with a massive dose of natural sciences—zoology, botany, mineralogy, human anatomy, and human physiology, in addition to the more traditional physics, chemistry, and mathematics. Natural sciences and the Orthodox catechism were the main training provided the future nihilists in high school. No wonder they were not able to appraise Pushkin's poems and Shakespeare's plays. No wonder they were accused of rejecting facts that could not be proved scientifically and of disparaging things tainted by human subjectivity, and above all traditional morals and officially recommended spiritual values.

(3) A specific sequence of events occurring while they were in their late adolescence (1855-1860) had a psychological impact that cannot be

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overemphasized:[46] First, defeat in the Crimean war. There were two sacrosanct pillars of Nicholas' autocracy and orthodoxy: the army and the bureaucracy. The former was defeated in a war waged on Russian soil; the latter proved appallingly inefficient and corrupted. God took no sides in the conflict and the Russian Orthodox Church appeared helpless to save Holy Russia from debacle. This happened after twenty-eight years of official praise of state institutions, particularly the army. Near the end of the war a symbolic event took place: Nicholas died. The defeat spread consternation and bewilderment; Nicholas' death caused an outburst of joy in educated society.

Second, the accession of the new tsar—greeted as the beginning of a new era, full of great hopes and bright promises. The tsar himself encouraged these hopes, and in March 1856 publicly declared in Moscow that serfdom was to be abolished. The future nihilists were by then fifteen to seventeen years old. Serfdom, of course, had to be abolished; but serfdom had always been officially presented as one of the perennial institutions of Russia, her essence, might, and wisdom. If this was wrong, then what was true?

Third, freedom was in sight. Expectations grew and public debate began. Soon thereafter the powers let it be understood that the planned emancipation was their exclusive concern, not the public's, and forbade any allusion to it in the press. It was the first of a series of disappointments ending in sheer consternation when details about the draft law became known in 1859-1860. Later, emancipated peasants believed that this was not "the genuine law"; educated people had no choice but to realize it was.

Fourth, the manifesto of emancipation of the peasants from the bonds of serfdom (February 19, 1861) was written by the Metropolitan Filaret and released through the church, which exhorted, around the country, that all men are created in God's image, and no man shall be the slave of another man. For 150 years the Russian Orthodox Church preached that serfdom had been ordained by God, and that it was a Christian's duty to accept his earthly fate. What, then, was to be believed? And who was to be blamed for the servitude of the peasants?

(4) Most of these events were the subject of heated debates in gentry circles. In many families, some of these suddenly obsolete truths had been, over the years, conveyed to the children by the father, himself a serf owner, who usually stood as a staunch defender of autocracy, orthodoxy, and serfdom, and who extolled these principles before or after his often-heard, but always engaging, reminiscences of deeds and adventures in the army, in the service of the tsar.

This is certainly the most complicated part of these developments, requiring a detailed inquiry into causes and motivations. It seems, however, that in hundreds, perhaps thousands, of gentry families sons and daughters

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in their late adolescence were in sharp conflict with their parents and rejected the authority of their fathers. Kropotkin writes in his *Memoirs* that "in nearly every wealthy family a bitter struggle was going on between the fathers, who wanted to maintain the old traditions, and the sons and daughters, who defended their right to dispose of their life . . . Girls, bred in the most aristocratic families, rushed penniless to St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Kieff, eager to learn a profession which would free them from the domestic yoke, and someday, perhaps, also from the possible yoke of a husband."[47] Remembering these days, the noted mathematician Sophia Kovalevskaia (then herself a mild rebel against her father, General Korvin-Krukovsky) says: "Of whatever gentry family you inquired . . . you would hear one and the same answer—that the young quarreled with the parents,"[48] that they had left home.

They usually went to university towns, the boys to study, the girls to fight for the right to study. Quite often they refused financial support from their families, for, as Nekrasov, the only poet they declared respectable, put it in a verse: "It is bitter, the bread that has been made by slaves," so they "refused to eat that bread, and to enjoy the riches that had been accumulated in their fathers' houses by means of servile labour,"[49] lived in distress doing any kind of job, and declared poverty an ideal and work the duty of decent and honest men and women. They gathered in groups, set up *kruzhki* and *kommuny*, met there their fellow *raznochintsy*, shared board and room and books and studies (formal and self-organized), in a spirit of mutual aid, comradeship, and the usual joys, sorrows, and quarrels of young people. The nihilists were on the make. This was, then, a revolt of sons and daughters against their biological fathers, but not against vague ideological "fathers of the forties," whom these young people often had never heard of before they left home. This was also their first "action." What were the others? What did they want? What did they achieve? Why is this episode important for the traditions of the Russian intellectuals, and for the intellectuals' attitude toward tradition?

Nihilism was not a political movement. It was parallel to political organizing and activity, not identical with them.[50] In the words of a nihilist, later a terrorist, Stepniak-Kravchinsky: "Nihilism was negation in the name of individual liberty, negation of the obligations imposed upon the individual. Nihilism was a powerful and passionate reaction, not against the political despotism, but against the moral despotism that weighs upon the private and inner life of the individual."[51] The principal points of the nihilist creed were:

(1) Individualism, meaning personal dignity and the importance of the personality, a clearly elitist streak. This attitude resulted in a permanent contribution to the slang of Russian intellectuals: *Pisarevshchina*. Nihilists seldom spoke on behalf of social groups or classes, but mostly of the individual.

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(2) A particular interest in questions of moral principles and rejection of a number of conventional morals. Their approach and motivation were existential rather than intellectual, and their starting point was, as a rule, a discrepancy found (or believed so) between established moral imperatives and the actual behavior of people professing them.

(3) Rejection of religion.

(4) Freedom of women (as daughter, wife, and person).

(5) Translation of these aspirations into forms of everyday behavior and dress that differed from the current fashion in society in general, and in aristocratic society in particular, and rejection of customary civility and polite speech.

The common denominator of all these manifestations was rejection of authority (of the fathers, the church, officials) and rejection of restrictions that made these youths feel underage (some of them were) and under too much supervision, the kind of supervision exercised in gentry families toward grown-up children. This set of attitudes and beliefs satisfied the desire for freedom and independence of a given age group from a definite social milieu. It was also a sort of game that provided simple answers to the intellectual and existential problems of these youths. The simple answers were found as they discovered action as the shortest way to fulfillment. Their ultimatum may be summarized as: smash everything that can be smashed, and do it now; the things that will stand the blows are those worth standing; those that will crumble to pieces are rubbish; at any rate, hit out right and left; there will and can be no harm from it. Strike at tyranny, strike at religion, strike at all the corrupt foundations of official morality.[52] For the time being the blows were only literary and, so to speak, personally existential, for the core of this attitude is in "everything" and "now." "Everything" meant the nearest things in these youths' existence: dependence upon the family and official advisers; submission of the woman; hypocrisy in human relations and family life; parasitism and social idleness. All that was to be destroyed, and it had to be done "now," that is, *in themselves,* in their own existence. Therefore it led them, *personally,* to undertake various attempts: to attain material and intellectual independence (Pisarev's "critically thinking personality"); to emancipate women, above all, to secure their access to a higher education; to inject frankness and honesty in human relations; to feel a desire to be useful to society; to reappraise moral rules of behavior (in order to destroy "the gap" between rules and behavior). This, in turn, led them to work out or to adopt more liberal and permissive theories and canons of behavior, much more puritan than was customary in aristocratic milieus (in reality, they rejected one sort of "gap" to adopt another). Last but not least, they wanted all this to be conspicuous and manifest, which accounts for their different external forms of social behavior: a new slang (not necessarily "dirty" words, but "other" words), a different fashion and various distinctive emblems, such as tinted spectacles, capes, round Gari-

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baldian caps, short hair for girls (quicker to comb than curls), and long hair for boys, accompanied by some negligence of personal hygiene, justified by "lack of time, needed for studying," the time spent in the bathroom being "not only wasted, but serving deceit and vanity."[53]

The "nihilist revolution" was a personal and individual "revolution" (and for that reason the new adepts needed external distinguishing marks). Actually, the nihilists were rebels, not revolutionaries, but their "here and now" created a style of life and a moral code—a *kodeks*, in their own words[54]—which represented a sort of counterculture. For that reason this style and code could become the basis of the ethos, characteristics and features of the intelligentsia and of intellectuals in this generation and in subsequent ones. These features are similar to the ones usually attributed to the intelligentsia.

Nihilism proper began to wane around 1866-1867. The causes need detailed elaboration, but one seems fairly clear: the nihilists grew older, reached the age of twenty-five to twenty-six;[55] the universities ceased to be their rallying centers and to serve as a means of structuring their dissent which, in the meantime, began to be incorporated into the traditions of wider circles of educated people.[56] In their biographies, one finds, later on, some of them in the revolutionary movements; others—in some remote Russian village. For, on the basis of the nihilist ethos of translating one's thoughts into personal deeds, both life styles were possible: that of a terrorist, for a man who believed that the political regime has to be changed, but found political activity impossible in autocratic Russia; that of a village physician, for one who thought that peasants were in a greater need of medical care than town people. By then, all that pertained already to the features of the intelligentsia. The word itself emerged at the end of the 1860's, a time of growing populist influence.

A brief assessment of the *raznochintsy*'s possible role and influence may be added now. As mentioned, in the 1860's the *raznochintsy* still represented a minority among intellectuals in general and university students in particular; their percentage in the period under discussion remained relatively stable as compared with the 1840's and 1850's. Moreover, during these last two to three decades, as well as in past times, the attitude of the *raznochinskie* intellectuals (nearly all of them state servants) toward the major problems of culture and society was consistently traditional and loyal to those in authority; they often displayed more conformity than, say, the gentry in the same rank or in similar status groups. The change in the sixties was not, therefore, a result of quantitative growth, but perhaps partly, of a different distribution of *raznochinskie* intellectuals in various occupations, with more of them in autonomous intellectual activities. The change was not a result of some intellectual feature or political orientation determined by their lower social origin. Historically, conformism, not dissent, was their traditional pattern.

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The circumstances that gave a role and an influence to a number of young *raznochintsy* seem to have been, therefore, of another kind. The impact of the series of occurrences from 1855 to 1861 described above led to a weakening of confidence in authority in general, and in the church in particular. For a number of *raznochintsy* studying in theological seminaries, a major consequence was loss of religious faith. As a result, they left these institutions and converged around the universities. The encounter of the *raznochintsy* with the rebelling young gentry gave the *raznochintsy* the courage to transfer their dissent to nonreligious spheres, and provided an opportunity for a valorization of several of their existential and psychological features.

Until that time *raznochintsy* were not proud of their poverty and modest social origin. An eloquent case in this respect is Dobroliubov, who wrote in shame of his poverty.[57] The "poor by deliberate choice" gentry-nihilists provided a new outlook. Indeed, only rich youths playing at being different could have made poverty an ideal. The *raznochintsy* took over willingly, washing out at once a wretched fact, and adding their own nuance: respecting asceticism as a result of their theological education, having experienced it at home and in the seminaries, and living this way anyway through lack of means, they canonized frugality as a virtue and affluence and riches as a sin. Furthermore, they themselves, "unlike others," did not have to feel ashamed and guilty for being born rich—an outlook to remain in the intelligentsia's *Weltanschauung* for several decades.

For the *raznochintsy* roughness had been a usual form of behavior. Lack of good manners, which had previously made them feel uncomfortable in society, never being quite sure whether they behaved *comme il faut*, was now justified and made respectable. It was not a regrettable gap, but a decoration—not a lack of education, but a new style. The gentry-nihilists knew what good manners were and rejected them as part of a game; the *raznochintsy* added a stress which made of it a serious matter. (However, this element in the intelligentsia's ethos was soon refined.[58]) The *raznochintsy* brought not only roughness, but also bitterness for the humiliations they had experienced. For that reason too, the nihilists' talk on individuality, personality, and man's dignity was a welcome innovation.

The *raznochintsy* also brought a dogmatic manner of thinking inherited from theological studies and the neophyte atheism of men who, not long before, really did believe. In a sense, the encounter between the rebelling gentry sons and the young *raznochintsy* was a mixing of the structure and dynamics of the natural sciences with the statics of dogmatic thought turned secular and filled in with a poor humanistic culture.

To sum up. The central phenomenon was not the rise of the *raznochinets* as a bearer of a new tradition, but rather the revolt of gentry sons and daughters, by means of which the *raznochintsy* obtained a role and became a part of the phenomenon. For the *raznochintsy* the rebelling young gentry played the role of catalyzer. For both the universities provided a means of structuring

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the "movement." The importance of the sixties as a formative period in the history of the intelligentsia (or, simply, of the intellectuals) is not in the relative rise of the *raznochintsy*, but perhaps in the breakthrough resulting from the absolute increase in numbers of young noblemen in the universities, and later on in the sciences and the professions, and in their willingness to "get their hands dirty," coupled with the emergence of several new existential and intellectual features.

It has been pointed out that "essentially the values and 'ethos,' the mentality and psychology, of the group are worked out and set by the first generation."[59] But in the case of the Russian intelligentsia, this was not done by the men of the 1830's. It was done, I believe, by the men of the sixties, who emerge as the "first generation." They had such an influence, not because of the specific nature and content of some set of theories, but because, in a sense, they created a counterculture: as a result of specific historical events occurring at a given point in their lives (late adolescence), combined with a generational conflict, developing within families of a given stratum of society, the nobility; at the level of manners, dress, vocabulary, behavior, attitudes toward everyday life habits, coupled with a reevaluation of the meaning of life, the aim of man's travail on earth, the nature of human bonds.[60]

It is the creation of this counterculture that has to be seen as the decisive reason for the main characteristics of this phenomenon, namely, that this age group did emerge and crystallize as a new generation, and that its attitudes, psychological make-up, and intellectual orientations could be conveyed to the next generation in spite of the subsequent emergence of new ideas and other philosophies. Their message, frame of reference, and intellectual orientations were a way of life, a vision of the world, and a moral code; these were, indeed, a specific "way of looking at the basic problems of social and cultural order, and of posing the major questions about them."[61] This was also a basic orientation implying that, in the search for answers, one has to attempt to correlate and conform one's way of life to one's way of looking at the problems. This did not necessarily imply a given type of solution; the answer could have been populist, anarchist, or liberal, elitist or anti-elitist.[62] It did imply, however, a number of basic trends, attitudes, frames of mind, and behaviors, which were, precisely, the core of this counterculture, and of a new tradition capable of being bequeathed to coming generations.

Was it bequeathed? And to what extent? This generation of the intelligentsia that displayed so neatly the classic features of the Russian intelligentsia and emerged as its first generation, was it not also the last?

Intellectuals in an Age of Modernity and Modernism

The study of Russian intellectuals as such from the early 1890's through 1917 meets with considerable difficulties because of intensity and pace of

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social and intellectual processes, as well as the gaps still left in the research on several aspects of the period. Therefore, I will not venture beyond some cursory remarks.

The subject needs, first, a thorough semantic inquiry on the term "intelligentsia," for there are, quite clearly, important changes in its connotations from the 1870's to the 1890's and after. At the beginning of that period, the term seems clear, has positive undertones, and conveys a set of traits amounting to what may be called "the nihilist ethos," plus a subsequent layer of populist attitudes, which is similar to the features of the intelligentsia described at the beginning of this essay. Around the 1890's these connotations become ambiguous, and the term shifts more and more to the meaning of "intellectuals" in a broad sense. Two examples are in Chekhov's letters: "Our only topic is Zola and Dreyfus. The great majority of the intelligentzia [in France] are on the side of Zola and believe in the innocence of Dreyfus."[63] "Intelligentsia" here clearly stands for "intellectuals"; note also that for Chekhov this is not a unique Russian phenomenon. Even more stressed is the following use: "You ask my opinion of Zola and his trial. I first of all take the obvious into consideration: on the side of Zola is all the European intelligentzia."[64] Further, publicists currently use the term with an adjective, in which case the context is meaningless if "intelligentsia" is not understood as "intellectuals." Thus, for instance, Lenin used adjectives such as "advanced," "liberal," "democratic," "bourgeois," "petty-bourgeois," "radical," "conservative"; Orgeiani, the anarchist theoretician, used "the toiling intelligentsia" (*trudovaia intelligentsia*),[65] in contradistinction to well-to-do or "exploiting" *intelligenty,* that is, "intellectuals."

Moreover, "intelligentsia" is now often a word of abuse and denigration, and the group it designates does not fulfill a prestigious historic mission anymore. According to Chekhov:

> The whole intelligentzia is to blame, all of them, sir. While they are still students they are a good honest sort, they are our hope, they are the future of Russia; but no sooner do they enter on an independent life and become grown up than our hope and the future of Russia turn into smoke, and in the filter there remains only doctors who own villas, hungry officials, and thieving engineers. Remember that Katkov, Podebonoszev, Vishnegradsky, are nurslings of the universities, that they are our professors, not upstarts, but professors, luminaries . . . I do not believe in our intelligentzia; it is hypocritical, false, hysterical, uneducated and lazy; nor do I believe in it even when it suffers and grumbles, since its oppressors come from its own midst.[66]

"Intelligentsia" was consistently used by Lenin to imply: impotent, inconsistent, compromising, selling itself, weak-willed, disgusting. The features of the intelligentsia are instability, flabbiness, wishy-washiness, opportunism, and anarchist phrase-mongering. For Lenin there was no doubt that the intelligentsia could barely lead itself, let alone the peasants, the workers, or, *horribile dictu,* the party.[67] The anarchists, displaying more civility and restraint than Lenin, consistently used "intelligentsia" as an

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equivalent of "intellectuals," and declared that it was "not a socio-economic group, neither a socio-ethical notion."[68] From the other end of the spectrum came the devastating criticism of the *Vekhi* group (Berdiaev, Frank, Struve, Bulgakov) against those who "gave themselves the name of 'the intelligentsia.' "[69] Although these critics still see themselves as "intelligentsia," there is ample lexicological and ideological evidence that they mean "intellectuals."

Another sign of the increasing ambiguity is the heated debate, from the early 1900's, on the theme "What Is the Intelligentsia?" After thirty years of use, it suddenly became clear that the term "intelligentsia" needed definition. In these attempts, only the neopopulists and a few liberals still believed in the intelligentsia's existence and in its typical moral qualities and historic mission. But in their writings there was more nostalgia and romanticism than hope and sociological analysis; and they stressed the intelligentsia of the 1870's above the stratum of their own day. They were faithfully defending "the purity of its ideas" and its great strength, to which Lenin was replying that "the 'purity' of its ideas" was exactly why it was, and had always been, impotent.[70] He could have argued that, anyway, it existed no more, but he did not, because he had in mind the intellectuals, whereas the neopopulists still meant the intelligentsia.

An attempt to explain these changes of meaning between the 1870's and the 1900's would involve a vast inquiry, obviously beyond the scope of this essay. Any such attempt should consider a series of complex background developments: rapid industrialization with its manifold by-products; transformations in the patterns of political action, entailing, after 1905, wider possibilities for political and social organizing, publishing, and structuring autonomous activities in all intellectual fields; the renaissance usually referred to as the Silver Age or the Second Golden Age, with its great creativity, richness, and vitality in all areas of cultural, intellectual, and spiritual life; and a conspicuous quantitative increase of the intellectual stratum, a growing diversification of occupations, and a greater specialization in every field.

An important change of the 1860's and 1870's is the growing number and importance of the non-state-service intellectuals and the decreasing influence of the traditional bureaucratic intellectuals. To be sure, their proportion within the intellectual stratum was still relatively high. It seems clear that the following period witnessed a great increase of intellectuals of the "pure" cultural specialization—of freelance, unattached, independent intellectuals—and the formation of several strong centers conceiving of intellectual activity as free and autonomous and of spiritual activity as standing in no need of external justification. This new intellectual stratum included a large and dynamic group of artists, poets, writers, and painters; a well-organized and effective group of urban professionals—lawyers, engineers, physicians, university professors, scientists; a large group of

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rural professionals—agronomists, statisticians, physicians, teachers. Some of the latter, although working in local government institutions (*Zemstva*), considered themselves as serving the people, not the state, and used their institutional location not for furthering central state policy, but in order to limit its hold at the local level. The *Zemstvo* intellectuals were a most active and articulate group in the political and social sphere.

Against this background, what were the trends and changes in attitudes toward tradition, toward the intellectuals' traditions, and toward the powers? Several hypotheses seem possible.

Notwithstanding the relatively considerable evidence to the contrary, it is worth exploring whether intellectuals were not the main modernizing force in Russian society. One obvious exception that comes to mind is industrialization, which was carried on by government decision and policy. One might learn, however, that after the initial decision and first stage (which coincided with the weakening of populist influence on intellectuals in matters of economic development), the distribution of roles between the powers and the intellectuals was somewhat different from the customary assessment.

The intellectuals' role and influence were carried on through various centers, channels, institutions, and organizations, rather than through political parties or conventional political action. It might well appear that in parties and political groups (whether oppositional or traditionalistic) intellectuals represented negligible minorities, although the Liberal party (Kadets) and the Battle Organization of the S.R.'s may be exceptions.

In spite of the current belief that intellectuals played a leading role in revolutionary parties, those who did were a minority in the intellectual stratum as a whole, as well as in the membership of these parties. A new assessment of their qualitative role is also needed. It seems clear that not every professional revolutionary was necessarily an intellectual, and an elite of professional revolutionaries was not an elite of intellectuals, let alone an intellectual elite.

The role of the bureaucratic intellectuals in the center should be thoroughly studied. How did they influence the formation and crystallization of the cultural and social forms? What were their responses to conformity as compared to the different kinds of autonomous or critical attitudes developed in other segments of the intellectual stratum, including the *Zemstvo* intellectuals? Different kinds of attitudes among bureaucratic intellectuals in the center are worth noting because changes, innovative trends, criticism, and the breaking of traditions in areas with marginal political relevance were viewed less and less by the powers as fields of resistance and conflict.

The three main groups having the greatest influence in shaping the cultural order are: the scientific intellectuals, who displayed high specialization coupled with wide humanistic interests, and felt that "true

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scientists combine supreme intellectual endeavour with a profound dedication to humanity";[71] the philosophers and religious thinkers, who reappraised Russia's tradition, criticized the intellectuals' traditions, and gave new content to religious thought and experience; and the artists, writers, poets, and composers—decadent, independent, soul-searching, open-minded, apolitical although rebellious and considering it a disgrace to support the powers—who broke taboos in the arts, leading to their wider role in the cultural order.

Finally: what were the attitudes of the intellectuals toward the traditions of the intellectuals or, for that matter, of the intelligentsia? This must be studied on two levels, the ideological and the sociopsychological.

Authorities agree that with regard to philosophy and general theoretical premises, the orientations of this generation represent a break with the previous one; it rejected the so-called ideological heritage of the intelligentsia, or, to put it more accurately, this heritage ceased to be the main concern of many nonbureaucratic intellectuals. The rejected philosophies and theories were: materialism, positivism, ultilitarianism, antiaestheticism, realism. In this respect the more traditional and conservative groups around 1910 were the neopopulists and the Marxists; the most innovative were the various constellations of men in the arts and religious philosophers. However, this heritage was not totally rejected, even by its critics, and parts of it continued to influence the thought of those who rebelled against it, very much as populist political ideology influenced Lenin's Marxism, for instance.[72]

At the sociopsychological level the subject is much more intricate. In a sense it may be formulated in the following ways: what did remain from the nihilist ethos (with its subsequent populist layer of the 1870's)? Do the traditional features of the intelligentsia typify this generation too, or a major part of it? On most points the fragmentary evidence is contradictory or ambiguous. A few assumptions nevertheless seem plausible.

A large segment of the intellectual stratum did not identify itself either with the powers or with the state. This attitude was not a by-product of political opinions; it went deeper and beyond them. It may be seen among many creative intellectuals in the world of art, where dissent was basically apolitical; it is noticeable also in liberals and in the *Vekhi* group. (This critical attitude toward the state as such may lead to a reassessment of the scope of Marxist influence, and may uncover some latent anarchist tendencies.) There seems also to be no stress on guilt feeling, as well as a weaker propensity to turning political problems into moral ones. Other aspects need much more additional investigation in order to be assessed. Was there a peculiar immediacy in human relations? An uncompromising stand in matters of truth (*pravda* and *istina*) and of personal integrity? Neglect and disdain for one's personal interests? Deep concern? Moral passion? Conforming one's behavior and way of life to one's way of looking at the world and society?

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Among the many variables that should be assessed, one seems fairly clear: Marxism had a disrupting effect on the traditions of the intelligentsia and contributed to the rejection or refraction of several. The focus of this kind of influence was its realism and relativism, as opposed to the romanticism of the populists. Marxism helped dismiss the guilt feeling and curtailed the propensity to turn political problems into moral ones. Instead, there were classes and class struggle, historical inevitability. The guilt was in others—in the exploiters, in the bourgeoisie, in the reactionaries and deviationists. Lenin's Marxism turned political problems into moral ones only for its adversaries.

Marxism helped weaken the sense of obligation to arrive at ultimate conclusions. Ultimate conclusions in life were petty bourgeois attitudes, the weak-willed impatience of people looking for individual salvation instead of fighting the right way for changing the whole fabric of society—utopian Dukhobory setting up equalitarian communities instead of preparing the overthrow of capitalism. Marxism helped to reduce the alienation of the intellectual from society by giving him a good conscience: henceforth he could live in the rotten bourgeois society, which was doomed anyway, and wait until revolution came.

Lenin's Marxism slackened also the sense of personal deep concern. Lenin's thought was first and foremost a political strategy, which required pragmatic and opportunistic attitudes. Fighting here and now for higher wages for the sake of wages was an aberration. Economism was a deviation. So was terrorism. And for the same reason. Terrorists do not understand that their ultimate conclusion in matters of revolutionary theory and practice is a fallacy. They do not understand the need to postpone. The only valid and moral ultimate conclusions are those emerging from the correct analysis of the situation, coming from the party.

"Correct analysis" meant no personal deep concern for general problems of public interest. The humiliated, the offended, the poor, the wretched, and the peasants were problems that could not be solved by philanthropy and good feelings. Were they a reservoir, a useful instrument, an ally, a force? That was what counted—force—not personal deep concern. In Lenin's words: "Agreement with a *force*, but the intelligentsia is not a force"[73]—the "intelligentsia," that is, the intellectuals.

What may have happened, then, to the intelligentsia during this phase, and to the intellectuals toward its end?

The term "intelligentsia" was probably loosely used from the late 1860's through the 1890's, that is, during a period when, as a result of the reforms of Alexander II and economic development, a new type of intellectual was emerging. Yet the group was not large; it had no clearly defined place in the social structure and estates system. There was a gradual formation of new intellectual roles and sporadic attempts at their legitimation, with some new patterns of participation in social and political move-

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ments. Thus, a vague term, loosely used and never defined, served with no difficulties in the political jargon of publicists and in the everyday slang of university students in the 1870's and 1880's, a time when these groups were imbued with populist beliefs. Thus the major connotations of the word came from two sources: the nihilist ethos and the populist creed. The intelligentsia itself was emerging within a relatively simple social structure, and, for that phase, the "two Russias" theory has a certain validity.[74] But not for long: twenty to thirty years later there were already many more than two.

Within three decades the social, economic, and institutional processes mentioned above were well under way. The intellectual stratum became more clearly structured; its roles and functions were differentiated; its place in society was unquestioned. At that time the word "intelligentsia" was becoming obsolete,[75] and the first result of that obsolescence was the emergence of the problem of definition, briefly stated as "What is the intelligentsia?" This marked the end of the intelligentsia, owing mainly to the numerical expansion of the intellectual stratum and its diversification and specialization, and the combined ideological blows of Marxism and the partial rejection of the intelligentsia's traditions by the Second Golden Age artists and religious thinkers.

Thus, in a sense, the intelligentsia of the 1860's to 1880's was not only the first generation, but also the last. Its heirs were intellectuals, or professional revolutionaries, not another generation of the intelligentsia. It nevertheless created a tradition and bequeathed a heritage, and further research would certainly permit us to assess and evaluate its scope and content during the Second Golden Age.

The dramatic epilogue to this phase argues the need for such research. For, as the intelligentsia of the 1860's to 1880's was a last generation, so were the intellectuals of the Golden Age. But interest in them should not be motivated by the well-known propensity to inquire mainly into the history of the victors. October 1917 was a victory neither for the intelligentsia, nor for intellectuals. The Bolshevik party was not "preeminently a party of intellectuals," as a recent scholar has it,[76] and the Bolshevik government was not "a government of intellectuals," as Volin and his fellow anarchists believed.[77] Rather, intellectuals, like the anarchists themselves, were among the most defeated victims. In this respect, too, there was a certain historical and logical continuity with the old nihilist-populist intelligentsia, and with the new modernist and individualist intellectuals of the Golden Age.

References

1. Recent important contributions on this subject include: I. Berlin, "A Marvellous Decade, 1838-1848: The Birth of the Russian Intelligentsia," *Encounter,* 4 (June 1955); "The Russian Intelligentsia," *Dædalus* (Summer 1960), ed. R. Pipes (especially the following articles: M. Malia, "What Is the Intelligentsia?" L. Schapiro, "The Pre-Revolutionary Intelligentsia and the Legal Order"; B. Elkin, "The Russian

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Intelligentsia on the Eve of the Revolution"; R. Pipes, "The Historical Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia"; and L. Labedz, "The Structure of the Soviet Intelligentsia"); R. Pipes, "Russia's Exigent Intellectuals," *Encounter*, 22 (January 1964); A. Pollard, "The Russian Intelligentsia: The Mind of Russia," *California Slavic Studies*, 3 (1964); V. C. Nahirny, "The Russian Intelligentsia: From Men of Ideas to Men of Convictions," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 4 (July 1964); G. Fischer, *Russian Liberalism: From Gentry to Intelligentsia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958); L. H. Haimson, *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), chap. 1; M. Raeff, *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1966). The subject is touched upon also in numerous works dealing with various aspects of Russia's social and intellectual history; some of them are mentioned below.

2. This feature seems somewhat less typical when one reads descriptions such as the following: "Now this polarizing tendency was especially marked in Germany. In Germany there has always existed a tendency to go to extremes in pushing logical arguments to their ultimate conclusions—a tendency which has not existed in such a marked fashion in the European countries outside Germany." K. Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," in *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 79.

3. Important features are stressed in Professor Pipes's formulation: "But for all its diversity, the intelligentsia did share certain common beliefs. (1) Those who considered themselves *intelligenty* were committed to public affairs, and conceived the emancipation of the individual only in connection with the general emancipation of Russian society and democratisation of the Russian State. (2) They were historically-minded; *i.e.*, they regarded history as a meaningful and regular process, whose general course could be scientifically studied and even predicted. (3) They believed in the historic mission of the intelligentsia: they thought of themselves as the vanguard of the forces of freedom, as a group destined to point the way towards a general liberation of society." "Russia's Exigent Intellectuals," p. 80.

4. E. Shils, "Intellectuals," *International Encyclopeadia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), VII, 399-415; S. N. Eisenstadt, "Intellectuals and Tradition," in this volume; E. Shils, "Intellectuals, Tradition, and the Traditions of Intellectuals: Some Preliminary Observations," in this volume. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Shils and Professor Eisenstadt for their extensive comments and criticism on the preliminary draft of this paper; unfortunately, for lack of time and space, many a good remark of theirs is not reflected in the present version.

5. For an example of discussion on that point, see E. Morin, "Intellectuels: critique du mythe et mythe de la critique," *Arguments*, 4 (October 1960).

6. See A. Vucinich, *Science in Russian Culture: A History to 1860* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), Part I, a work which I found extremely valuable for this study; K. V. Ostrovitianov, ed., *Istoriia Akademii Nauk SSSR* (Moscow, 1958), I, 13-19.

7. The degree of success and failure is an issue not relevant to the point under discussion.

8. With one important exception: the preservation of serfdom.

9. See J. P. Nettl, "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent," in Philip Rieff, ed., *On Intellectuals* (New York: Doubleday, 1969).

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10. A. Besançon, *Le tsarévich immolé: La symbolique de la loi dans la culture russe* (Paris: Plon, 1967).

11. Alexander Herzen's expressions.

12. See Raeff, *Origins;* *M. M. Shtrange, Demokraticheskaia intelligentsia Rossii v XVIII veke* (Moscow, 1965).

13. See my "Le paysan russe jugé par la noblesse au XVIIIe siècle," *Revue des Etudes slaves,* 38 (1961).

14. Among the Russians elected to the St. Petersburg Academy during its first fifty years, none was of gentry origin; until the middle of the nineteenth century the nobility produced 25 per cent of its total membership. See Vucinich, *Science,* p. 80. On the nobility's lack of interest in university studies, see *ibid.,* pp. 49, 80, 127-128, 134.

15. See my "Histoire et Psychologie: A propos de la noblesse russe au XVIIIe siècle," *Annales E. S .C.,* no. 6 (November-December 1967).

16. M. Speransky, "Draft of Introduction to the State Laws" (1809), in J. Mavor, *An Economic History of Russia* (London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1914), I, 333.

17. A. Herzen, *O razvitii revoliutsionnykh idei v Rossii* (Moscow, 1958), p. 47.

18. See Vucinich, *Science,* pp. 30-31, 62-64; A. G. Mazour, *Modern Russian Historiography* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1958), pp. 9-49; H. Rogger, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 186-252.

19. M. Raeff, *Imperial Russia, 1685-1825: The Coming of Age of Modern Russia* (New York: Knopf, 1971), p. 146; see also V. O. Kliuchevsky, "Vospominanie o N. I. Novikove i ego vremeni," *Sochineniia* (Moscow, 1959), VII, 223-252.

20. See A. McConnell, "Radishchev's Political Thought," *American Slavic Review,* 17 (1958), 439-453.

21. I should hasten to add that until the October Revolution, Radishchev's kind of suicide was rather rare among Russian intellectuals; see A. Gaiev, "Suicides d'écrivains soviétiques" and I. Krotov, "Trois suicides," *Le Contrat Social,* 12 (December 1968).

22. See Herzen's testimony on himself and Ogarev in *Byloe i dumy* (Moscow, 1962), I, 84-91.

23. I owe the idea of this subtitle to Sir Isaiah Berlin's brilliant essay "The Marvellous Decade."

24. A. Herzen, N. Ogarev, N. Stankevich, V. Belinsky, M. Bakunin, N. Turgenev, V. Passek, N. Ketcher, N. Sazonov, A. Savich, N. Satin, A. Lakhtin, T. Granovsky, and a few others.

25. Herzen, *Byloe i dumy,* I, 364 (Herzen's emphasis).

26. See Nahirny, "The Russian Intelligentsia." The one major exception is Belinsky, who stands out clearly with regard to attitudes and psychological make-up.

27. A. Herzen, "Bazarov. Letter II," in *My Past and Thoughts: The Memoirs of Alexander Herzen,* trans. Constance Garnett (London, 1927), VI, 206.

28. *"Slova poeta sut' uzhe ego dela"* (The poet's words are his deeds).

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29. Herzen, "Bazarov," p. 208. The "seven years" were the period of political reaction in Russia, extending from the 1848 revolutions through the death of Nicholas I in 1855.

30. T. Granovsky to Alexandre and Natalie Herzen, Moscow, [June] 1849, *Byloe i dumy*, II, 621. (Belinsky died in 1848.)

31. Berlin, "The Marvellous Decade," p. 34.

32. See above, p. 118.

33. Berlin, "The Marvellous Decade," p. 34.

34. I shall not discuss here the history and etymological aspects of the term "nihilism"; although a reconsideration of several points may be useful, such a discussion would extend this paper beyond any reasonable length. As to the periodization, according to established custom in Russian historiography, the "sixties" represent the period from the mid-1850's to the mid-1860's.

35. Such is the current Soviet view; for two examples in Western works see E. Lampert, *Sons against Fathers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 85; Malia, "What Is the Intelligentsia?" p. 452.

36. For some scattered data, see V. R. Leikina-Svirskaia, "Formirovanie raznochinskoi intelligentsii v Rossii v 40-kh godakh XIX v.," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 1 (1958), 83-104. In the 1850's and 1860's, compared to the enrollment of students from the lower and middle classes, the representation of the gentry in the universities was rising. In the academic year 1860-1861, at St. Petersburg University there were 1,228 students of gentry origin and 203 of more modest origin. V. V. Grigoriev, *Imperatorskij S. Peterburgskij universitet v techenie pervykh piatidesiati let ego sushchestvovaniia* (St. Petersburg, 1870), p. 306. Fragmentary data in a recent publication are contradictory; some of them tend to confirm the present assessment; others hint at the possibility that the *raznochintsy*'s breakthrough in the universities might have happened only in the late 1860's or early 1870's. See L. V. Kamosko, "Izmeneniia soslovnogo sostava uchashchikhsiia srednei i vyshei shkoly Rossii (30—80-e gody XIX v.)," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 10 (1970), 203-207; see also Pollard, "The Russian Intelligentsia," pp. 26-27.

37. N. K. Mikhailovsky, *Sochineniia* (St. Petersburg, 1896), II, column 623 (the essay appeared in 1874). Oddly enough, he also adds that the *raznochintsy* were, however, immediately followed by "the other social element which at first played only a subordinate role, but afterwards dominated the entire scene. I refer to the repentant noblemen . . . Pisarev was, at least in literature, the figure most representative of this sect" (*ibid.*, 647). On the whole question, see the excellent analysis of C. Becker, "*Raznochintsy*: The Development of the Word and of the Concept," *American Slavic and East European Review*, 18 (February 1959), 70-74, who aptly remarks that for Mikhailovsky, "in literature (and by implicit reference, in the radical movement) the *raznochinets* arrives late on the stage in the late 1850's and leaves it mysteriously in the late 1860's"; this author points out too that Mikhailovsky "regarded the word as something he was consciously putting into circulation" (*ibid.*, p. 71). However, the real mythmakers appear to have been Ivanov-Razumnik and Lenin. See also Pollard, "The Russian Intelligentsia," pp. 10, 26.

38. See for example: A. Coquart, *D. Pisarev et l'idéologie du nihilisme russe* (Paris: Institut d'Etudes slaves, 1946); Sh. M. Levin, *Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 60—70-e gody XIX v.* (Moscow, 1958); L. A. Plotkin, *Pisarev i literaturno-*

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obshchestvennoe dvizhenie 60—kh godov (Moscow and Leningrad, 1945); B. P. Koz'min, "'Raskol v nigilistakh' (Epizod iz istorii russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli 60-kh godov)," in *Iz istorii revoliutsionnoi mysli v Rossii. Izbrannye trudy* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 20-67; F. C. Barghoorn, "D. I. Pisarev: A Representative of Russian Nihilism," *Review of Politics,* 10 (April 1948), 190-211, and "Nihilism, Utopia, and Realism in the Thought of Pisarev," *Harvard Slavic Studies,* 4 (1957), 225-235; J. A. Rogers, "Darwinism, Scientism, and Nihilism," *Russian Review,* 19 (1960), 10-23.

39. F. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (New York: Knopf, 1960), p. 325.

40. S. V. Utechin, *Russian Political Thought* (New York and London: Praeger, 1963), pp. 112-114.

41. Herzen convincingly argued that nihilism "has brought forth no new principles" ("Bazarov," p. 209).

42. This kind of criticism implies too a tribute to the ideas of the "men of the forties," for it means that they had valuable thoughts, *but* refrained from acting in order to implement them. If not so, the criticism regarding the lack of action would have been pointless. I shall discuss below what the nihilist meant exactly by "action."

43. Pisarev's attitude on this issue may seem ambivalent, for, on the one hand, he advocated action, and, on the other hand, he opposed political organizing, stressing the importance of learning, consciousness, acquiring knowledge, and thinking. This apparent contradiction receives at least a partial explanation when examining the specific content that Pisarev and his fellow nihilists attributed to action, and which was different in several respects from the views of Chernyshevsky and Dobroliubov. For a good treatment of the differences between the two groups, see Koz'min, "'Raskol v nigilistakh.'"

44. I follow here R. A. Nisbet's analysis and definition of "modernist revolt" in his introduction to *Tradition and Revolt: Historical and Sociological Essays* (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 3-5.

45. The expression is used here as in Nettl's "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent." The case under discussion shows clearly, I believe, the limitations of this model.

46. This part of the essay is based on extensive contemporary reports and testimonies: diaries, letters, memoirs, and so forth. For some especially useful examples see: E. N. Vodovozova, *Na zare zhizni: Memuarnye ocherki i portreti,* 2 vols. (Moscow, 1964); S. V. Kovalevskaia, *Vospominaniia detstva i avtobiograficheskie ocherki* (Moscow, 1945); L. F. Panteleev, *Vospominaniia* (Moscow, 1958); N. V. Shelgunov, L. P. Shelgunova, M. L. Mikhailov, *Vospominaniia,* 2 vols. (Moscow, 1967); N. Belogolovyi, *Vospominaniia i drugie stat'i* (St. Petersburg, 1901); P. D. Boborykin, *Vospominaniia,* 2 vols. (Moscow, 1965); A. V. Nikitenko, *Dnevnik* (Moscow, 1956), II-III; I. Khudiakov, *Opyt avtobiografii* (Geneva, 1882); E. Breshkovskaia, *Iz moikh vospominanij* (St. Petersburg, 1906); I. M. Krasnoperov, *Zapiski raznochintsa* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1929); P. Kropotkin, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist,* 2 vols. (London, 1899); Stepniak [S. Kravchinsky], *Underground Russia* (New York, 1883).

47. Kropotkin, *Memoirs,* II, 90.

48. Kovalevskaia, *Vospominaniia,* p. 68; see also Vodovozova, *Na zare,* II, 99, 221; and Shelgunov, *Vospominaniia,* I, 139-140.

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49. Kropotkin, *Memoirs,* II, 89.

50. For a detailed analysis of these political groups see Venturi, *Roots of Revolution;* A. Yarmolinsky, *Road to Revolution: A Century of Russian Radicalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1962).

51. Stepniak, *Underground Russia,* p. 4.

52. See, for instance, D. Pisarev, *Sochineniia* (Moscow, 1955), II, 120-126.

53. See Vodovozova, *Na zare,* II, 9.

54. *Ibid.,* p. 486.

55. Among those who married at that time, especially the women, many developed a keen interest in child rearing. Subjects of discussion were, for instance, hygiene, physical culture, liberty in artistic education, and swaddling or not swaddling babies. Some of the important (and "modernistic") new trends and reforms in Russian pedagogical thought and practice were initiated by these circles or under their influence. See Vodovozova, *Na zare,* II, 197-198; Shelgunov, *Vospominaniia,* I, 137-138.

56. See Vodovozova, *Na zare,* II, 29; Kropotkin, *Memoirs,* II, 84.

57. See, for instance, letters to aunt (December 29, 1854) and to Blagobrazovs (April 20, 1855), in K. T. Soldatenkov, *Materialy dlia biografii N.A. Dobroliubova* (Moscow, 1890), I, 190, 210.

58. See Vodovozova, *Na zare,* II, 282.

59. Raeff, *Origins,* p. 173n.

60. This counterculture had some abstract theoretical components: positivism, scientism, antiaestheticism. But they were coincidental, adopted by this generation because of the accidental junction of two sets of facts: the education received in their formative years; the discovery of these theories as *dernier cri* around 1855-1860. Moreover, while the function of this set of theories was essential, their specific content was not. Actually, there were, within this generation, various subgroups professing slightly different social, political, and philosophical theories, while fulfilling—socially and culturally—the same role and function and keeping homogeneous the generational framework with its distinct role and place in society (transcending the political tendencies and almost unaffected by them). On a similar issue, R. Pipes argues convincingly that the rationalism of the critical intelligentsia "was a historical coincidence, . . . the essence of this group [being] the critical spirit of which 'rationalism' is merely one expression," and could be exercised from many different positions. "The Historical Evolution," p. 497.

61. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Intellectuals and Tradition."

62. Marxism presents some peculiarities which will be mentioned in the next section of this essay.

63. To F. D. Batiushkov, from Nice, January 23, 1898, in S. S. Koteliansky and Philip Tomlinson, trans. and eds., *The Life and Letters of Anton Tchekhov* (London, 1928), p. 253.

64. To his brother Mikhail, from Nice, February 22, 1898, *ibid.,* p. 256.

65. K. Orgeiani [G. Gogelia], *Ob intelligentsii* (London, 1912), pp. 4, 12.

66. To I. I. Orlov, from Yalta, February 22, 1899, *Life and Letters,* p. 265. Note also

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that Chekhov considers Katkov, Pobedonostsev, and Vyshnegradsky as belonging to the intelligentsia.

67. Compare this position of Lenin's with the role which Plekhanov attributed to the intelligentsia in the "Programme of the Social Democratic Emancipation of Labour Group" (1884).

68. Orgeiani, *Ob intelligentsii,* p. 17.

69. N. Berdiaev, *Dostoievsky* (1934), pp. 163-164.

70. V. I. Lenin, "Ekonomicheskoe soderzhanie narodnichestva i kritika ego v knige g. Struve," *Sochineniia* (Moscow, 1941), I, 401.

71. I. Mechnikov's expression, in A. Vucinich, "Politics, Universities, and Science," in T. G. Stavrou, ed., *Russia Under the Last Tsar* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 178.

72. See R. Pipes, "Russian Marxism and Its Populist Background: The Late Nineteenth Century," *Russian Review,* 19 (1960), 316-337.

73. V. I. Lenin, "Obshchij plan reshenij III s'ezda," *Sochineniia* (Moscow, 1947), VIII, 162 (Lenin's emphasis).

74. The "two Russias" theory essentially means: (1) the simultaneous existence of two cultures in Russia, the one Westernized (however superficially) within a small elite from among the nobility and the bureaucracy, the other popular, indigenous, traditional, well-rooted in the Russian past and ethos; (2) a very simple class structure—on the one hand the nobility and bureaucracy, on the other the peasantry, a conspicuous feature being the lack of a middle class.

    According to this theory, the intelligentsia emerges within this twofold social-cultural context, and the role it would have to fulfill is almost inevitably determined *par la force des choses.* (1) Culturally, it would try to bridge the gap between Western enlightenment, progress, and science, and the Russian popular values, native culture, and so forth. (2) Socially, it would fill the vacuum between the upper and lower classes of society, although it would not perform what is sometimes considered as the traditional and congenial role of a middle class. Just the opposite.

    Some of the ultimate conclusions of this theory (such as "permanent state of isolation and alienation," "profound unhappiness") are speculations of the mind, much more than results of precise research.

75. See L. Labedz, "The Structure of the Soviet Intelligentsia," p. 505.

76. L. S. Feuer, *Marx and the Intellectuals: A Set of Post-Ideological Essays* (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1969), pp. 56-57, 67-68.

77. Voline [V. M. Eichenbaum], *La révolution inconnue: Russie 1917-1921* (Paris: P. Belfond, 1969), p. 205.

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THOMAS F. O'DEA

The Role of the Intellectual in the Catholic Tradition

Catholicism and the Development of Modern Intellectual Life

THE COUNCIL of Trent (1545-1563) reformed the Catholic church and secured the foundations of its discipline and its spiritual life. Following Trent religious life, which had been in a deplorable state when the Reformation commenced, experienced a profound renewal among Catholics. If the statistics of canonization constitute a reliable index of Christian vitality, as many Catholic scholars would assert, then the post-tridentine spiritual revival was an authentic one, for there was at that time an abundance of canonizations. The saints were drawn from all classes of society and were of all ages. The less central position of the church in the post-medieval world turned its life inward and made it more exclusively a school of sanctity.[1]

This period was not without its seamier side, as may be seen in the continuing need for and effort to achieve reform in the early years of the seventeenth century. During the years from the Peace of Westphalia to the French Revolution reform was urgently needed, but attempts to achieve it usually failed.[2] Nevertheless, the first quarter of the seventeenth century produced some exemplary figures as well as an exacting ideal of the priesthood. Christian piety, however, reflecting the changed relation of the church to the world about it, tended to develop in isolation from daily life, a tendency that would increase over time.[3] Post-tridentine piety continued the emphasis of the *Devotio moderna.* This movement, which originated with Gerhard de Groote (1340-1384) and found its classical expression in the *Imitation of Christ* of Thomas à Kempis (1380-1471), stressed feeling, sincerity, and humility over intellectual qualities. This was in part a reaction against the intellectualism, often arid and sterile, of late scholasticism. Although the *Devotio moderna* was well received by no less a mind than Erasmus, it possessed potentially anti-intellectual characteristics.

Trent itself was an intellectual effort of considerable proportions. In responding to the challenge thrown down by the Reformation, the Catholic church emphasized more than ever the importance of intellectual explicit-

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ness in matters of belief. The Council reviewed the greater part of Catholic doctrine and reaffirmed it, taking pains to give precise definition at those points that had been questioned by the reformers. The work took four and a half years and the product was more voluminous than that produced by all the preceding eighteen councils recognized by the Roman church as ecumenical. Moreover, at Trent Thomas Aquinas came into his own as the *doctor communis* among theologians.[4]

The post-tridentine period saw a great flowering of theology in many centers. The excessive verbalism of late scholasticism and the attacks of the nominalists upon its essentialism led to a reaction against the earlier speculative theology and a turn toward positive theology based upon the Bible and the fathers. Father Sarpi's history of the Council tells of the protest of the older style schoolmen against the onset of this trend, a protest that won little favor with the pope or the assembled fathers. Yet the high intellectual caliber of Trent is beyond question. Sacred studies thereafter became more differentiated, and separate disciplines evolved such as exegesis, patrology, history of dogma, and ecclesiastical history. A more practical moral theology developed, one that made use of intellectual distinctions to bring the moral law into contact with the realities of daily life. This casuistry was itself liable to abuse and open to attack. Pascal considered it one of the two chief dangers to the church, threatening it from within as freethinking threatened it from without.[5] The post-tridentine period saw profound theological controversies concerning the Catholic understanding of grace and free will, as may be seen in the conflicts concerning Molinism in the sixteenth century and Jansenism in the seventeenth. It also saw a flowering of the mystical life, and the writings of such figures as St. Teresa of Avila and St. John of the Cross constitute important intellectual as well as religious creations.

It is especially important to note, however, that these developments all took place in a situation in which the Catholic church had been put on the defensive. After Trent, the church's "first care henceforward was her own defense." It had been transformed into a "beseiged city" and although the vast intellectual improvement of the theological scene at Trent and afterwards made possible a "counter offensive of Catholic orthodoxy" the posture of defense remained fundamental.[6] As Lord Acton put it, Trent impressed upon the church "the stamp of an intolerant age."[7] However, Trent was "in some respects less rigid, defensive and anti-Protestant than the post-tridentine Catholicism it helped to mold."[8] Thus was initiated the first great countermovement of modern times—the Counter Reformation. The Counter Reformation added to the dimensions of the intellectual role in the Catholic milieu the characteristics of a counterposition—of a stance against—a marked defensiveness, an emphasis upon discipline and loyalty, and a counteroffensive polemicism.

While these developments were in the making, others of even greater

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eventual significance were taking place. Science was about to come into its own. Science had deep roots in the Christian culture of the Middle Ages. Whitehead has insisted that "faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific theory, is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology." He saw at the same time that science was also part of an antirationalist trend which itself was a "very necessary corrective to the unguarded rationalism of the Middle Ages," but one that ran "to extremes." The scientific activity of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance came to fruition in the scientific outburst of the seventeenth century, the century of genius.[9] Out of this development there emerged the idea of man starting all over again—of beginning anew. Bacon spoke of "minds washed clean of opinions" and Descartes attempted to "unload himself of all the teaching which had been transmitted from the ancient world."[10] This notion of newness was related to the somewhat inconsistent idea that time itself made a difference, that we could know more now, and that the present age surpassed classical antiquity in its accumulated knowledge. Giordano Bruno, before the beginning of the seventeenth century, had already stated that his generation were the ancients and that ancient Greece belonged to the infancy of mankind.

To this tendency to see the past as over there was an active and a passive expression. The latter may be seen in the *Essays* of Montaigne, whose combination of fideism, skepticism, neostoicism, and a profound mistrust of rationality appears to have been a reaction of fatigue to the intellectual controversies and religious wars of the time following the Reformation.[11] The active expression may be seen in Descartes who not only based philosophy upon methodological doubt but also was a significant contributor to that great transformation of thinking characteristic of the age—the mathematicization or geometricization of thought.[12]

Moreover, Descartes was surprisingly clear about the practical implications of science, stating that with it we would be able to "render ourselves the lords and possessors of nature."[13] Scientific technique would lead to a new kind of relationship between European man and his world, to an unprecedented ability to manipulate and control, while the mathematicization of thought would have two further consequences. It made the experience of quality come to appear illusory. It was a view of the world "framed by mathematicians for the use of mathematicians," a construct composed of abstractions and conducive to "eliciting from them clear-cut demonstrative trains of reasoning, entirely satisfactory so long as it is these abstractions which you want to talk about."[14] If you preferred to talk about something else, you were, so to speak, out of the game. Thus everything not subsumable under abstract mathematical formulation became unreal and an entire world of aesthetic response and human relationships were accounted outside genuine knowledge. This dubious experiential and epistemological character was extended to religion. The analytic geometry of Descartes and

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the infinitesimal calculus of Newton and Leibnitz made possible the Newtonian breakthrough. The Newtonian breakthrough changed Western man's relation to his world and altered radically his style of thought. In the next century the philosophes popularized this new way of thinking among a receptive bourgeoisie.

The consequences of these developments created a difficult set of circumstances for traditional religion, although the early scientists themselves had little awareness that such would be the issue. Bacon himself remained a "discriminating, yet orthodox member of the Church of England,"[15] and Descartes was always a Catholic. Even in his own lifetime he complained that his *Discourse* was being misunderstood and cautioned against widespread use of his method.[16] There took place nevertheless a secularization of the Western outlook. This was the case in part because the new mathematized science was based upon an epistemological stance capable of acting as an acid solvent of tradition and of qualitative thinking generally. But there were other reasons as well. We have already alluded to the skeptical literary tradition of which Montaigne is an example. This tradition popularized science and did so in a secular and irreligious context. Fontenelle, for example, presented science in the context of skepticism and cynicism. Thus was introduced a bias not found in the earlier scientists and one Descartes would have repudiated.[17]

That too is but part of the story. Not only was there a group of literary transmitters available who would secularize the implications of science, but there was as well a literate public predisposed to accept the product. In the new middle classes there existed a type of man ready to hail the new science in secular garb and to reject the excessively otherworldly religion preached by the church. Thomas Aquinas had discovered an autonomous realm of nature, but in subsequent centuries Catholic thought had done little to work out the fundamental implications of his discovery. The result was a failure to do justice to this world that made it almost inevitable that the rise of middle classes would entail considerable apostasy. The new breed of man, the eighteenth-century bourgeois, "lost the character of ordinary believers. These were people who argued and wanted to analyze before believing . . . The clergy were at a loss in the face of the pretensions of this new man," who was "out of place in the Christian universe." Indeed the bourgeois constructing his own world "was entering into competition with the God of the Christians." From that competition the bourgeois "went on to the conquest of power without the cooperation of the Church."[18] The popularization of the Newtonian breakthrough gave these middle classes a world they could understand and manipulate. The concept of mystery was exorcised and with it the common ground with traditional religion.

Yet even before these developments, the potential of science as a competitor and antagonist of religion became discernible. It is significant not only that the early scientists were men of religious convictions and religious

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interests, but also that they found the opportunity for the expression of the former and pursuit of the latter in science rather than in the traditional religious context. Fontenelle's biographies of scientists suggest that there were prominent among them men from middle-class background. Moreover, it appears repeatedly that they had been intended for the church and that their fathers had insisted on an education in theology. "But over and over again, the same pattern occurs in the biographies—the youth finds the prevailing educational methods irksome, finds that he is being given an education in mere words and not in real things."[19] It should also be noted that much of the novel speculation found in the early scientific milieu was of a sort to raise religious suspicions. Almost everywhere in the writings of sixteenth-century astronomers and in those of Galileo himself there is expressed the opinion that the vastly expanded universe scientists now perceived could not have been created solely for man. When such notions led to ideas like Bruno's plurality of worlds and his immanentist pantheism, they were suppressed by the Inquisition.

It is against this background that the trial of Galileo must be assessed. Copernicus had been a canon of the Catholic church and important churchmen were associated with the publication of his *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* in 1543. Pope Clement had approved an outline of the work in 1531. Galileo too had been encouraged by men in high places in the church. But by the beginning of the seventeenth century things had changed. The church had assumed its post-tridentine counterposition and churchmen tended to see much of the novel speculation of scientific circles as dangerous to faith. The Jesuits were directed by their general to shun ideas that would weaken Aristotelianism with which so much theology had become entwined.[20] Moreover, there prevailed a kind of literalist attitude which saw the Bible as a source of all kinds of knowledge. When Galileo suggested that the Bible tells us how to go to heaven and not how the heavens go, his point was not grasped. In 1616 the Congregation of the Index declared the heliocentric theory heretical.[21]

Between 1625 and 1629 Galileo wrote his dialogues on *The Two Principal World Systems*. It was a general attack upon Aristotelian science and included an assertion of and support for the heliocentric hypothesis. After a trial in 1633, the Holy Office pronounced Galileo to be "vehemently suspected of heresy, namely, of having believed and held the doctrine—which is false and contrary to the sacred and divine scriptures—that the Sun is the center of the world and does not move from east to west and that the earth moves and is not the center of the world; and that an opinion may be held and defended as probable after it has been declared and defined to be contrary to the Holy Scriptures."[22] While there was more than a little ecclesiastical politicking in this condemnation and while the condemnation apparently had little effect on arresting the progress of astronomy, even among Catholic scientists, the fact is that the church was helping to set up

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the conflict between science and religion. As Lecomte du Nouy put it, when the church should have understood it failed to do so. "The Church became frightened; it doubted."[23] The Galileo case, with some justification, became for the advocates of an antireligious secularism and scientism the favorite club with which to thrash the church. A new conflict had emerged and the church developed what almost amounted to another counterposition —an attitude of caution and reserve toward scientific breakthroughs.

The most traumatic experience for the church arrived in 1789. In that year, beginning with a Mass of the Holy Ghost at which the assembled estates of France prayed that the Spirit might enlighten their deliberations, the French Revolution erupted and a year later the French church "appeared to lie in ruins."[24] The Revolution gave rise to a campaign of violent de-Christianization in which the church was despoiled and its ministers hunted, arrested, and even massacred. This great shock came upon a church completely unprepared. It lacked spiritual vitality; its clergy was influenced by current rationalist and secularist ideas. For many it could be said that becoming timid, their "faith was declining and disappearing; the Enlightenment, triumphing in their minds, was withering what were called 'ancient prejudices.'" The laity, like the clergy, imbibed the current rationalism, the science of the encyclopedists, Voltaire's "mockery of superstition," Rousseau's "sentimental deism."[25] Yet under the blows of persecution the church in France produced heroes and martyrs; "amid insult, suffering and death willingly endured . . . the Church bore her witness." Consequently the church recovered its prestige in the eyes of Frenchmen and experienced a great spiritual renascence.[26] Thus was enacted for the first time the archetypal drama of modern times—the revolution versus the church, a drama that would be repeated again and again in Europe and Latin America in the nineteenth century and throughout the world in the twentieth. To the church's posture of Counter Reformation, to its suspicion and defensiveness in the face of science, there was now added the stance of counterrevolution. A new counterposition came to characterize the relation of the church to developing modernity.

The nineteenth century found the church alienated from the spirit of the age. It seemed to some churchmen that the course of modern history was "nothing but a horrible perversion." Yet there were those Catholics who "felt the attraction toward political liberty, the independence of peoples, the nationality and unity of states, freedom of religious conscience and of the Church herself, the spread of culture, technical and industrial improvement; they experienced currents of approval and sympathy for the creations of modern philosophers, writers and poets, and took up the study and the independent scrutiny of history and even of the history of the Church . . . This effort toward accord and reconciliation, varying and often different in spirit in the several countries and variously tempered and fused, was called Liberal Catholicism."[27]

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In fact, between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of World War I, there took place at least six significant attempts to rethink aspects of the church's relation to developing modernity.[28] Three of these, occurring in France, attempted to reconcile the church with the "principles of 1789" and to develop a liberal Catholicism in the political sphere. The first was led by Lamennais (1782-1854) and was condemned by Pope Gregory XVI in the encyclical *Mirari vos* in 1832. The second, led by Montalembert (1810-1870), was condemned by Pope Pius IX in 1864. A third attempt to reconcile the church with the working-class movement and to foster a Christian democratic movement was led by Marc Sagnier and was condemned by Pope Pius X in 1910. In Germany the nineteenth century saw two impressive attempts to bring Catholic life into contact with intellectual developments in history and science. The first was the Catholic Tübingen school which flourished from 1817 to 1840. Influenced by Schleiermacher (1768-1834) it sought to reconcile modern science and philosophy with Christianity. Its leader Johann Adam Mohler (1796-1838) and his colleagues took an approach to modern thought that was both sympathetic and critical. After 1840 the center shifted to Munich and there Ignaz Dollinger (1799-1890) set forth a program to update Catholic intellectual life. In 1863 he organized an impressive Congress of Catholic scholars at Munich and put forth a program to modernize Catholic thinking, bringing it into close relation with developments in philosophy and historical studies. The congress defended the independent rights of scholarship in history, philosophy, and science, and discussed the relation of these disciplines to theology. While the efforts of the Catholic Tübingen school were never condemned by church authorities, those of the Munich group were in effect. Pope Pius IX sent a brief to the archbishop of Munich stating that scholastic philosophy was required of theologians and that the decisions of the Roman congregations were binding on scientists and scholars.

Finally, at the turn of the century Catholic scholarship became aware of the methods and findings of modern biblical study and church history. There developed an impressive Catholic effort in these fields. Catholics, long self-segregated from modern trends, were unprepared to assimilate the impact of this experience. When extreme positions were taken, ecclesiastical authority, obviously gravely threatened, reacted violently. The result was the Modernist crisis and the condemnation of Modernism by Pope Pius X in 1907 in the encyclical *Pascendi Gregis* and the decree *Lamentabili*. The latter condemned the "fervor for novelties" characteristic of the times and some sixty-five propositions drawn mostly from the works of Alfred Loisy (1857-1940).[29]

Most characteristic of the stance of the church in the nineteenth century was the Syllabus of Errors and the First Vatican Council. The Syllabus and the encyclical *Quanta Cura* that accompanied it presented a general condemnation of modern ideas and social and political practices. It was a

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collection of statements of the pope, removed from the concrete context in which they had been uttered and presented as the church's position. Pius IX had come to the See of Rome as a liberal. He had attempted to compromise with the revolutionaries in Rome but failed because they would not compromise with him; consequently, he became conservative. Throughout his long pontificate he combatted liberalism, nationalism, socialism, and the efforts of liberal Catholics within the church. The First Vatican Council (1869-1870) proclaimed the infallibility of the pope in matters of faith and morals. It thereby asserted the independence of Catholic Christianity in the face of rising nationalisms that often sought for themselves some religious expression. It at the same time defined the church largely as a centralized clerical hierarchy.[30]

The church stood in relation to the modern world as half progenitor and half alien. Its fundamental position was based upon two dominating counterpositions—Counter Reformation and counterrevolution. Nowhere is its status of half progenitor and half alien so strikingly evident as in its relation to science. The church always maintained and constantly asserted its belief in human reason; it would not reject truths if it were convinced that they were indeed truths. But the church was obviously threatened by the development of modern science and it took its stance with respect to it with extreme caution. At first there had been many important scientists who were Catholics, but this condition changed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus we see the church during this period developing a high degree of alienation from the spirit of the age and an increasingly peripheral status in relation to the significant enterprises of Western man.

This condition was complex and profound and I cannot do justice to it here. Yet it must be noted, for it constitutes a strategic element in our topic. A new mode of human awareness and of relationship of man to his world was evolving and in many of its crucial *notae* and in its over-all character it differed most significantly from the world view and the mode of "being there" in which the Christian faith had long been embedded. The most important intellectual development of early modernity was the rise of science which impressed upon the thought patterns of later times the needs and ideals of the new scientists. The most significant societal development of the period was the commercial revolution which hastened the great transformation from status to contract, from traditional society to modern dynamic society.[31] Both contributed to what is sometimes called the disenchantment of the world or the demythologization of thought. Moreover, both emphasized doing as against contemplation and relationship. The modern stance stressed elements like doubt, distance from phenomena, manipulation rather than relationship, quantity as the "really real" or the index to it, abstraction as against immediate experience, a flat rationality as against a sense of mystery. In the face of the rise of such a modern outlook, the church tried to defend its older cultural contexts—to

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prevent the rending of the cultural garments in which faith had long been clad. It did this in order to defend faith itself. When romanticism arose with its own defense of faith, the church turned to defend its own conceptions of the proper character and role of reason and rejected what it considered a "neofideism" and therefore an obscurantism. It could accept neither extreme of the modern argument.

The older Catholic view of man's situation differed in strangely contrasting ways from that which developed in modern society. Modern thought was promethean and optimistic whereas the church accepted what it considered the ills and limitations inherent in the human condition and held to an otherworldly orientation that rendered its view of man in this life a pessimistic one. Yet it is equally true that modern thought developed a profound pessimism on a deeper level which eventually issued too often in despair and meaninglessness. Modern philosophy became in Nietzsche's words a school of suspicion. In an important sense it left man less at home in the world he now successfully manipulated and to which he was no longer related as prime form among its hierarchy of forms than was the case with otherworldly religion. The church on the other hand maintained an over-all optimistic estimation of man's deeper meaning, of his belongingness in the world, his rootedness in being. It saw him called to relationship with God and fellowship with the Saints, a view based on creationist premises that made the earth a home for man in one sense while in another he remained a stranger and a sojourner here below.

Against this background it becomes clear that the disarticulation between the Catholic church and modernity was not a superficial one, that the stance of Counter Reformation and counterrevolution and the attitude of distrust toward science derived from a profound condition of deviance and disparity. "What was lost in the modern age, of course, was not the capacity for truth or reality or faith nor the concomitant inevitable acceptance of the testimony of the senses and of reason, but the certainty that formerly went with it. In religion it was not belief in salvation or in a hereafter that was immediately lost, but the *certitudo salutis*—and this happened in all Protestant countries where the downfall of the Catholic Church had eliminated the last tradition-bound institution which, wherever its authority remained unchallenged, stood between the impact of modernity and the masses of believers."[32] The church saw the new view as a kind of "epistemological vertigo" which involved the loss of a place to stand and in consequence of which men were uprooted in a most radical sense.

In the nineteenth century Catholics concerned with the intellectual life to varying degrees divide roughly into two groups. The alienation of the church from the world and the tendency within the church to separate faith and devotion from the intellect combined to make the intellectual life a constrained and difficult pursuit and to place it now in actual, now in potential, conflict with authority. In this situation most Catholics responded

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in terms of the counterpositions, and the events of that century were such as to elicit such responses and reinforce them. They tried simultaneously to defend the faith and the cultural forms in which it had become embedded. A smaller group, as we have seen, aware that such defensiveness is at best a temporary recourse and that history, like Galileo's earth, does move, attempted to meet the intellectual challenge of the church's condition. This latter group was composed of men of the sort that we usually characterize as intellectuals—men who give centrality to intellectual understanding and judgment. They were also mostly intellectuals in the professional sense, academicians, theologians, philosophers, and scholars. The church itself and the larger defensive-minded group that dominated the clerical leadership made use of authority to enforce an increasingly protective cultural self-segregation. Nowhere is this more vividly to be seen than in the aftermath of the Modernist crisis, when a repressive authoritarian response stifled intellectual life in the church. With respect to biblical studies "stringent measures of defense were adopted by the Church authorities, and for some years anything that savored of 'novelty' in exegesis became suspect." Indeed at this time the ecclesiastical leadership in the United States "became so antimodernist that the infant intellectual life of the Church was retarded."[33]

The counterpositions and their attendant mind-sets evolved under circumstances of severe conflict and hence increased the significance of loyalty and authority and reinforced the residual position of the layman. Thus the clerical and authoritarian character of the church was exaggerated. Churchmen had come to handle crisis situations in terms of that attitude caricatured by Acton: "Authority must overcome history!"[34]

Despite the difficulties of this highly unpropitious situation of the intellectual in the church and the church in the world, the efforts to rethink the church's response to modernity continued, while the modern world beset with its own profound crisis began to question some of its own assumptions. As a consequence of a changed situation in the world and in the church, revisionist efforts found fruition in the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). For Vatican II represented precisely that; it initiated an epoch of profound rethinking of the church's understanding of itself and its relation to the evolving "postmodern" world of the late twentieth and the twenty-first centuries. The Counter Reformation is over and is replaced by ecumenical fraternity and intellectual exchange; the counterrevolution gives way to more open and more sophisticated attitudes toward contemporary politics, even when anti-Christian elements are involved. Vatican II legitimated what we have called liberal Catholicism, if by this term we mean the effort to develop attitudes and policies that, while Christian in content and Catholic in emphasis, will no longer be encumbered by historically conditioned attitudes and interests not appropriate to reality. Most significant is the abandonment of the older defense-motivated constraints upon

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intellectual endeavor. Vatican II recognized the "rightful independence of science" and declared that independence to be not only a necessity for modern man but the will of God. The official council document which made this statement carried a notation referring to a two volume study on Galileo published in 1964 by the Vatican Press. That document also stressed the significance of the lay enterprise in the world and of the laity in the church.[35]

The Second Vatican Council which initiated this new situation in the church was itself the work of intellectuals. It was in a sense the victory of a small group, the conciliar *periti*, in cooperation with important Council fathers under conditions favorable to a liberal issue. This small minority were in a very real sense the spiritual descendants of those pioneers in France and Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the Council these intellectuals found their opportunity. Discourse always favors the intellectuals and a council is a discursive body. Discourse before the world favors those intellectuals who have something to say that is relevant. The vast development of communications in our century ensured that the Council would meet within reach of the world's eyes and ears. The difficult post-World War II years in which Catholic intellectuals in Europe and America continued their attempt to confront modern issues ensured that there be men present with something significant to say. Moreover, the world that would follow this Council was a world much less hostile to the church than was the world of 1869-1870 in which Vatican I took place. This circumstance removed the pressures of external restraints and made loyalty and caution appear less significant. In short, bishops called to council are no longer bureaucratic administrators in chanceries; they are parliamentarians involved in discourse. Hence, once a council convened the progressive theologians found themselves possessing enormous leverage.[36] The favorable relationship of intellectuals to decision-makers was not maintained once the bishops returned to their sees and to accustomed settings and set procedures. Yet the precedent had been established. Vatican II initiated a development destined to bring about a major transformation in the church the shape of which cannot be discerned at present. The role of the Catholic intellectual today is also completely transformed. It is now full of creative possibilities but it also faces new and indeed formidable problems.

The post-Vatican II situation finds the church back in the world, and within the church, faith and devotion are once more developing a living contact with what happens in intellectual life. The church no longer looks on with prudent reserve at the efforts of modern man. The immediate consequence of this situation is conflict and confusion. Beneath the surface lies the deeper problem. Can the church develop a sympathetic and cooperative relationship with the significant endeavors of contemporary man—the man of the remainder of the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries—without losing its own proper Catholic essence and identity? Can it

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assimilate the authentic breakthroughs of contemporary consciousness and still remain a "school of sanctity"?

So far we have considered the character of intellectual life in the Catholic church in the modern period. It is abundantly clear that the lot of the intellectual became an increasingly unhappy one as time went on. It was burdened by interior anguish and institutional constraint. To see more clearly the ambiguities, ambivalences, strains, and tensions that have typically been incumbent on the role of the intellectual in the Catholic tradition it is necessary to look more closely at three aspects of the problem. First, we shall deal with the general character of the intellectual role in all cultures where it exists. Second, we shall consider the specific way that role came into existence and became institutionalized within the Catholic milieu. Third, we shall consider how secularization and especially the break-up of the older medieval clerical monopoly of learning affected the intellectual role in the church. We shall then be in a position to return to the contemporary situation and assess its problems and its possibilities.

The Intellectual Role and the "Socratic Tension"

When Immanuel Kant proclaimed "Dare to know!" (*Sapere aude*) and called men to an "exodus from self-incurred tutelage,"[37] he recognized that knowledge could of itself prove threatening to a deeper personal composure. When he wrote to Moses Mendelssohn that he had thought many things he did not have the courage to say but that he never said anything he did not think,[38] he recognized that thinking could threaten the stability of human institutions. We see here an indication of the inevitable ambiguities characteristic of intellectual life. Reason versus life, spontaneity versus reflection, confidence versus criticism—these are three conflicting pairs that may be said to describe the ambiguity of the place of reason in human existence. When there takes place an institutionalization of reason, that is to say a recognized and legitimated intellectual role is established as part of the activity structure of a society, those contrarieties become strains incumbent upon those who perform that role. They then constitute a basic tension that we shall designate as the "Socratic tension."

Aristotle declared that "all men naturally desire knowledge" and it is this condition that makes intellectual activity intrinsically rewarding and the intellectual himself highly esteemed by the other members of his society. But as T. S. Eliot observed, "people cannot stand too much reality." As one who attempts to recognize reality and do justice to it the intellectual can appear to be a source of danger to others and can experience within himself an insecurity that threatens the stability of his selfhood.[39] The intellectual role represents a societal acceptance of the Socratic dictum that "the unexamined life is not a fit life for man." Such examination may indeed threaten significant interests and at times societal survival itself. Socrates

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is not only the prototype of the intellectual but of the martyr as well, for his contemporaries saw his activity as a threat.

The examination of life, which involves the examination of the cultural and institutional context in which life is lived, may threaten other elements in society. Consequently there remains, despite institutional acceptance, an abiding ambiguity with respect to the intellectual role. Under stress of threat or conflict, that ambiguity can give rise to a virulent anti-intellectualism. The intellectual enhances society by increasing its knowledge; he embellishes it by adding to its cultural heritage. For these activities he is honored. He carries on traditions and for this he is esteemed. But breakthroughs to new knowledge can threaten old beliefs; new cultural creations may undermine old assumptions. And in transmitting traditions the intellectual may subject them to historical or philosophical criticism. And for these consequences of his activity the intellectual is suspect, disliked, and feared. The ambiguity is a real one although it is often expressed in confused forms. In Greece the sophists made genuine contributions to intellectual life and to the professionalization of education, but they also contributed to the erosion of values and the evolution of cynicism. Socrates was not a sophist but he was confused with them by conservatives like Aristophanes.

This central ambiguity and the Socratic tension to which it gives rise is the cause of conflict within the intellectual and tension and strain in his relation to society. Three antinomies are involved: (1) traditionalism versus rationality, (2) stability and continuity versus innovation and creativity, and (3) institutional legitimation versus critical evaluation. The consequences of these antinomies tend to erode established "credibility structures" or "plausibility structures" and to undermine established forms of consensus.[40] Furthermore, since rationality implies universalism and since intellectual activity is concerned with value as well as with being, the intellectual often finds himself in conflict with the various forms of in-group allegiance prevalent in his milieu. Since he shares the values and prejudices of that milieu to some extent, that conflict will produce an inner anguish.

For the religious intellectual examining religious matters this Socratic tension is intensified by the religious element itself. This may be strikingly seen in the Western religious traditions. For the Jew or Christian or Muslim the demands of the religious relationship—the I-Thou relationship to God—implies an attitude variously designated as obedience, humility, or submission, and this attitude may conflict with the disciplined objectivity and assumption of mental distance demanded by intellectual activity. Since religion is concerned with what matters ultimately, examination in the religious sphere may threaten not only the stability of society and its normative consensus but the very stability and integrity of the self. Moreover, when we deal with religion we deal with the "holy" (*qadosh, ayios, sacer, sanctus*) which the religious man experiences as both appealing and

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fascinating but evoking a peculiar dread and repulsion.[41] In that sacred realm intellectual confrontation and examination may be experienced as sacreligious or blasphemous, and the intellectuals appear like the seventy men of Bethshemesh who deserved to be slain by divine retribution "because they looked into the Ark of the Lord" (I Samuel 6:19). Catholics have at times tended to see intellectual examination as an intrusion in the realm of the holy and the intellectual as Saint Bernard saw Abelard, as a "scrutinizer of Majesty and fabricator of heresies."[42]

These problems become greater in the case of Catholicism because the Catholic understanding of the act of faith gives tremendous centrality to the element of intellectual assent to formulated doctrines. All Christians see faith as possessing both an intellectual and a voluntaristic element. Saint Augustine defined it as thinking with assent (*cum assentione cogitare*). For Luther the chief element was trust (*fiducia*). A generation after him Lutheran theologians distinguished three elements, knowledge (*notitia*), assent (*assensus*), and trust (*fiducia*), and made trust by far the most important. Catholics see faith as the act of both mind and will by which statements are taken to be true. The church is seen as having a "declaratory power" to "determine what pronouncements are to be received on the immediate authority of God"—a power "infallibly to propose the content of Christian revelation to the world."[43] The Council of Trent declared that fiducial faith did not suffice for salvation but that it was necessary to have a dogmatic faith as well, consisting of the acceptance of the truths of revelation on the authority of God revealing.[44] Vatican I based its teaching on Aquinas and understood faith to be "an intellectual assent under the impulse of the will."[45] It defined faith as "a supernatural virtue by which we, with the aid and inspiration of the grace of God, believe that the things revealed by him are true."[46] While this understanding of faith enhances the value of the intellect, at the same time by that very same token it makes the critical and creative functions of the intellect more of a risk, for such activities can threaten the basic act of faith on which the entire Catholic religion rests. Consequently the abiding Socratic tension is magnified.

The Emergence of the Intellectual Role in the Church

As early as the second century the church encountered Greek culture and from it "received that tendency to intellectualism which has clung to it ever since."[47] Christians came to see the Greek philosophical ideals of *paideia* and the good life in terms of biblical religion and biblical religion in terms of these ideals. Education and character formation became significant Christian activities, a fact important for the development of monasticism, the humanism of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and even for the eventual emergence of secular humanism.[48] Moreover, the church took over and made use of the Greek philosophical mode—its vocabulary

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and its technique—to state its beliefs in a manner that held in check affect-laden images and achieved objectivity and clarity. The achievement of the patristic period and the early councils was to transform the mode of statement of faith from the more existential and experiential mode of the Bible to the propositional mode of the councils—"from the *quoad nos* of the Scriptures to the *quoad se* of the councils."[49]

The church was influenced not only by Platonism and Stoicism, with which Christianity had profound elective affinities, but by Gnosticism as well. Here too significant affinities existed, but they concealed great dangers for the complete subversion of biblical faith.[50] Since the Gnostics were the first systematic theologians, the church had to emulate their methods in order to fight them. "The struggle against Gnosticism compelled the church to put its teaching, its worship, and its discipline into fixed forms and ordinances, and to exclude everyone who would yield them obedience."[51] The development of doctrinal definition was inevitable in the Christian situation in any case, but the Gnostic confrontation hastened it and started it off in an atmosphere of threat. This circumstance inevitably increased the closeness of relationship between intellectual activities, defense against heresy, authority, and discipline.

The conciliar and patristic achievement to be seen in the Christological statements of Nicea (325) and Chalcedon (451) represents an authentic triumph of *logos* over *mythos*. As a consequence rationality was esteemed in the Catholic tradition and intellectual activity given a high value, a condition that was never reversed, even when the concrete historical circumstances made them a serious threat. Antirational figures like Saint Peter Damian (1007-1072) were never able to prevail,[52] and, as we have seen, when modern scientism became a most serious threat the church took a stance of extreme reserve but did not allow itself to be propelled into obscurantism. The conciliar and patristic achievement, however, had other consequences whose significance was more complex and more ambiguous, as would eventually become clear. Catholic intellectual activity with respect to man's relation to transcendence—Catholicism's "Hellenic" explication of the meaning of its "Hebraic" religious experience—would heighten consciousness of the difference between faith and knowledge on the one hand and between faith and conventional belief on the other. It would make men aware of how vastly "other" was the subject of our religious experience and how frail was the human contact with it through faith. Following the Epistle to the Hebrews, Christians recognized faith as concerned with things unseen and things hoped for.[53] Saint Augustine had written that "faith is a virture whereby we believe what we do not see." Saint John of Damascus called faith an "assent without inquiry." Hugh of St. Victor speaks of faith as "that certainty of the mind about absent things which surpasses opinion but falls short of science." Saint Thomas speaks of "the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of faith." He sees

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faith as an act proceeding from both the intellect and the will and therefore conditioned by the desire of the former for truth and the latter for the good. He pointed out that on the part of the believer faith is less certain than knowledge "because matters of faith are above the human intellect."[54]

The Catholic church as a religious institution has as its psychological base the act and habit of faith on the part of its members. Intellectual definition and clarification of the content of that faith reveals the tenuousness of that base. There is always a sufficiency of experiences in life to make men aware of that tenuousness, but with the acceptance of rationality and making it a central value, that awareness was increased. Because of this tenuousness, faith required that as a basis for a Christian civilization it should receive the secondary support of a civilizational environment—institutional forms, consensually validated beliefs and values, rational apologetics. As Voegelin states:

> Uncertainty is the very essence of Christianity. The feeling of security in a "world full of gods" is lost with the gods themselves; when the world is de-divinized, communication with the world-transcendent God is reduced to the tenuous bond of faith, in the sense of Heb. 11:1, as the substance of things hoped for and proof of things unseen. Ontologically, the substance of things hoped for is nowhere to be found but in faith itself; and, epistemologically, there is no proof for things unseen but again this very faith. The bond is tenuous, indeed, and it may snap easily. The life of the soul in openness toward God, the waiting, the periods of aridity and dulness, guilt and despondency, contrition and repentance, forsakenness and hope against hope, the silent stirrings of love and grace, trembling on the verge of a certainty which if gained is loss—the very lightness of this fabric may prove too heavy a burden for men who lust for massively possessive experience.[55]

Intellectual clarification revealed this tenuousness more clearly. Moreover, intellectual activity brought the critical and self-transcendent dynamic of reason into direct contact with all attempts to state the substance of faith and thereby legitimated questioning and inquiry even in this most sacred realm. Such a legitimation made doubt more probable, though such doubt may be justified as leading to a purer faith.[56] Furthermore the development of doctrinal definition contributed to an eventual objectification of the content of faith in propositional form, thus producing a vast cognitive map of "things unseen and hoped for" and of the human condition in relation to them. Such rational objectifications inevitably run the danger of losing resonance with interior religiosity and becoming alienated.[57] The whole structure could become an enormous *impedimenta* for the Christian mind. Thus we see that unlike Jewish religious rationality, which focused upon proper behavior (*orthopraxis*), Christian religious rationality, adopting the Greek mode of thought, focused upon belief (*orthodoxa*). Consequently Jewish religious rationality was basically ethical and legal, while Christian religious rationality became basically ontological, thus further revealing and intensifying the abiding Socratic tension. The Catholic intellectual role

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continued to have a close interrelation with authority and discipline—one often characterized by tension.

In these first centuries the role of the intellectual in the Catholic milieu was established and given a central importance, but this was not done without opposition which witnessed the reality and presence of the Socratic antinomies. There were those who felt with Tertullian that Athens had nothing to do with Jerusalem.[58] Moreover, the church was always basically conservative, adhering to what it regarded as the Apostolic faith. Innovation was ever to be rejected and it was not admitted when it took place. The period from Athanasius' struggle against Arianism (ca. 339-369) to Chalcedon (451) was a great epoch in theology and the product of that epoch became the defined faith. It was the work of a small number and does not seem to have been highly regarded by the majority of bishops. According to Harnack, the creative theologians themselves, "in proportion to their piety, conceived their task to be compulsory, dangerous, and ensnaring them in guilt."[59] Yet the Catholic tradition legitimated definition as a justifiable activity and always continued to recognize it as such.

The legitimacy given the intellectual role testified to the continuation of the tradition of classical education within the Christian community. The church did little to change the rhetorical system of education prevalent at the time, and accepted much from the Platonists and the Stoics. Ancient empiricism, however, was rejected and the science, history, and criticism of antiquity was largely neglected.[60] This was not particularly Christian but was in line with the dominant spirit of the period. Christian education came to rest on two foundations, the older classical literature and the new specifically Christian literature. In the Byzantine East this education continued for centuries and there always remained a class of educated laymen who studied Homer and Plato as well as the fathers. The Cappadocian Fathers, the two Gregories, and Saint Basil (330-379) are the products of this education in the East as is Saint Augustine in the West. It would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of Saint Augustine in the intellectual history of Catholicism. Combining profound intelligence with profound religiosity, he was theologian, philosopher, historian, and psychologist. He was also a bishop, an ecclesiastical functionary, who defended the church and developed significant ideas in ecclesiology.[61] It may truly be said that the medieval theological enterprise rested upon the foundation of Augustine.

The history of the West differed in important ways from that of the East. In the West the church remained the sole carrier of high culture and no lay educated strata survived the Fall. The church assumed the enormous task of providing Western Europe a moral education and in converting the northern peoples to Christianity. It also brought many elements of the culture of Mediterranean antiquity to the Teutonic and Celtic peoples. Lay higher education did not survive, but the church preserved the liberal arts because they provided the basis for ecclesiastical studies, without

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which the church could not have survived.[62] Monasticism became the bearer of Christian education and its foundations the centers for the gradual conversion of the rural areas. The monastic schools developed plans of study like that of Cassiodorus (496-575) in which the Latin classics and the old tradition of learning found a haven.[63] These monasteries also became both the source of tremendous artistic creativity,[64] and of reform of the church. From the ninth century on they gave rise to a series of reforming movements.[65] The Cathedral schools began in the tenth century at Liege and Rheims and in the eleventh century expanded and took over the leadership of education, reflecting the rise of cities and the increasing importance of city life.

The issue of all this was the new institution of the university with its characteristic lectures and disputations and its new practice of conferring degrees.[66] In the university setting three significant developments took place. First was the rise of scholastic philosophy at the University of Paris and the theological enterprise based upon it. Second was the rediscovery and reappropriation of Roman law at the University of Bologna, which became as eminent in legal studies as Paris was in theology.[67] Third was the rise of science. This was a matter both of the accumulation of new facts and the theoretical critique of Aristotle, the latter eventually leading to the overthrow of Aristotelianism and a new conception of the kinds of questions proper to science.[68]

In these developments we see the church, in Paul Tillich's words, as the schoolmistress of Europe, sponsoring both the appropriation of antique culture and the achievement of authentic advances in the development of the European consciousness.[69] Here too we see the antinomies of the Socratic tension. We have already noted them in Saint Bernard's remarks about Abelard. We see them in the banning of the works of Aristotle by popes in 1215 and 1231, although these bans were not effective. We see them in a statement by Saint Bonaventure: "When I was a student, I heard it said that Aristotle posited the world as eternal, and when I heard the reasons and arguments quoted to that effect, my heart began to beat, and I asked myself: how is this possible?"[70] But perhaps the most dramatic expression of the Socratic tension in that period is to be seen in the Omnibus Condemnation of 1277. This was a radical censure by the Bishop of Paris and the Archbishop of Canterbury and later approved by Pope John XXI. One of its chief aims was to condemn the "doctrine of double truth" put forth by Siger of Brabant, Boetius of Sweden, and the Latin Averroists. It also aimed to condemn naturalism, which made reason superior to faith. In that condemnation the church affirmed its commitment to one truth and hence to the universality of reason, while affirming the superiority of faith. The event, however, testifies to the risks involved in intellectual activity and the presence of the Socratic antinomies. In fact after the Omnibus Condemnation the fruitful collaboration between philosophy and theology

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that had made an Aquinas possible came to an end and each discipline went its own separate way.[71]

There are several things to be said about these developments. As the church had dealt with the intricate theological problem of grace and nature by suggesting a complex interaction of the two, so it worked out its solution to the enduring problem of Christ and culture by fostering the growth of a Catholic culture bringing together Christian with classical and Northern European elements.[72] There can be no doubt of the cultural importance of medieval education "as an intellectual discipline that moulded the Western mind and this was clearly recognized in the Middle Ages when *Studium*, or Learning, was ranked alongside of *Imperium* and *Sacerdotum* —Empire and Priesthood—as one of the three great powers that ruled the Christian world." There arose an intellectual elite almost independent of wealth and birth because many were of humble origin. Those who could manage the twelve years needed for a doctorate in divinity at Paris or Oxford, or of Law at Bologna, were able to attain the highest offices in church and state.[73]

The church was the central institution in medieval culture. It was first of all a teaching institution, a *magisterium*, and that fact affected significantly its relationship to the intellectual role. It accepted that role and made it part of its own structure. This meant that it both nurtured it and at the same time exercised a degree of control—of constraint—over it. It imparted to it a degree of ideational and institutional responsibility; it subjected it in ultimate matters—matters of faith—and at times for prudential reasons—reasons of defense most often—to authority. However, the Catholic intellectual was and is a man of "two conversions," and his loyalties to each cannot but intensify the Socratic tension for him. He remains a critic, as we have seen in the role of the monasteries in agitating for reform and in the university scene in the Middle Ages. As a critic he is not so much the collaborator with authority—although at times he may be—as its opponent, or at least he finds himself suspect by it. As theologian to the church—adviser to duly constituted teaching authority—he is likely to find himself a collaborator at one time and a critic at another. The intellectual was important as a conserver and transmitter of tradition and in that function he was in harmony with the conserving function of the church; he was also important as an innovator and as such was seen as dangerous to the church or was believed to be so. The Omnibus Condemnation also condemned a number of Thomist propositions.[74]

The church was not only an authority structure but as a consequence a juridical structure as well, one "which created for itself a specific legal system."[75] The law became an important specialized intellectual role. Here too the intellectual found himself a collaborator with authority. The rise of the state in the Middle Ages gave him another option; he could and often did become the collaborator of emperors and kings who were struggling

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against the church for autonomy and indeed for state control over the church. In this role the intellectual as legist was a strategic element in one of the central societal conflicts of the medieval Catholic community.

Despite the centrality of the church, there arose as a consequence of the church's educational activity a lay culture in which Catholic and native northern elements mixed. Thus there began the lay education that transformed the barbarian feudal warrior into Chaucer's "verray parfit gentil knight." This new lay culture exercised "a civilizing and educative influence on the ruling classes who regarded learning as the business of the clerks." Although it embodied much that was not Christian, its Christian character in so many other respects indicated how "the native tradition of the semi-barbarian West had become modified and transformed in the course of centuries by the influence of Christian culture." The thirteenth century produced a number of eminent lay writers of whom Dante is the greatest.[76] This marks the beginning of a lay literary culture, whose significance would be vastly increased in the Renaissance.

The Middle Ages created an intellectual elite drawn from diverse strata of society, but it kept that elite within the church and employed many of its members as "attached intellectuals."[77] The tutelage state of the laity that began in the early church had been strengthened and confirmed by the exigencies and accidents of the medieval experience. With the further strengthening of the clerical character of the church in the Counter Reformation the lay intellectual role could not easily emerge to full legitimacy in the Catholic milieu.[78] Finally among restrictive elements in the situation of the Catholic intellectual we should note that the continual definition of dogma gradually closes off questions and realms with final answers. It therefore in a sense continually narrows down the area in which theology can really be done.

Secularization: Politics, Humanism, and Science

The late medieval and the early modern periods were extremely complex. What actually happened was that the sacral society of the Middle Ages had created the conditions that made possible and to some extent necessary a secular civilization. The significance of this situation will be grasped if we recall the uncertainty and tenuousness of faith and the consequent necessity of supporting it with a civilizational order of a Christian character. By the fourteenth century the Christian (or really semi-Christian) order that had evolved was changing into a secular one. Yet the older forms with respect both to institutions and ideas remained and were still the structural framework of the civilization. The church was still central in many ways but it was challenged by the state and by new ideas and was itself the arena for the fighting out of conflicts which had both religious and civilizational significance. Beneath the rivalry of church and state—

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ostensibly a struggle over spheres of competence—and beneath the struggles within the church itself, there actually lurked different human ideals, different conceptions of society, and different ideas concerning the value of life in the world. The church stood for the maintenance of the older *respublica christiana*, while the state embodied the thrust of lay upper classes toward secularization. The more conservative in the church did not see how to bring about change, while those who saw the need for reform did not agree either substantively or tactically on what should be done. Cities were important from the high Middle Ages on and cities meant trade. Indeed the medieval city was founded for purposes of trade.[79] The new city middle classes represented a new life experience whose implications would challenge the established interpretations of the Christian faith.

Every society is an acted out answer to the implicit question: what ought man to be doing on this earth being the kind of being that he is? It is an answer acted out under the press of circumstances and conditioned by situational exigencies. It is an answer which elicits some sides of the human potential, neglects others, and indeed represses some others as well. The latent and the repressed always remain possible and therefore a possible threat to the established order. The church was older than the society of Western Europe; it was in a certain sense its progenitor. It brought to the rise of Western European civilization its own formulated beliefs, its own established organization, and its own patterned ritual forms. Thus the society of Western Europe was in a sense two societies in one; it was the sacral society brought from the earlier period and from Mediterranean antiquity and the Western European society arising in the specific historical circumstances of its own time and place. There were two authority structures in Western European society but their respective jurisdictions was a cause of confusion and conflict. New developments within the society, new activities such as commerce, new evaluations such as an increasing this-worldly interest,[80] and a new lay spirit[81] were at the same time developments within the church. Yet while the society was evolving, the church was relatively set and patterned in organization and belief. In its established form it did not elicit and esteem sides of man that were finding expression in the new developing medieval civilization, although it was the sponsor and inspiration of significant cultural values.

One evidence of all this can be seen in the failure of the conciliar movement to achieve reform. While Europe was still Christian, the city of man was slowly declaring its independence and asserting the dignity and worth of this-worldly activities against the marked other-worldly cast and emphasis of the church's preaching. However, on a deeper level the issues here were never clarified. Different visions and different versions of man's calling—different answers to the constitutive question "what ought man to be doing?"—and consequently different ideas concerning order and authority mingled with vested interests and ambitions to pro-

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duce conflict. In this situation the church became increasingly clericalist, while a militant secularism evolved in the world. Curiously enough in both the church and the political society the democratic tendencies of the Middle Ages were largely smothered by absolutist ideas nourished on Roman imperial law, and an authoritarian centralism evolved. But underneath it all that which was neglected or repressed was asserting itself; those who did the work of the world were revolting against the technicians of the spirit. "The various priesthoods of second causes rose against the alienation of their domain into the hands of the priesthood of the First Cause. A superabundance of proofs could be adduced that this is the true, profound meaning of the lay movement—and of the modern world too . . . It would be embarrassing to have to choose among all the statements of leaders in the priesthoods of second causes—statesmen, philosophers, scholars, medical men, philanthropists."[82]

Important intellectual developments reflected and expressed this rebellion. Marsiglio of Padua (1275-1342), rector of the University of Paris, supporter of the emperor against the pope, wrote the *Defensor Pacis* which declared that the state was the basic human institution and community, that it derived its legitimacy from the people, while the church had no inherent jurisdiction either temporal or spiritual, and should be subordinate to the civil authority. William of Ockham (1300-1349), the "invincible doctor," member of the Franciscan Order at that time in conflict with the pope, supported the emperor in his antipapal struggle. Living in a period when old conceptions and old institutions had become ambiguous and when formulated ideas tended to become a verbalism removed from reality, he initiated an acid solvent intellectual critique known as nominalism which further dismantled what had once been common intellectual premises.[83] Francesco Petrarch (1304-1374), declaring himself to be a Christian as Cicero would have been had he known Christ, revived interest in classical literature but at the same time wrote his *De Contemptu Mundi* as a series of dialogues with Saint Augustine concerning this-worldly and other-worldly orientations.[84] Erasmus, associated with Brothers of the Common Life, Christian and humanist, reformer and loyal to the old church, friend of Thomas More and opponent of Luther on free will, advanced scriptural study and made fun of scholastic philosophy and many common pious practices of the time.[85] Of Galileo and science we have already spoken.

The neglected was asserting itself; the repressed was in rebellion in the souls of European men. In that process the normal "healthy disarticulation" characteristic of the relation prevailing between a religion of transcendence and the society in which it exists[86] was being gravely exacerbated by the conflict and confusion inherent in this evolution. The sociologist may distinguish four foci around which human activity becomes patterned and human consciousness becomes structured. The first is rela-

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tional and elicits a many-sided diffuse response involving psychosexual elements and the acting out of archetypal relationships. The second is environmental, to which men respond both as constructive workers and as aesthetic creators. In archaic society the tool is always the implement of both the worker and the artist. The third concerns order and belongingness; it is the realm of authority, community, and power, the political realm in the broader sense. The fourth is religious. It involves man's response to the call of the Beyond. In primitive and archaic societies these foci and the responses they elicit tend to be fused together. In the constitutive symbolism of archaic cultures they are mixed together in compact symbolic expressions. In the history of the West they have become symbolically, conceptually, and institutionally separated.[87]

The victory of Yahwism in Elijah's confrontation of the priests of Baal (I Kings 18:18-46) symbolizes the suppression of the first with respect to manifest religious significance for the Judeo-Christian tradition. The separation of the third and fourth is symbolized with special poignancy in the prophet Jeremiah's opposition to military resistance and with special urgency in the social critique of the prophet Amos. The second—the environmental—long remained the humble domain of *homo faber* and did not really assume dynamic historical significance until the development of modern technology. It did however provide the basis in both ancient and early modern times for a commercial capitalism that played its part in the demythologization of thought and the disenchantment of the world.[88]

What had happened in medieval society was that the fourth of these foci was given central importance. Christian values were otherworldly; the church was the keeper of the public conscience and the tutor of souls and minds. The fact that the church came into the new Europe already formed and that it possessed not only a religious dignity but the remaining luster of classical culture made this outcome inevitable. But such an emphasis involved the neglect of aspirations and values concerned with the other foci; in the concrete circumstances of the time that meant the denigration and disvaluation of this-worldly pursuits. The religious ideal as it evolved could not provide a representative ideal for human potentiality because it rejected too much that was necessary for full human growth.[89] There was a dynamic or historical irony in this situation. The dominant role of the church made the rise of civilization possible, but precisely to the extent that the civilizational development sponsored and nourished by the church advanced, the possibility of the church playing this central role diminished. Moreover, the tenuousness of faith of which we have already spoken exacerbated the problem. The great overarching spiritual and cultural edifice of the church rested on this frail foundation. As a consequence, in the midst of confusion and conflict the position of the church would appear less than self-evidently justified and the appeal of this-worldly callings and ideas would be enhanced. Under the circum-

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stances the church proved unable to grasp and handle the deeper latent structure of its problem. The church tended to stand pat while the forces working for secularization, some degree of which had become necessary, became at first anticlerical and finally anti-Christian.

The first severe break came with the Reformation. That movement represented an attempt to renew religious life by emancipating it from the now rigid and overinstitutionalized ecclesiastical context in which it had become embedded. Yet it was also an attempt to return to the conditions of the earlier now hardly appropriate sacral society.[90] With the Lutherans this led to surrendering the "world" to secular forces and segregating the church as an otherworldly community. The result was a vastly increased secularization. Among the Calvinists there was the effort to build a Christian community with the state and all spheres of life subordinate to the church. Despite the dynamism of the Calvinist movement, neither Geneva nor the English Commonwealth proved viable for the evolving modern world. Regardless of the aspirations of the reformers the unintentional consequences of the Reformation involved a great increase in secularization. The Catholic church was now being thrust to one side in the evolution of Europe; it was being put on the defensive; it would be more and more seen as standing for the past. From progenitor it was being made into an alien. Its position was being changed into a counterposition.

In this process laicization was a diffuse and subtle development. The church had brought from the ancient world and developed further in its own setting a concern with knowledge and thought. It had sponsored education and created an intellectual elite. Although the members of that elite were overwhelmingly clerics, they were susceptible to the laicization process. The clerical monopoly of intellectual life was transformed from within. It was destroyed in form after it had ceased to exist in spirit. The intellectual role was not simply institutionalized in the church but in the general society as well. It was a part of the earthly city now declaring its independence. "From a sociological point of view the decisive fact of modern times, in contrast with the situation during the Middle Ages, is that this monopoly of the ecclesiastical interpretation of the world which was held by the priestly caste is broken, and in the place of a closed and thoroughly organized stratum of intellectuals, a free intelligentsia has arisen."[91] There evolved a new relationship of the intellectuals to authority and to tradition.

The Catholic intellectual is now progressively out of the mainstream. In this transformed situation he faces new problems. His responses are constrained by the counterpositions. His general situation is greatly affected by the fact that intellectual life develops by leaps and bounds outside of and increasingly hostile to Catholic Christianity. For the role of the specifically Catholic intellectual, history was creating an enormous task—the task of working through this complicated and anguish-laden history

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in order to understand it and to undo its disfiguring effects upon the Catholic community. It would be some time before this task would be recognized and the first attempts to formulate its problems would appear to those in authority—now defensive in terms of the counterpositions and the reserved attitude toward science—to be threats to the church and the Catholic tradition itself. Moreover, under the circumstances they would possess aspects quite justifiably interpreted as such. The tendency to separate devotion from the intellect and to see them in some way disarticulated was increased and in turn itself increased the difficulties involved.

The Role of the Catholic Intellectual Today

The lay intelligentsia of the eighteenth century supported the middle classes in their struggle against the church, the monarchy, and tradition, but their own aspirations went far beyond those of their allies. They gradually came to see history as going somewhere and themselves as having a role in achieving man's emancipation and fulfillment. These ideas represented a radical secularization of the biblical conception of history, since man making use of science would be his own savior. These intellectuals believed that they had discovered in "reason," as they conceived of it, "a new and marvellous instrument" with which they felt men could proceed to an increasing control of the conditions of their lives, to the reform of society, and even to their own regeneration.[92] They challenged accepted beliefs, as may be seen in the popularization of the critical study of the Bible done by Richard Simon made by Pierre Bayle in his *Dictionary*, or in the merciless criticism to which the theology and ethics of the church were subjected in the eighteenth century. They tended to see man as throwing off the intellectual shackles with which tradition had fettered him and assuming for the first time a conscious responsibility for his destiny.

What was advocated was, in the words of Saint Simon (1760-1825), that men come to be able "to do consciously, by direct effort and with more fruitful results what they have hitherto been doing, as it were, unintentionally, slowly, indecisively, and with little success."[93] They sought also "to free the elite from the bondage of authority," although like Voltaire they usually considered "the rabble" as "apt for every yoke."[94] They preferred the active life to the contemplative, and industry and work were their most highly prized actions.[95] They believed that man could change his world and could eliminate what the church called the consequences of original sin and Kant called "radical evil." They found themselves in rebellion against biblical religion, what Voltaire called "this infamous superstition," and against tradition and authority. They advocated freedom of scientific inquiry and were in conflict with a church that too often represented "privileged and persecuting orthodoxy."[96] In England this rationalist spirit had been received with sympathy but in France, despite

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its penetration into the clergy, it was persecuted by church and state.

The ideas and aspirations of these men may best be seen in the *Encyclopedia* of Diderot and D'Alembert. Leading French scientists and men of letters supported this project, but it elicited the hatred of the ecclesiastical party for the way it handled religion. The work was "a *summa* of the new learning" and an encomium to science and industry, seen as the twin engines of progress. The section on technology, written by Diderot himself, and illustrated by an excellent set of plates, shows how these intellectuals had become aware of the coming of the age of the machine decades before the actual beginning of the industrial revolution.[97] The work asserts that the welfare of the common people should be the chief concern of government; it sees religious freedom and intellectual freedom as indispensable to progress. The *Encyclopedia* was suppressed by the authorities in 1759, three decades before the storming of the Bastille, yet despite its massive size it continued to circulate.[98] Ideals of progress, the unity of humanity, prosperity, peace, and some kind of popular sovereignty had come to replace older ideas of Europe as Christendom and society as a hierarchy of orders. These ideas were carried over into the nineteenth century. Said Renan, "By every way open to us we begin to proclaim the right of human reason to reform society by means of rational science."[99] Moreover, in the nineteenth century, ideas that had previously been the concern of salon discussion became the property of mass movements. Many of them found a new formulation in liberalism which confronted Catholicism as a rival "religious" belief.[100] They became associated with the rising nationalisms, which also constituted competing religion surrogates possessing great attraction for European men. However, these ideas found their quintessential nineteenth-century formulation in the works of Karl Marx. Marx saw work as man's central activity, accountable for his development and the basis for his eventual achievement of full maturity. Reinterpreting Hegel he saw the industrial working class as the instrument for achieving human emancipation, an end that "can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions."[101] Marx replaced the deism of the Enlightenment with an unexamined atheism and the criticism of religion became central to the Marxist point of view. Like the Enlightenment, however, Marx's primary concerns were practical. "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point however is to *change* it."[102]

Marxism represented a combination of Prometheanism and a secularized and immanentized apocalypticism. The latter had a long genealogy going back to Jewish Messianism. Throughout Christian history one can distinguish two Christian traditions—the tradition of the church with its emphasis upon man's limitations and the tradition of chiliasm with its utopian regenerationist hopes.[103] Since the Joachimite movement of the Middle Ages, there had been intermittent reassertions of such apocalyptic expecta-

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tions of a renewed earth and a regenerated mankind.[104] Voegelin suggests that one reason for the longlivedness of this tradition is to be found in the fact that such movements "overcame the uncertainty of faith by receding from transcendence and endowing man and his intramundane range of action with the meaning of eschatological fulfillment."[105] Behind the aspirations of the eighteenth century there lurked in secularized form important traces of these ideas. Marx systematized this heritage into a secular ideology and made militant atheism a part of it, as he had earlier made the "confession of Prometheus 'In a word, I hate all the gods'" his own in his doctoral dissertation.[106]

Not only was the church alienated from science and scholarship, but the new political movements were against her. To these aspirations of the nineteenth century the church did not simply offer those qualifications demanded by the Catholic faith or dictated by wisdom. She opposed them. They had arisen under circumstances which made anti-Christian orientations appear essential to them. They were preached in militant anti-Christian formulations. Thus was the revolution continued, while the church faced it in the posture of counterrevolution.

The church's idea—"the root idea of Pius IX"—was that "humanity had taken the wrong road," an idea that informed all modern papal social thinking until John XXIII.[107] The church was on the defensive and it was in close alliance with conservative political forces from whom it expected protection. It was distrustful of science, and the new scholarship of the nineteenth century was not understood in Rome. However, the French Revolution had truly demolished the old Europe and not all the efforts of conservative statesmen could alter this situation. For the church the suffering of the revolution had been like a refiner's fire. Beneath all the manifest destruction there had taken place a partial achievement of what the church needed most. The church was partially deinstitutionalized; it was pried loose from the older societal and political contexts that it long assumed to be necessary for its mission and even its survival. This new condition caused increased difficulty at first but slowly and gradually it enabled churchmen to distinguish authentic aspirations from vested interests. As in the period of the Counter Reformation, so now, as the stance of counterrevolution became strategically central for Catholic action, the church developed an intense inner life; it became again a "school of sanctity." This religious authenticity was however generally tragically separated from intellectual life as the church was removed from the significant developments of the age.

As we have already seen, this situation was not propitious for the development of intellectual life in the Catholic milieu. Yet, there did take place a series of attempts to initiate a revision of the church's stance. And finally, these efforts came to fruition in the Second Vatican Council, thereby initiating an altogether transformed situation within the church.

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As we have seen throughout this study, the situation of intellectual life in the church always stands in close relation to the situation of the church in the world. In the half-century since the Modernist crisis of 1907, the position of the church improved and the prestige of the papacy rose. This changed situation was important for the liberal issue of Vatican II. The effort to rethink the church's stance began again and, although chided in *Humani Generis* (1950), continued. Moreover, Catholic biblical studies revived and in 1943 were given a new freedom of operation by the encyclical *Divino afflante Spiritu* of Pope Pius XII. The effort to rethink the relationship of Catholicism and modernity added two new functions to the role of the Catholic intellectual. We may designate them as the *resourcement* function and the "mediating" function. The first is based upon the insight that the required rethinking of the past must be done in close relation to the sources of the Christian faith and the Catholic tradition—the Bible, the fathers, and the documents of the liturgy.[108] The second is based upon the equally important insight that the past must be worked through intellectually. It must be brought to a different issue so that its authentic latent meaning and its genuine contributions can be assimilated.[109]

Moreover, the history of the modern period is not simply the record of intellectual expansion and material growth. Science and technology may or may not have fulfilled the dream of Descartes of making men the "lords and possessors of nature," but they have been gravely misused by unregenerate man in war and in mass murder. As a matter of fact, modern philosophy did not reflect that scientific confidence. The contrast between scientists and their optimism and the secular humanists and their pessimism has been a striking characteristic of the recent period.[110] Science has "been credited with a demonstrable, ever-quickening increase in human knowledge and power . . . Yet the same phenomenon is blamed with equal right for the hardly less demonstrable increase in human despair."[111] Against this specifically modern nihilism[112] the church maintained its own conviction of man's rootedness in being, his capacity for reason, and his call to a relationship with God. The defense of this more balanced traditional position against a scientistic overconfidence on the one hand and modern nihilism on the other was carried out in the constrained condition of the counterpositions which made it impossible for Catholic thinkers to do justice to their position. It follows that the function of the Catholic intellectual in the new situation involves both enabling the church to assimilate the authentic contribution of modernity and enabling a civilization in crisis to assimilate the genuine wisdom of the Catholic tradition.

One consequence of the defensive stance of modern Catholicism and its alienation from intellectual life was that it tended to become unaware of history in a deeper sense. It came to confuse the vertical dimension of its religious experience of transcendence with a spurious sense of being somehow not really embedded in history. The modern sense of history was

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thus long lost to Catholic thinking. But today, again, Catholic thinkers are making the sense of history and its implications their own. They are recognizing "the need for the finite, historical inquirer to conduct a critique of his own possibilities of meaning and those of other cultures and epochs."[113]

The relative deinstitutionalization of the church, the intensity of its religious life, and the improved status it had come to occupy in recent decades prepared for a second phase of relative deinstitutionalization. It began with the accession of Pope John XXIII; it involved nothing less than the dismantling of the counterpositions. That process started with the encyclical *Mater et Magistra* (1961). Modern papal social teaching, which came on the scene late in the day, was concerned with social justice in an industrial society, but its view was static and basically conservative. It tended to see the class structure of Europe as Leo XIII (1878-1903) saw it—as ordained by God. *Mater et Magistra* expanded Leo's idea of a human right to livelihood and extended its applications so far beyond what any pope had said before that it seemed to many to be socialistic and revolutionary.[114] The encyclical accepts the modern state as an agent of social change in the service of human betterment. Vatican II, having not yet embarked upon its own project that issued in *Gaudium et Spes*, ignored this letter and John issued another, the *Pacem et Terris* (1963). This letter covered much of the same ground, except that where the first had stressed social and economic matters, this one gave centrality to politics and international relations.

Pacem et Terris made three points strategic to undoing the counterpositions. It declared that it no longer makes sense to use war in the nuclear age to restore rights and to repair violations of justice.[115] It reasserted the rights of conscience and stressed the right of the individual to practice his religion privately and publicly.[116] It approved the collaboration of Catholics with unbelievers "in the pursuit of objectives that are of their nature good." It repeated and stressed the distinction between "error and the person that errs" and confirmed the inviolable rights of the latter despite error. Moreover, it declared that movements originally anti-Christian in ideology may prove to be "readily susceptible to change" and declared that it was permissible for Catholics to discuss questions with their members and even to some extent to collaborate with them.[117] Such statements go a long way toward abandoning the stance of counterrevolution. They create an open situation in the realm of political thought and action.

The great event of the second phase of the church's relative deinstitutionalization was, of course, Vatican II. There the crisis of the modern world was recognized, but it was characterized as a "crisis of growth" and as part of a broader and deeper revolution in which the "scientific spirit exerts a new kind of impact" to bring to men improved self-knowledge and great technological capacities. The Council recognized that the times raised the fundamental question of the meaning of life. Dynamic and continual

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change was seen to be a fact of the human condition in the present age and the passing away of established forms was seen as inevitable. *Gaudium et Spes,* the document that reflects most adequately the thrust of the Council, declared, "Persons and societies thirst for a full and free life worthy of man—one in which they can subject to their own welfare all that the modern world can offer them so abundantly."[118]

This new situation in the church means that while not losing sight of the special nature of its own pilgrimage and the unique character of its own proclamation the church has become involved in the common venture of modern man. It has joined that venture not to lead it but to serve men. The church is freeing itself from the procrustean bed of the counterpositions; it is discovering how to act rather than react. It recognizes freedom for scientific and scholarly inquiry and it seeks to help in utilizing technology to produce a more peaceful and more prosperous world. For the Catholic intellectual this means that he confronts the non-Catholic world of learning and science with a new openness of mind and freedom of action. He confronts the contemporary world with the conviction that the ideals of the *Encyclopedia* and those of Christianity need no longer stand in opposition, but rather exist in a state of creative tension. Cardinal Newman once said, "Great minds need elbow room, not indeed in the domain of faith, but of thought. And so indeed do lesser minds, and all minds."[119] The elbow room now exists. Indeed one can now say that theology is being done once again and not merely talked about as already done.[120]

The Catholic intellectual in his new freedom faces profound challenges from every side. Religious meaning and its statement, the relation of propositional to existential truth, the problems that are discussed under the rubrics of "demythologization" and of "dehellenization,"[121] history and the social sciences, biblical studies—all these and a host of immediately and remotely related questions are on the intellectual order of the day. Moreover, the role of the Catholic intellectual is undergoing a significant change on the organizational level. There is far less self-segregation; ecumenical dialogue is a reality and is being embodied in institutional forms. With respect to intellectual activities the distinction between clergy and laity is losing its former significance.

Yet as might be expected, the relative breakdown of precedent which these changes entail not only provides a vast expansion of opportunity and a new freedom, but by that very token introduces new problems inherent in a loss of established structures. Perplexity, confusion, and conflict are the consequence. This molting process will not be easy nor will it be accomplished soon. The fact is that the church is undergoing the greatest crisis of its ruling and teaching authority since the sixteenth century.[122] As the earlier defensive position involved a truncation or disfigurement of Catholic intellectual life, so now the new and unaccustomed liberty proves to be a heady wine. It elicits from no small number of Catholics a tendency toward

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an epistemological giddiness that finds expression in fads and novelties. The ultraconservatism of so much in the past is now counterbalanced by a kind of anarchy. Maritain has charged that the ultraconservatism of the past "has been spreading among us during the nineteenth century and the first decade of our own. Now, with a crash, the pendulum is swinging to the opposite extreme," to a "childish anarchy in the opposite direction."[123]

It has been said that if the church thoroughly assimilates the Johannine encyclicals, "she will, in effect, be abandoning her attitude of suspicion towards the claims of the liberal and socialist state and entering into a partnership with it in promoting a new phase in the life of society,"[124] lines presumably written with the West and the third world in mind but not unmindful of possible change within the Communist camp itself. We can say of the intellectual developments we have described that if the church succeeds in thoroughly assimilating them, she will place herself in a cooperative and creative relationship with all who share the contemporary experience. The church will bring her religious message, her tradition, and her wisdom into contact with all the authentic achievements of modernity. She will thereby be enabled to work together with the secular world for the solution of the tremendous problems of our age, problems upon whose solution the survival of humanity depends, while remaining herself a "sacrament or sign of intimate union with God and of the unity of all mankind."[125] In the realm of politics it has been said that the church has abandoned the "idea that she must resist those governing powers which she can no longer control."[126] In the realm of scholarship and science the church also is abandoning the idea of control and constraint; it is learning to live with the Socratic tension.

The position of the intellectual in the Catholic church has been completely altered. The present situation is an open-ended one; it is one of uncertain issue. Who can say where all this will end? Has the church started upon a course of deinstitutionalization that will lead to a new, more flexible, more adaptable, more creative, and more vital Catholicism? Is this deinstitutionalization the prelude to a new more appropriate institutionalization? Or has Catholicism entered upon a process of "self-liquidation"?[127] The present disarray in Catholic ranks shows signs pointing in both directions. In the midst of this risk and uncertainty, we see the tenuousness of faith exposed without the support of a traditional civilizational context. How will the Catholic intellectuals meet these new challenges? Will they prove themselves both creative and responsible? The answer to that question only they can give. Should they prove up to it they will be able in the words of Pope Paul VI to make their contribution to the creation of a "new humanism which will enable modern man to find himself anew by embracing the higher values of love and friendship, of prayer and contemplation."[128]

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53. The King James Bible stated Hebrews 11:1 in this way: "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen." The Revised Standard Version says: "Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen." Compare Romans 8:24-25: "hope that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees? But if we hope for what we do not see we wait for it with patience."

54. Saint Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica,* II, II, Question IV, article 1, quoted from *The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas,* ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945), II, 1096; Question IV, article 2, pp. 1097-1098; Question IV, article 8, p. 1107.

55. Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 122.

56. See the interesting treatment of the closeness of faith and doubt in Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1957).

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57. See Thomas F. O'Dea, *Sociology and the Study of Religion: Theory, Research, Interpretation* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 240ff.

58. Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation* (New York: Scribner's, 1938).

59. Adolph Harnack, *History of Dogma*, trans. Neil Buchanan (New York: Dover Publications, 1961), III, 146.

60. Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, trans. Olive Wyon (London: Allen and Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1931), I, 142-143.

61. See Whitney J. Oates, *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*, 2 vols. (New York: Random House, 1948).

62. Christopher Dawson, *The Crisis of Western Education* (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, Doubleday, 1965), p. 13.

63. Christopher Dawson, *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, Doubleday, 1958), p. 45.

64. It is interesting to note that Saint Bernard not only opposed the rationalism of Abelard but the aesthetic splendor of Cluny as well, which he saw from a highly puritanical perspective. "There appears on all sides so rich and amazing a variety of forms that it is more delightful to read the marble than the manuscripts and to spend the whole day in admiring these things, piece by piece, rather than in meditating on the Divine Law." Quoted from Kenneth Clarke, *Civilisation: A Personal View* (London: British Broadcasting Company and John Murray, 1971), p. 40.

65. Frederich Heer, *The Medieval World* (New York: New American Library, Mentor, 1963), p. 63.

66. Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 246ff.

67. Taylor, *The Medieval Mind*, II, 260ff.

68. See especially A. C. Crombie, *Medieval and Early Modern Science* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1959), II, chap. 1; and Butterfield, *Origins of Modern Science*, chap. 1.

69. There were significant outside influences upon these developments, especially from the Muslim world. Indeed J. Ribera Y Tarrago, a Spanish scholar, has maintained that much in the medieval university was influenced by the educational system of the Arabs. See Heer, *The Medieval World*, p. 235.

70. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, p. 402.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 405ff. The Omnibus Condemnation did not simply condemn Averroist propositions. At least twenty of those condemned were Thomist. Some of the condemned statements were of unknown and possibly oral origin and have a shockingly modern ring about them. For example, *quod lex christiana impedit addiscere* (The Christian religion is a hindrance to education), *quod fabulae et falsa in lege christiana, sicut in aliis* (There are myths and falsehoods in Christianity as in all religions), and *quod sermones theologi fundati sunt in fabulis* (What the theologians talk about is based upon myths).

72. See H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1956), esp. chap. 1, pp. 1-44.

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73. Dawson, *The Crisis of Western Education*, pp. 19-20.

74. See note 64 above.

75. Troeltsch, *Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, I, 96.

76. Dawson, *Crisis of Western Education*, pp. 22-23. Among these were Conon of Bethune, Thibaut of Champagne, John of Joinville, Geoffrey de Villhardouin, Wolfrom von Eschenbach, Snorri Sturlason, and Walter von der Wogelweide.

77. On attached and unattached intellectuals see Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure: Toward the Codification of Theory and Research* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), pp. 161ff. It is interesting that university faculty are considered "unattached." See note 7 on page 385.

78. This situation is changing rapidly at the present time. See the final section of this essay.

79. Max Weber, *The City* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); Lewis Mumford, *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1961); and Henri Pirenne, *Medieval Cities* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1965).

80. See Amintore Fanfani, *Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1935); and R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: Penguin Books, 1947).

81. See especially Pirenne, *Medieval Cities.*

82. Yves M. J. Congar, O.P., *Lay People in the Church*, trans. Donald Attwater (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1957), pp. 33, 19.

83. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, pp. 524ff, 489ff.

84. E. H. Wilkins, *The Life of Petrarch* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

85. Johan Huizinga, *Erasmus and the Age of the Reformation* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1957).

86. See the discussion of the "healthy unadjustment" characteristic of the relation between religions of transcendence and the "world," in O'Dea, *Sociology and the Study of Religion*, pp. 55ff.

87. See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London and New York: Longman's and Philosophical Library, 1957), chap. VI on the Biological, Aesthetic, Intellectual and Dramatic Patterns of Experience, pp. 181-190; Christopher Dawson, *Progress and Religion* (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, Doubleday, 1960), Part II, chaps. V and VI; Eric Voegelin, *Israel and Revelation* and *The World of the Polis*, vols. I and II of *Order and History* (Baton Rouge, La.: University of Louisiana Press, 1956 and 1957); Talcott Parsons, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution," *American Sociological Review* (June 1964).

88. See, for example, Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.*

89. "Great as the achievements of axial religion were, lasting as their influence remains, they rested in some degree on illusion. The type of personality they sought to impress on mankind as a whole is not, in fact, a universal one. In its over-

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emphasis of the 'cerebral' and spiritual, the axial personality is a valuable corrective to the extraversion and shallowness of more common types: but it is not, in its isolated perfection, a sufficiently representative ideal of human potentiality, for it rejects too much that is needed for full human growth." Lewis Mumford, *The Transformations of Man* (New York: Harper and Row, 1956). Who can doubt the reality of the problem propounded here? Who also can doubt the deliterious effects of overinstitutionalization on the whole problem as it existed in European history. See O'Dea, *Sociology and the Study of Religion,* pp. 240-270.

90. Ernst Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), pp. 85ff.

91. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949), p. 10.

92. Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason,* pp. 235ff.

93. As quoted in Thomas Molnar, *The Decline of the Intellectual* (Cleveland and New York: Meridian, World Publishing Company, 1961), p. 48.

94. Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason,* p. 241.

95. See Arendt, *The Human Condition,* pp. 225ff.

96. Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason,* pp. 241, 240.

97. Dawson, *The Crisis of Western Education,* p. 48.

98. Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason,* p. 246.

99. Molnar, *Decline of the Intellectual,* p. 57.

100. Croce, *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century,* pp. 20ff.

101. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto,* quoted from Emile Burns, ed., *Handbook of Marxism* (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 59.

102. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," quoted from Burns, ed., *Handbook of Marxism,* p. 231.

103. Walter H. Capps, ed., *The Future of Hope* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), pp. 32ff.

104. See Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1961).

105. Voegelin, *New Science of Politics,* p. 129.

106. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *On Religion* (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 15.

107. E. E. Y. Hales, *Pope John and His Revolution?* (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, Doubleday, 1965), p. 50.

108. Roger Aubert, "The Catholic Church," in Guy S. Metraux and François Crouzet, eds., *Religion and the Promise of the Twentieth Century* (New York: New American Library, 1965), pp. 66-67.

109. There are many important names associated with this effort—Lamennais, Lacordaire, Montalembert, Mohler, Dollinger, D'Hulst, Acton, Murri, Sturzo, Sagnier, Loisy, Tyrrel, Blondel, and so forth.

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110. See, for example, C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962).

111. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 237.

112. Paul Tillich, *The Courage To Be* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 46ff, 139ff.

113. Davis Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 193.

114. Hales, *Pope John*, p. 56. Hales points out how John extended the idea "human right, of what is necessary to the development of human personality" that he got from Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and extended it so far "that not only Leo, but Pius XI or Pius XII would have been astonished by the claims he was making." Hales, *Pope John*, p. 57.

115. John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris*, paragraph 127.

116. *Ibid.*, paragraph 14, National Catholic Welfare Conference edition quoted. See also the Vatican II documents which carry forward these policies. First of all is the *Gaudium et Spes* which gives a major restructuring of the position of the church in the modern world. Like the encyclicals of John it is optimistic and confident and expresses openness. The church becomes once again positively related to the venture of modern man. See also the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church which defines the church as a "pilgrim people," a definition more in accord with the changed conception of the church's relation to the world. Also there are the "Declaration on Religious Freedom," and the "Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions," which set forth new positions. See Abbott and Gallagher, *Documents of Vatican II*, pp. 199ff, 14ff, 675ff, 660ff.

117. John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris*, paragraphs 157, 158, 60.

118. "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," articles 4, 5, 10, 6, 7, 9.

119. John Henry Cardinal Newman, *The Idea of a University* (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, Doubleday, 1962), p. 429.

120. See the excellent summary of Catholic theology in its contemporary situation by Daniel J. O'Hanlon, "Concluding Reflections," in Donald J. Wolf, S.J., and James V. Schall, S.J., eds., *Current Trends in Theology* (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, Doubleday, 1966), pp. 259-265.

121. On this topic see Leslie Dewart, *The Future of Belief: On Theism in a World Come of Age* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966); also Leslie Dewart, "God and the Supernatural," Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "The Dehellenization of Dogma," and Justus George Lawler, "The Future of Belief Debate," in Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman, *New Theology*, no. 5 (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 142-190.

122. John L. McKenzie, S.J., "Authority Crisis in Roman Catholicism," in Clyde L. Manschreck, ed., *Erosion of Authority* (Nashville and New York: Abingdon Press, 1971), pp. 37-58.

123. Jacques Maritain, *The Peasant of the Garonne* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 162.

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124. Hales, *Pope John,* p. 61.

125. *De Ecclesia,* article 1. See Thomas F. O'Dea, "The Church as *Sacramentum Mundi,*" in *Concilium,* vol. 8, no. 6 (October 1970).

126. Hales, *Pope John,* p. 61.

127. For an interesting discussion of the self-defeating elements in many Christian attempts to come to terms with secularization and the profoundly upsetting character of secularization and pluralism for the churches on a deeper level, see Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), part II.

128. Pope Paul VI, *Populorum Progressio (On the Development of Peoples),* United States Catholic Conference edition (Washington, D.C., 1967), paragraph 20.

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